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ABSTRACT
ELEMENTAL CHALLENGES:
ENVIRONMENTAL TROUBLES BEYOND THE LIMITS OF DEMOCRACY
SEPTEMBER 2010
BRADLEY T. MAPES-MARTINS, B.A., THE EVERGREEN STATE COLLEGE
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Nicholas Xenos

From an examination of how environmental issues reshape politics, this inquiry
focuses on the theoretical grounds of deliberative democratic theory to ask whether such
a vision offers the best means of resolving environmental problems. Arguing that the very
terms in which environmental politics have been defined retain features better suited to
previous historical circumstances, the analysis proceeds from features typical of
environmental problems to a more context-specific assessment of the role for democratic
participation. Engaging the works of Jürgen Habermas, the author details the way in
which deliberative democratic theory is indebted to a concept of communicative action
that defines complex environmental issues as beyond the scope for successful resolution.
Covering theoretical as well as empirical aspects of environmental deliberation, this
inquiry includes a comparative framework for evaluating the performance of differing
deliberative institutions according to the type of environmental problem addressed.
Following this critical assessment of deliberative democratic theory, the analysis turns to
the effects of authoritative expertise on democratic involvement in environmental issues.
Given that authoritative expertise cannot be dispensed with despite the asymmetry it
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introduces into the relationship between experts and lay citizens, it is asserted that the
conditions for justifiable deference should be encouraged by cultivating institutions that
promote trust between experts and lay citizens. The analysis proceeds to link the way in
which decentralized institutions decrease the risks inherent in trust with an assessment of
the precautionary principle as a standard against which regulatory decisions can be
evaluated. The inquiry concludes by turning to proposals for global democratic
governance, arguing that the fragmented landscape of international environmental law
offers increased opportunities for resolving environmental disputes due to the
proliferation of coordinated but decentralized institutions and codification of the
precautionary principle.
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INTRODUCTION

The impetus for this project comes, it goes almost without saying, from personal
convictions about the beauty of the many places I have been privileged to reside in.
However, a more complicated dynamic operative in political science with its, at times,
stifling 'normative/empirical divide' shaped my line of inquiry. From my vantage point as
a self-professed environmentalist with all the ambiguities that entails, the work I
encountered on the theoretical side of that divide often discounted empirical evidence as
merely constructed, as if being the outcome of situated and imperfect judgment made all
knowledge claims commensurable. Not that this recommends 'empirical' accounts of
environmental politics either. In this case, the treatment of environmental politics as
strictly technical problem solving elides significant questions about the relationship
between power and authority that are too messy for metrics. Moreover, many 'empirical'
accounts remained silent about normative issues from what I can only presume is an
unwillingness to appear partial, as though political scientists are capable upholding
standards of objectivity and reproducibility that apply to controlled experiments.
The dilemma I felt I faced in articulating a committed but measured account of
the landscape of environmental politics was led, however, in unexpected directions by the
near unanimity of support for democracy I encountered. Coming to this project with an
admiration for the works of Sheldon Wolin made me want to accept what appeared to be
a strong foundation and push ahead, opting for theoretical refinement of the existing
'literature.' Wolin's work, however, had also attuned me to ambivalences in democracy
that ceased, or so it appeared, to surface in the transplanting of democratic theory into
1

environmental political theory. The tensions present in Wolin's work that I found so
fruitful result from his engagement with a tradition of political theory for which
democracy was not an immediate solution but a problem as well. This interplay was lost
in the ready acceptance of democracy in recent environmental political theory. As I
discuss in greater detail in the first chapter, this appears to be a reaction to the baldly
authoritarian visions emerging in the 1970s, themselves responding to perceived failures
of the 1960s environmental movement as well as evidence of environmental damage in
the postwar years.
I chose, then, to approach a broad evaluation of environmental politics by first
suspending the democratic presumption. Doing so makes immediately evident that
politics does not end at democracy and even on a day-to-day basis within 'actually
existing democracy' much politics is not democratic. Were environmental politics simply
awaiting the blockage of democratic potential to be unleashed from its constitutional
fetters? Surely when environmentally benign values, much less the stronger values
posited by deep ecologists, had been propounded they did not meet an unequivocal
embrace by the public. As far as I could tell, decrying environmental destruction when
popular support runs in the opposite direction risks being forced to prioritize
environmental over democratic attachments. In the end, my suspension of the democratic
presumption is warranted as an exploration of a politics that is not already democratic.
This comes with the risk of being read as rejecting democratic politics altogether. My
point of departure does not, however, automatically trigger an authoritarian response
either. Insofar as I take my bearings from the Frankfurt School of critical theory, I seek to
understand the limits of democracy, which means admitting to limits.

2

To pursue this line of inquiry I needed to open up a conceptual space in the nearly
complete convergence of critical theory and the philosophy of Jürgen Habermas. The
inheritance of critical theory is heavily monopolized by Habermas, especially in his turn
to a communicative rationality as a supposed corrective to the critique of ideology and its
reliance upon a philosophy of consciousness. Even critical theorists looking to distance
their ideas from Habermas such as John Dryzek struggle to escape his orbit as they adopt
foundational components of his conceptual apparatus. Concepts such as the public sphere
and communicative rationality shaped the landscape of academic political theory in the
United States following the decline of Marxism as a viable vocabulary in the 1980s as
well as the climax and subsequent receding of post-isms in the 1990s. As I discuss in
greater detail in Chapter 2, there is a great deal at stake in following Habermas's lead
when attempting to think through environmental politics. In the era during which
Habermas would become the last surviving representative of the Frankfurt School his
work began to diverge more and more from his predecessors, reflecting instead his
embrace of Kant-inspired liberalism. The result was that Habermas grafted a search for
universal norms of the sort pursued by John Rawls in his A Theory of Justice onto prior
analysis of 'system and lifeworld' in Theory of Communicative Action. Habermas
managed to resolve these strains by assigning each a place within either a discourse of
justification or a discourse of application, in essence reinscribing the 'normativeempirical' divide that had taken root in American political science. Habermas backed
away from the aspects of critical theory that I find most compelling: the willingness to
reflect dialectically on momentous political events with an express disregard for the
distinction between 'facts' and 'norms.' Critical theory can be at once richly detailed in its
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descriptions of political circumstances (recall Franz Nuemann's Behemoth: The Structure
and Practice of National Socialism, 1933-1944) as well as engaged in the most mundane
measurements of social science (recall Theodor Adorno's F-scale in The Authoritarian
Personality).
The fundamental premise from which I begin − that changes to the environment
over the last century generated an irreducibly political dimension to many human
activities that was previously unproblematic − complicates the way in which I draw upon
critical theory. Where others working in environmental political theory seek to articulate
an 'ecological rationality' to serve as a corrective to instrumental rationality, I see
instrumental rationality as valuable for diagnosing and remedying environmental
problems.1 Instead of rejection I opt for selective deployment, which entails a prudential
analysis. Thus, where Habermas's distinction between justification and application
involves deriving principles for the sake of adjudicating particular cases, my approach
entails acknowledging that political engagement in which one takes a position in a finite
and concrete set of circumstances involves entering into definite calculations about the
world as it is and as it could be, neither of which can avoid empirical assertions. In
environmental politics, though, these empirical assertions define the targets of one's
substantive commitments and render retreat into procedural politics impossible.
Environmental political theories pose the dilemma of having at their core unverifiable
empirical evaluations or predictions to which one must commit. And it is for this reason
that, without turning to a metaphysical argument for preserving the environment,
scientific research offers the best basis for judgment in the face of competing and
contradictory claims.
1

See Baber and Bartlett, 2005; Brulle, 2000; Dryzek, 1987.
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This dilemma is prominently on display in discussions of global democratic
institutions driven by claims that such alterations are necessary to prevent catastrophic
environmental problems such as global warming. In the case of global warming, a few
computer models are used to test 'predictions' about past climatic patterns against actual
occurrences. This retrocasting serves as proxy verification for identifying the relevant
variables in climate models that then forecast likely changes given different levels of
greenhouse gas emissions. The judgments that greenhouse gases are accumulating in the
stratosphere, are significantly influenced by intentional human activities, and impact
temperatures in the lithosphere and biosphere are all based upon reasonable inferences.
But the certainty manifest in expressing a need to alter current patterns of energy use to
avoid harmful consequences erases all traces of uncertainty built into judgment. And yet,
to limit environmental politics strictly to already occurring harm is to define politics as a
domain of unrevisable and irrevocable judgment.
I take up the task of circumscribing environmental politics in Chapter 1 where I
begin from the political implications of recurring features of environmental problems. To
achieve the conceptual space needed to view environmental politics in the ways I have
just described, I treat similarities between the concept of legitimacy as it emerges out of
theories of a state of nature and environmental critiques of the present. The objective is to
establish the groundwork for situated, context-dependent analysis of the intersection
between environmental and democratic politics, which I do by articulating the temporal
dimensions that divide legitimacy and authority as well as justification and vindication.
The second chapter tackles directly the theoretical account of communicative
action developed by Habermas that has steered much of the work on environmental
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politics towards deliberative democracy. Beginning with Habermas's diagnosis of
modernity, I demonstrate that his theory rests upon a depiction of the lifeworld as deeply
fragile. This is accompanied by a promise that communication is the most likely means of
repairing lifeworlds that Habermas cannot fulfill on his own terms. I proceed to
reconstruct Habermas's rationalist theory of motivation, which is reliant upon coercive
state functions for social integration but necessarily disavows this dependency. It is the
combination of fragility, unfulfillable commensurability, and disavowed coercion that
leads me to conclude that typical environmental problems are beyond the capacity of
deliberative democracy to resolve. In doing so, I set the stage for expressly
acknowledging the role played by state institutions in identifying, monitoring and
resolving environmental problems. In the end, I conclude that without widespread
agreement already in place, deliberative democracy is likely to legitimize an
environmentally destructive status quo.
Following upon my theoretical analysis of Habermasian deliberation, I turn in
Chapter 3 to the task of evaluating the performance of deliberative democratic institutions
in response to various types of environmental problems. After recapitulating the lines
dividing 'empiricists' and 'theorists' in the study of deliberative democracy, I devise a
framework for ensuring that cases of deliberation over environmental issues are
comparable. This involves translating assumptions about deliberation into the spatial and
temporal terms of environmental problems detailed in Chapter 1. The resulting
framework ensures that deliberative institutions are evaluated in relation to specific sets
of problems. This is consistent with the premise that environmental problems pose unique
difficulties discussed in Chapter 1. While methodological precautions limit the
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availability of cases, in turn preventing me from drawing robust conclusions, I use the
limited number of cases to generate hypotheses that will become testable as the number
of cases increase.
Having therefore cleared the conceptual space needed for a more context-specific
analysis of environmental problems, I turn in Chapter 4 to the pressure exerted on
democratic politics by the role of authoritative expertise in identifying and monitoring
environmental issues. Focusing on the routinized context of environmental regulatory
agencies, I analyze the way in which scientific research is both necessary to the
assessment of environmental problems while operating in ways different from the sorts of
knowledge claims introduced into deliberative democratic institutions. This asymmetry, I
argue, arises from the different standards imposed upon conclusions designed to be
verifiable and reproducible and those claims which are unable to be challenged on such
grounds. The path that I recommend focuses on building and sustaining trust between
authoritative experts and citizens as a prerequisite for justifiable deference. Here,
deliberative democracy is not rejected outright, but accepted on instrumental grounds as
offering a potential avenue for rebuilding trust and enabling deference. This argument is
combined with the analysis offered in Chapter 1 on the role of vindication in authority,
which leads me to conclude that in order to minimize the risks inherent in trust
environmental regulatory institutions should avoid centralization. With this in mind, I go
on to discuss how a precautionary principle must be institutionalized as a guide for
administrative decisions to ensure a clear baseline against which to judge authoritative
expertise while unifying the operations of environmental agencies.

7

In the final chapter I expand upon the two recommendations I arrive at in Chapter
4, institutional decentralization and a fundamental role for the precautionary principle,
turning to an analysis of international environmental politics. As environmental politics
has come to be defined in terms of contemporary debates in democratic theory,
arguments about the democratic potential of global governance have turned to
environmental issues for examples. By tracing the lines of this debate, I expose the way
in which articulations of transnational or global democracy presumes state capacities to
resolve environmental problems. In the work of David Held, where such capacities are
expressly avowed, the vision he offers is of a centralized global state. This overly
centralized version, I argue, results from an inability to see the opportunities for
environmental politics available in the fragmented landscape of international
environmental law. Instead of pinning the prospects of environmental politics to the
transcendence of a state-centered international order via a global public sphere, I look to
the reasons for engaging at the level of nation-states. The goal, then, is to improve the
environmental performance of states so as to render the need to transcend them moot.

8

CHAPTER I
VINDICATING A POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
Modern democratic society seems to me, in fact, like a society in which power,
law and knowledge are exposed to a radical indetermination, a society that has
become the theatre of an uncontrollable adventure, so that what is instituted never
becomes established, the known remains undermined by the unknown, the present
proves to be undefinable, covering many different social times which are
staggered in relation to one another within simultaneity - or definable only in
terms of some fictitious future; an adventure such that the quest for identity
cannot be separated from the experience of division. This society is historical
society par excellence.1

In December 1997, the New York Times framed its coverage of the Convention
on Climate Change in Kyoto, Japan, around Vice President Al Gore's attempts to not
offend any constituents that could play an important role in his presidential campaign in
2000. During this same period, environmental issues took hold as a topic of political
inquiry. Amongst political theorists, the dire predictions of the 1970s have given way to
an endless optimism that calls for expanding democratic opportunities while working to
apply the insights of ostensibly more sophisticated democratic principles analyzed by
John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. In the past few years, this has taken on a more definite
shape as authors such as John Dryzek seek to approach environmental problems through
deliberative democratic theory. Following in the footsteps of Dryzek (2000), others such
as Baber and Bartlett (2005), Smith (2003), Holden (2002), and Vanderheiden (2008)
have taken up the mantle of deliberation, arguing that the benefits accruing from the
reasoned exchange of perspectives and arguments are sufficient for dealing with the
specific problems under study.

1

Lefort, 1986: 305.
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I suspend the assumption that democratic approaches are sufficient, thus rejecting
arguments from democracy, as opposed to arguments to democracy. That is to say, I am
open to acknowledging the importance of democratic participation but only once a case
for expecting democracy to successfully resolve environmental problems is made and
examples cited demonstrating those claims, not on the basis of a deontological
idealization.
Given that the purpose of this inquiry as a whole is to determine what, if any, are
the limitations to be expected when approaching environmental problems democratically,
specifically deliberative democracy given its relative acceptance, it is necessary to avoid
affirming or rejecting democratic participation at the start. This chapter, then, deals with
three interrelated issues. First, in order to establish the parameters of my inquiry as well
as the political implications that must be theoretically addressed I begin by outlining the
relevant features of environmental problems. This set of features should be understood as
tentative since it is neither intended to be exhaustive of existing environmental problems
nor to have permanently established the grounds for any future environmental analysis.
Instead, I hope to provide a conceptual space from which to begin an argument, threaded
into the whole of my project, that moves from a political conception of the environment
to maximal participation.
The second task of this chapter is to argue for the rejection of legitimacy as the
relevant framework within which to analyze environmental politics. I begin by looking at
how the concept of legitimacy as the provision of independent normative grounds
emerged out of Immanuel Kant's merging of two philosophical devices in his attempt to
understand the political circumstances of the French Revolution. Claiming that the terms
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of legitimacy are poorly suited to the features of modern environmental politics, I follow
this by looking at how the very notion of an environmental problem was formulated in
the 1960s and 1970s in terms that were wholly inadequate to the task and which simply
inverted the basic framework underlying the notion of legitimacy.
The final task to be dealt with in this chapter is to establish the theoretical grounds
for what follows. This means offering a framework for prudential political analysis that
addresses the limitations pointed out in the previous section. Thus, the third section of the
chapter provides a skeletal theory that is developed throughout the text. Following a
critical ground clearing in Chapters 2 and 3 that focuses on understanding the theoretical
and practical limitations of deliberative democracy, Chapters 4 and 5 undertake a
reconstructive effort to combine empirical insights with a more nuanced, even if limited,
role for democratic participation. However, where limitations to democratic participation
are discerned, I will also look at how to reconcile non-democratic political arrangements
with the necessity of environmental politics. That is, I aim to recognize the
interpenetration of democratic and non-democratic politics that shape the resources
available for resolving environmental problems on different scales.

A. Political Implications of Environmental Problems
Approaching political inquiry by way of examining environmental problems
requires identifying the relevant features that both inform and constrain the expectations
set upon political action.2 It is important to note that this is not strictly a classification
since the categories are not jointly exhaustive, mutually exclusive, or homogeneously
2

I use the terms action and political action interchangeably throughout this dissertation.
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classed. Instead, I operate on the basis of conceptual resemblances organized spatially,
temporally, and qualitatively as complexity. Thus, the sets of shared traits are fully
revisable and amendable. Along with the seeming commonality of these problems,
occurring frequently enough to warrant a sustained theoretical treatment, the problems I
include are also durable insofar as once they have occurred they are not easily repairable.
Beyond organizing environmental problems spatially, temporally, and
qualitatively, it should be added that all of the problems dealt with are understood to be
preventable. Many problems, such as the accumulation of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere, are partially inherited from previous generations while others, such as the
ubiquity of polypropylene, polystyrene, and polyethylene are of more recent vintage. In
all cases, however, it is assumed that the problems are anthropogenic and, thus,
resolvable by human action. This also excludes problems such as geological and weather
phenomenon, despite claims that climate change will exacerbate the problem by
contributing to higher sustained windspeed during hurricanes, for example.

1. Complex Issues
Complex issues exhibit interdependent relationships that, as John Dryzek
describes them, cannot be captured by single-variable, non-interactive measurements
such that improvement on one variable can hide deterioration on another variable.3
Complexity also covers a secondary trait: varying patterns of recovery and deterioration
that occur within a given ecosystem. In studying an ecosystem it is necessary to take into
account the non-linear processes that occur. On the one hand, ecosystems vary in their
sensitivity to stimuli such that a pollutant may cause gradual changes in one ecosystem
3

Dryzek, 2005: 60-1 and 69.
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while the same pollutant in a different ecosystem must accumulate over a longer period
of time before a sudden change occurs. On the other hand, decreasing levels or removal
of a pollutant does not necessarily return an ecosystem to its previous state, or does so
only after it has passed through a series of recovery stages. Thus, environmental issues
involve two levels of complexity: complex relationships between objects and complex
knowledge about these relationships. Another way to put the matter is that relationships
that are analytically distinguishable are not ontologically distinct, which implies that
predicting interaction effects is both necessary and uncertain.

13

a. Sensitivity
The disturbance of an ecosystem refers to the effects of a given stimulus, or
perturbation, on the totality of relationships within the ecosystem. Of significance is the
degree to which a stimulus affects the dynamics of its surroundings, that is, whether a
perturbation involves a quantitative alteration that can be integrated into the relationships
of a given equilibrium or involves shifting to a qualitatively new set of ecological
relationships. Determining the sensitivity of an ecosystem to perturbation has played a
central role in debates about permitting logging roads in protected forests. Disputes about
sensitivity have also impacted public perceptions about exploring and drilling for oil in
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR). At issue in the case of ANWR is not the
quantity of land that must be used but the qualitative alterations that will result from use.
Sensitivity is also at issue in cases of nitrogen-fed algae blooms exacerbated by
agricultural runoff in waterways such as the Sea of Cortez.4
A corresponding measurement applies to assessing the risks posed to humans by
different chemicals. In order to make such an assessment, the rate of exposure must be
determined by analyzing the quantity, duration and type of contact at issue. The problems
of concentration mirror the problem of sensitivity in ecosystems.

4

Beman, et al., 2005
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The political significance of sensitivity lies in the necessity of basing decisions on
inconclusive and conditional information. Sensitivity must be evaluated on a case by case
basis. While debate about the role of generalization in ecological studies is ongoing, it is
clear that increasing the degree of accuracy in assessments of sensitivity depends upon
site specific analysis.5 The implication is that decisions, whether administrative or
deliberative, will not be based on certainties but will involve weighing evidence as well
as contestable suppositions to inform expected outcomes.

b. Irreversibility
Irreversibility refers to the transition to a state wherein specific sufficient
conditions required for generating the preceding state are no longer available.
Irreversibility occurs in cases such as species extinction, the introduction of invasive
species or the generation of toxic materials with high-magnitude half-lives. Thus,
irreversibility is the epitome of a threshold problem where once a particular set of
conditions is surpassed the option to return is eliminated. While not the most common
type of environmental problem, irreversibility is one of the more difficult precisely
because of the absolute nature of such a condition. Along with the difficulty of predicting
irreversible change, the political implication of irreversible environmental issues is that
once an irreversible change has occurred it is no longer a political problem since
resolution is no longer an option. Instead, irreversibility is a problem that is political only
insofar as it is projected and speculated about.

5

For a sample of the debate about the role of generalizations in ecology, see Mikkelson, 2003; Weber,
1999; and White and Jentsch, 2001.
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c. Non-linear Resilience
Where the recovery of an ecosystem from a disturbance remains possible, thus
differentiating it from irreversibility, this recovery does not always follow a linear path.
Non-linear processes of recovery, termed hysteresis, are instances in which removing the
cause of a disturbance does not return the ecosystem to its prior condition. To put it
differently, hysteresis refers to environmental circumstances where disturbance cannot be
corrected by subtraction.6 Non-linear recovery occurs in various cases such as decreased
biodiversity, desertification, and deforestation. This is simply a way of recognizing the
magnitude of variables that interact to generate changes of equilibrium, or 'tipping
points.'
In political terms, non-linear recovery differs dramatically from irreversibility in
that, because returning to the previous state remains possible, the issue remains open for
dispute and resolution. However, the issue of recovery is easily converted into a question
of cost. As is the case with many Superfund sites, the ability to accelerate recovery is not
at issue. Instead, as can be seen with the Lower Duwamish waterway in Seattle,
Washington, which was declared a Superfund site in 2001, it is reliance upon costintensive procedures and the presence of numerous polluters over time that creates
incentives for parties to engage in long-term disputes over legal responsibility.7 In the
case of the Duwamish, the cost climbs precipitously at the margins where cleanup
approaches zero contamination.8
6
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high levels of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), and
mercury, among others, as a result of years of industrial processing along the river.
8
At the time of writing, the Draft Feasibility Study was recently submitted to the EPA and made publicly
available. See LDWG, 2009.
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2. Spatial Issues
The group of spatial issues comprises those circumstances in which the harmful
environmental consequences of an act performed in one location extend to groups in
another location that are then subject to those effects without having significantly
contributed to them. Thus, spatial issues cross established political boundaries. Given the
centrality of sovereignty in the modern nation-state and the numerous challenges to
territorial sovereignty that have come about in the past century, such problems have
received a great deal of attention on their own.9 What I wish to add is that spatial issues
require some common medium, such as air and water, in order to transmit effects
between disparate locales. The implication, however, is that this common medium
extends across multiple ecosystems, each of which will interact differently with the new
stimuli.

a. Diffuse Causes
Diffuseness refers to whether an environmental problem is caused by a sitespecific polluter or by stimuli spread over many locations. All cases of nonpoint source
pollution constitute diffuse causes, as is the case with runoff from paved surfaces, which
carries automotive chemicals into groundwater supplies, or with agricultural runoff,
which carries fungicides, pesticides and fertilizers into waterways.10 Effluent treatment, a
highly regulated form of pollution, demonstrates the extensive infrastructure required for

9
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handling spatially diffuse causes. Similar problems occur in terms of the atmosphere as
well with particulate matter from combustion engines posing serious health risks to
humans. Carbon dioxide emissions appear to pose the most entrenched problem, since as
a byproduct of fossil fuels carbon dioxide use occurs on a global scale.
Whether or not an environmental problem is attributable to an identifiable, sitespecific polluter or is caused by stimuli spread over many locations fundamentally alters
the political attributes that must be considered. Diffusion stands in positive proportion to
coordination among actors. The greater the space over which the cause of pollution is
spread, the greater number of points that must be monitored and regulated to resolve the
problem. The complication lies in the way in which such problems cross not only
multiple types of ecosystems but multiple types of political systems with varying degrees
of citizen participation, what Robert Paehlke has referred to as "tangled jurisdictions."11

b. Dispersed Effects
Along with the complications introduced by the need to deal with multiple,
diffuse causes, the effects of a given stimulus are not easily constrained, accumulating
along a path where differing degrees of pollution will occur. Such problems are not
always easy to pinpoint since increasing distance further increases the number of
contingencies that must be comprehended. The difficulty of locating the precise cause or
causes of a problem, and the responsible parties, increases exponentially when all that
can be detected is the effect, although in rare instances such as the nontarget effects of
controlling an organism, this can be simpler to trace. While it is possible to address
particulate matter or ground-level ozone by establishing ambient air quality standards,
11
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other long-range transboundary problems such as acidic precipitation involve greater
effort to understand how chemicals act as they cross from air to water, moving from one
medium to another. Furthermore, large-scale effects such as climate change are not only
dispersed over a large space, but are dispersed unevenly, thus affecting ecosystems
differently.
Dispersion generates a number of political difficulties as well. While
transboundary issues offer some of the oldest political precedents with a legal framework
stretching from the Trail Smelter Arbitration (1941) to the Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution (1979), one of the more problematic aspects of dispersion is
the difficulties that arise in establishing responsibility.12 Not only is it more difficult to
attribute responsibility to specific agents, the uncertainties that are introduced provide
ample opportunity to contest data as inconclusive, which tends to entrench the status quo.

3. Temporal Issues
The defining feature of a temporal issue, much like spatial issues, is that a
disjuncture exists between cause and effect. In this case, an act at one point in time leads
to a consequence at some later point, which substantially impacts the options available to
an uninvolved group. Temporal issues pose particularly difficult political challenges
insofar as such issues are intergenerational and, on the surface, contradict the most basic
assumptions about legitimacy. The ability of present generations to impose substantial
constraints upon future groups of people that are unable to represent themselves -- or to
put it more plainly, one group having undisputed influence over another group for
12
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accidental reasons -- raises complicated normative questions. Beyond the asymmetry
between the groups, there is also the difficult matter of how inherently unverifiable
claims of future groups can be addressed through available institutions.

a. Accumulation
The most common instance of a delayed effect happens with accumulated
substances. This is a problem exhibited across various phenomena, from mercury, which
is concentrated in organisms higher up in a food network, and endocrine disruptors such
as PCBs to less complicated issues such as municipal solid waste, which contributes to
overfull landfills. In other cases, such as hazardous and radioactive waste, accumulation
is more easily overlooked because of long-term dormancy.13
Delayed effects pose a dual challenge in terms of their political significance. First,
accumulation fundamentally changes the options available to future actors, even if use of
a previously accumulated pollutant is indispensable to those future actors. That is, using a
pollutant to a level approaching unacceptability leaves minimal leeway for others that
may find using that pollutant essential. The second challenge is epistemological: even
where the eventual effects of accumulation are knowable with a high degree of certainty,
lower levels of accumulation may have disproportionate impacts. These challenges
combine in such a way that, even where present generations attempt to address the
consequences of their actions upon future generations, the foreseeable constraints
imposed upon future actors may be too narrowly gauged.

13
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When added together, these common aspects of environmental problems set a
relatively coherent set of parameters for the success of any given political response. First,
a problem must be publicly identified. This involves both determining the extent of
change already incurred, the scope of the problem in both spatial and temporal terms, and
the impact a given stimuli will have within that scope, even where it acts without
uniformity. Second, speculation is inherent in the process of arriving at even tentative
claims about harm, scope and impact. Stated differently, uncertainty is inherent in
projections, whether climate forecasts or cancer risks. Furthermore, the quality of the
available evidence determines the type and degree of uncertainty involved. Finally,
environmental problems constitute political problems insofar as they display the "logic of
consequences."14 Benjamin Barber describes the logic of consequences as the onset of
necessary action, thus initiating a political problem:
Politics encompasses the realm not simply of action but of necessary action. It is
enmeshed in events that are part of a train of cause and effect already at work in
the world. This engagement guarantees that even the choice not to make some
political decision will have public consequences. Recent political science has
given the odd name 'nondecision' to this behavior. A nondecision is still a species
of decision because as a passive component of ongoing events it has specifiable
public consequences: it reinforces a status quo or permits a train of action already
in process to gain momentum.15
I follow Barber in claiming that circumstances arise ― without an actor's intending so or
even being aware ― that change the significance of an act from relatively benign to
dramatically important. For instance, to drive a Ford Model T in 1908 had an entirely
different significance than driving a Ford Expedition in 2008, despite the near parity in
gas mileage. Thus, I understand agency as entangled in a world where the emergence of
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new political contexts may involve rejecting or modifying existing terms of political
inquiry.

B. The Limits of Legitimacy
Locating the concept of legitimacy within its historical context, in which it
emerges as an accompaniment to theories of sovereignty, illuminates the way in which
current usages retain a residual sense of the 'naturally ordered' worldview that comes to
reshape its meaning when combined with a notion of the state of nature.16 Thus, the very
question as to whether human activity is more or less harmonious with natural order,
framed in terms of progress during the era of the French Revolution by Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and Thomas Malthus, is anachronistic following the theory of
evolutionary biology.
In order to hold together the components of legitimacy as they are shaped by Kant,
without losing critical distance and becoming locked into the very terms that compose the
concept, I frame the issue in terms of political imaginary. The notion of a political
imaginary parallels that of a discourse, although it lacks the institutional referents
covered by the concept of discourse as well as not bracketing off the problem of validity.
This slight difference of terminology also allows me to avoid the baggage of debates that
are beyond the scope of this inquiry. I focus my attention on understanding the
conceptual terrain of legitimacy mapped out by Immanuel Kant and Thomas Hobbes
precisely because both of these authors have informed the two most prominent strands of
political theory addressing environmental problems: the eco-authoritarianism of the
1970s and the deliberative democracy of the present.
16
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1. Originary Political Imagination and Legitimacy
Whether referring to a requirement of independent normative grounds that serve
as the idealized terms of operation for a political system or prescriptive limits for political
power, legitimacy retains overtones of the 'naturally ordered' context out of which it
emerged. The word has its source in Roman jurisprudence as the recognition of a lawful
birth. However, the strategic maneuvering between supporters of the French Revolution
and their Royalist opponents served to reshape the concept. What, prior to the Revolution,
served to describe the historically recognized hereditary lineage ascending to the throne
became a term of contestation for arguing the rightful rule of a monarch or popular
sovereign, Bourbon or Bonaparte. As Stephen Holmes puts it,

Legitimacy, one might say, was a hand-me-down vessel into which was poured
twenty-five years of pent up émigré resentment and frustration. It was an
intrinsically reactionary concept insofar as it contained an interpretation of and
response to the revolutionary experience, from the viewpoint of the expropriated,
the exiled and the injured.17
It was through political conflict that legitimacy became a tool for delimiting the power of
a sovereign, even a democratically construed popular sovereign.18 Thus, at the very
instant when lineage was losing its authoritative status, the origin of the ruler took on
disproportionate significance and legitimacy emerged as a retroactive justification for an
already accomplished overthrow of the government, for usurpation. That is, at the
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moment when extralegal action successfully established non-hereditary government, a
discursive battle over legal ramifications ensued.
The context within which legitimacy would take on its new role as philosophical
measurement of political arrangements was not limited to revolutionary France. Around
the time that the Girondists were being executed, on the opposite side of the Rhine,
Immanuel Kant was witnessing the violent manifestation of the rights of man. By
providing a single answer that combines consent as the source of political obligation with
the broader natural law assumptions framing the status naturalis Kant serves as the
culmination of 150 years of contractarian thought, operating as the second source of
content in a reshaped concept of legitimacy.
In part two of his "On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, But
It Is of No Use in Practice," Kant expressly positions his theory of Recht in contrast to
Hobbes. However, he does not make a clean break with his English predecessor. Instead,
Kant opts to use a similar conception of the state of nature as the basis for his argument,
borrowing certain key assumptions. Among these assumptions is the notion that a rational
anxiety or fear expressed as antagonism between individuals is the motivation for exiting
the state of nature and entering into civil society. Kant, then, turns to an account of
origins as a vehicle for articulating the basis of obedience to authoritative rule, the role of
consent, and a transcendental political order derived from Reason and bound by natural
law. It is the way in which Kant combines the concern with justifying authority based
upon its source with a hypothetical origin narrative structured around a notion of
collective willing that serves to demonstrate both his indebtedness to Hobbes as well as
the degree to which he distanced himself from previous formulations.
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Already in his "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent" of 1784,
Kant was making use of the state of nature as a means of deriving his political philosophy.
In the Fourth Proposition, Kant describes human nature as having an "unsocial
sociability" that serves as the basis for explaining the emergence of civil society. Much
like Hobbes, whose view of individuals in isolation and lacking an impartial judge led
him to posit anticipating competition over resources as the source of anxiety and fear that
would propel rational beings out of such a state, Kant employs a modified notion of
antagonism, which serves as the cause of order. Kant describes this competitive
antagonism,
No one is bound to refrain from encroaching on what another possesses if the
other gives him no equal assurance that he will observe the same restraint toward
him. No one, therefore, need wait until he has learned by bitter experience of the
other's contrary disposition; for what should bind him to wait till he has suffered a
loss before he becomes prudent, when he can quite well perceive within himself
the inclination of human beings generally to lord it over others as their master
[...]?19
Furthermore, Hobbes's conception of the state of nature, like Kant's, combines freely
consenting individuals bound by natural laws, by which he means rules of Reason.20 The
resemblances, however, go only so far as the formal attributes of the state of nature that
allow each to generate the political implications of their theory.
For Hobbes, the agreement binding a people together was entered into for definite,
measurable gains of security, psychological as well as material. At its most basic level,
Kant rejects the idea that Hobbes's conceptual apparatus serves as a description of
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empirically verifiable events. Hobbes insists that the motivations and assumptions
employed in the state of nature are adequate approximations of pervasive phenomena:
Concerning my method, I thought it not sufficient to use a plain and evident style
in what I have to deliver, except I took my beginning from the very matter of civil
government, and thence proceeded to its generation and form, and the first
beginning of justice. For everything is best understood by its constitutive causes.21
So sure is he of his evidence that he directs audiences' attention to the relationships
between sovereigns as an example of the world without a power to over-awe them.
Reiterating his point, Hobbes goes so far as to suggest that the sovereign is but a fragile
barrier between his subjects' inclinations:
It may seem strange, to some man that has not well weighed these things, that
nature should thus dissociate, and render men apt to invade and destroy one
another. And he may, therefore, not trusting to this inference made from the
passions, desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by experience. Let him
therefore consider with himself ― when taking a journey, he arms himself, and
seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his doors; when
even in his house, he locks his chests; and this when he knows there be laws, and
public officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall be done to him [...] (Ch. XIII,
10).22
Thus, Hobbes turns to the state of nature less as a source for deriving political
implications than as a model for replicating the conficted world of politics within which
he found himself. As François Tricaud explains, Hobbes's state of nature encompasses
premises insusceptible to formalization.23 Instead of a formal system, Tricaud claims,
Hobbes develops a model or "conceptual artefact" that captures tendencies but never
exhausts the world it attempts to simulate, an approach in line with his own scientific
aspirations.24
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Kant, however, transforms this constitutive view of the state of nature into a
strictly hypothetical, regulative idea and, in doing so, moves closer to a formal system. At
the level of premises, Kant introduces a new conception of human nature that foregos
treating individuals in isolation and, instead, locates conflict both within individuals and
between individuals. This Kant achieves with his notion of unsocial sociability. By
changing the initial terms of his deduction, however, Kant displaces the very problem
that Hobbes sought to address, attributing to human nature what Hobbes must explain:
the emergence of society. Kant's conception of the individual as simultaneously torn
between isolation and association enables him to bypass the implications of a fearful,
preservation-motivated populace. No longer burdened by the need to specify a reason for
entering society, Kant is free to turn to the issue of universally administered justice in
civil society, which arrives at a state of peace by working out Nature's purpose.

There is a drawback, however, to this approach: without a deeper grounding, it is
possible for consent to undermine obligation. Having withdrawn the necessary
preservation of the individual and demoted it to a mere "conditional duty," the formality
of Kant's method obligates subjects to the status quo, regardless of the sovereign's
actions.25
While Kant begins by differentiating between politics and morality, he
subordinates the former to the latter. Both politics and morality operate as sources of
obligations, but those obligations have different statuses. As Patrick Riley points out, the
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difference between the two lies in the "incentive to obedience."26 In the case of morality,
an objective end attaches to an unconditional duty, which Kant calls an internal incentive.
Politics, however, is instrumental for removing obstacles to moral action but requires
external incentives. Kant distinguishes between the two thusly:
All lawgiving can therefore be distinguished with respect to the incentive
[parenthetical comment omitted]. That lawgiving which makes an action a duty
and also makes this duty the incentive is ethical. But that lawgiving which does
not include the incentive of duty in the law and so admits an incentive other than
the idea of duty itself is juridical."27
The distinction between internal and external motivation allows Kant, following in the
footsteps of Hobbes, to posit consent as a basis of obligation to the source of law.
Unlike Hobbes, though, Kant cannot rely solely upon consent as the justification
for obedience since he derives the internal incentive (action from duty) from a priori
principles of Reason, which lies at the center of his notion of natural law. Thus, Kant
introduces a subdivision between natural and positive laws, where both may necessitate
external motivation:
Obligatory laws for which there can be an external lawgiving are called external
laws (leges externae) in general. Those among them that can be recognized as
obligatory a priori by reason even without external lawgiving are indeed external
but natural laws, whereas those that do not bind without actual external lawgiving
(and so without it would not be laws) are called positive laws. One can therefore
contain only positive laws; but then a natural law would still have to precede
it, which would establish the authority of the lawgiver (i.e., his authorization to
bind others by his mere choice).28
By deriving obligation to authority from the logical preconditions of the idea of a
lawgiver and granting Nature and Reason metaphysically equivalent statuses, Kant posits
a priori laws discernible through the faculty of reason as the constitutive elements of his
26
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conception of the state of nature while freedom to consent is relegated to a more confined
role as a regulative indicator of legitimacy. Thus, consent becomes a hypothetical
question to be derived from Reason: "In general, for Kant those laws are legitimate that
could have been consented to by a mature, rational people and that are congruent with
natural law."29
Of course, the conditions that trigger conflict in Hobbes's state of nature, the lack
of a power capable of enforcing rule-based judgments, are without grounds in Kant's
conception precisely because Kant understands the generally available faculty of reason
to be the ultimate arbiter of dispute while Hobbes views reason as yet another source of
conflict. Hobbes, treating both reason and sense perception as facts to be accounted for in
moral philosophy, writes:
Good and evil are names that signify our appetites and aversions, which in
different tempers, customs, and doctrines of men are different; and divers men
differ not only in their on the senses (of what is pleasant and unpleasant to the
taste, smell, hearing, touch, and sight), but also of what is conformable or
disagreeable to reason in the actions of common life. Nay, the same man in divers
times differs from himself, and one time praiseth (that is, calleth good) what
another time he dispraiseth (and calleth evil); from whence arises disputes,
controversies, and at last war [Ch. XV, paragraph 40].30
The role each attributes to reason serves to ensure that no common ground is possible
between the vigilance of the Hobbesian sovereign and the transcendent progress of
Kantian Reason towards a peaceful equilibrium.
Without a stronger role for consent, Kant's assumptions about the transcendental
power of Reason serve as the strongest assurance against the abuse of authority. And yet,
the question remains as to whether these assurances are equal, even, to the limitations he
ascribes to human nature. In the "Universal History," Kant claims that a civil society
29
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characterized by universally administered justice is one of the final and most difficult
historical tasks confronting humans. In a passage suggestive of Hobbes's psychological
evidence, Kant writes:
The difficulty (which the very idea of this problem clearly presents) is this: if he
lives among others of his own species, man is an animal who needs a master. For
he certainly abuses his freedom in relation to others of his own kind. And even
although, as a rational creature, he desires a law to impose limits on the
freedom of all, he is still misled by his self-seeking animal inclinations into
exempting himself from the law where he can. He thus requires a master to break
his self-will and force him to obey a universally valid will under which everyone
can be free. But where is he to find such a master? Nowhere else but in the
human species. But this master will also be an animal who needs a master. Thus
while man may try as he will, it is hard to see how he can obtain for public justice
a supreme authority which would itself be just, whether he seeks this authority in
a single person or in a group of many persons selected for this purpose. For each
one of them will always misuse his freedom if he does not have anyone above
him to apply force to him as the laws should require it. Yet the highest authority
has to be just in itself and yet also a man. This is therefore the most difficult of all
tasks, and a perfect solution is impossible. Nothing straight can be constructed
from such warped wood as that which man is made of. Nature only requires of us
that we should approximate to this idea.31
Here, Kant offers a reconstructed version of the very problem to which the mythical
figure of Rousseau's lawgiver offers the remedy. Although aware of the path to
transcendence, human nature fails to overcome its baser instincts. Given the magnitude of
the task confronting humans and the limitations he ascribes to humans, it comes as no
surprise that Kant concludes the Sixth Proposition by pinning his hopes for
transformation to lessons of failure as much as to Reason.
The near impossibility of transcending the imperfections of human nature, it
seems, would incline Kant to locate all possibilities in his political philosophy for
resisting abusive authorities. Instead, Kant states that "A change in a (defective)
constitution, which may certainly be necessary at times, can therefore be carried out only
31
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through reform by the sovereign itself, but not by the people, and therefore not by
revolution; and when such a change takes place this reform can affect only the executive
authority, not the legislative."32 Here, Kant limits opportunities for altering even an
admittedly deficient constitution to reform of the executive by the legislature. Taken in
the context of a republican constitution, he is simply reaffirming the claim that, once
constituted, a people may not dissolve itself.
While Kant lends his support to a notion of reform, this takes on a narrower
meaning when repositioned in light of his broader political philosophy. Of significance
for determining the meaning of legitimate reform is the conditions that justify change, i.e.,
the reasonable grounds for reform. Having foregone a constitutive use of the state of
nature for a regulative one, Kant's inclusion of consent serves as the lone standard for
judgment about reform. And yet, Kant removes even these grounds for reform by
claiming that to do so would be to return, even if only temporarily, to a condition without
public right, a condition that Reason dictates must be exited. He writes,
It is futile to inquire into the historical documentation of the mechanism of
government, that is, one cannot reach back to the time at which civil society
began (for savages draw up no record of their submission to law; besides, we can
already gather from the nature of uncivilized human beings that they were
originally subjected to it by force). But it is culpable to undertake this inquiry
with a view to possibly changing by force the constitution that now exists. For
this transformation would have to take place by the people acting as a mob, not by
legislation; but insurrection in a constitution that already exists overthrows all
civil rightful relations and therefore all right, that is, it is not change in the civil
constitution but dissolution of it. The transition to a better constitution is not
then a metamorphosis but a palingenesis, which requires a new social contract
on which the previous one (now annulled) has no effect.33
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Kant affirms that the historical origin of authority is coercion -- that is, without right -while simultaneously claiming that progress is the result of a return to origin, a rebirth.
One of two conclusions can be drawn from this dual affirmation: either Kant is subtly
lending his support to a revolutionary notion of change or he is removing all justification
for rightful reform.
His reassertion of obligation to successful revolutionaries only deepens the
interpretive dilemma since, as Kant states, "once a revolution has succeeded and a new
constitution has been established, the lack of legitimacy with which it began and has been
implemented cannot release the subjects from the obligation to comply with the new
order of things as good citizens, and they cannot refuse honest obedience to the authority
that now has the power."34 On top of that, the solution that Kant provides as to how
change occur offers few clues as to the content of legitimate reform, stating only that "the
spirit of the original contract involves an obligation on the part of the constituting
authority to make the kind of government suited to the idea of the original contract."35 If,
however, we take Kant at his word and allow for a consistent application of his principle
of obligation regardless of origin then Kant has clearly succeeded in removing the basis
for even reformative measures that are not arrived at legislatively, regardless of whether
such a legislature is representative or not.
In allowing for this consistency, however, the hypothetical character of the state
of nature takes on a more important role, providing a content to legitimacy without
expressly saying as much. In the opening passage of his 'General Remark' on the right of
the state, Kant writes:
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Whether a state began with an actual contract of submission (pactum subiectionis
civilis) as a fact, or whether power came first and law arrived only afterwards, or
even whether they should have followed in this order: for a people already subject
to civil law these subtle reasonings are altogether pointless and, moreover,
threaten a state with danger. If a subject, having pondered over the ultimate
origin of the authority now ruling, wanted to resist this authority, he would be
punished, got rid of, or expelled (as an outlaw, ex lex) in accordance with the laws
of this authority, that is, with every right. − A law that is so holy (inviolable) that
it is already a crime even to call it in doubt in a practical way, and so to suspend
its effect for a moment, is thought as if it must have arisen not from human beings
but from some highest, flawless lawgiver, and that is what the saying "All
authority is from God" means. This saying is not an assertion about the historical
basis of the civil constitution; it instead sets forth an idea as a practical principle
of reason: the principle that the presently existing legislative authority ought to be
obeyed, whatever its origin.36
The professed inconsequential role of origins, even the "should have" underlying Kant's
own regulative notion, returns in the form of a transcendental order, albeit a hypothetical
one. While no position is articulated from which to act, thus leaving only the hope for
autopoietic change, when Kant's transcendental faith is combined with his obligation to
the status quo, what results is a notion of legitimacy as veneration. Here, the threat that
must be regulated is not to popular freedom, although such freedom is not precluded.
Instead, it is the threat to stability that arises when sovereignty is called into question in a
practical way. Obligation to authority without conditions, then, serves to make the
stability of the state, its perpetuation ad infinitum, the purpose of political right.
The issue of stability figures prominently in another work of the same
revolutionary era, The Federalist Papers. The experiment in confederated statehood
following the successful formation of the United States led to considerable disagreement,
not only over specific issues but about whether small insurrections constituted instability.
As Jason Frank argues, a particular form of political imagination was called for by
proponents of the new Constitution that couched its claims in the language of reason as
36
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well.37 Fittingly, James Madison seeks to limit opportunities for popular changes to the
Constitution itself since "every appeal to the people would carry an implication of some
defect in the government, frequent appeals would, in great measure, deprive the
government of that veneration which time bestows on everything, and without which
perhaps the wisest and freest governments would not possess the requisite stability."38
Madison sought to inculcate a structural veneration for the Constitution. Furthermore, the
Federalist Papers hypothetically employs a transcendental motif as well to justify uniting
the states under an invigorated central government: "This country and this people seem to
have been made for each other, and it appears as if it was the design of Providence that an
inheritance so proper and convenient for a band of brethren, united to each other by the
strongest ties, should never be split into a number of unsocial, jealous, and alien
sovereignties."39 The issue, then, is not that political imagination is to be rejected since,
as I discuss further along, it performs a crucial function in relating the necessarily
uncertain projections about environmental impacts to political expectations, but how it is
to be used.

2. Finitary Political Imagination and Illegitimacy
While Kant's teleological rendering of the Hobbesian state of nature posits a set of
standards by which to judge when history arrives at an enlightened republic, Hobbes's
state of nature serves as a starting point for a more recent, negatively defined conception
of illegitimacy. In the late 1960s, following nearly two decades of changes in the
American landscape ― from the rise of tract housing and the corresponding commute to
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work to the manufacturing of plastics and the introduction of the distinction between
durable and disposable products ― a new set of thinkers went about formulating a more
economistic political theory. By the end of the 1970s this new formulation of an
environmental critique of society would link up with the already established concerns of
environmentalists, thus culminating in the finitary political imagination animating the
professional environmental policy groups formed in the wake of the environmental
movement. Thus, what had once been a push by conservationists for resource
management or by preservationists for refuges insulated from production demands were
followed in the post-war period by anxieties about the consequences of an entire way of
life.
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A first line of thinking picked up on by the social movements that took shape
around issues such as nuclear proliferation and episodes of environmental destruction
such as the Cuyahoga River fire of 1969 was a critique of the technological capacities
developed in the first half of the twentieth century. A sublime capacity for destruction is
already under scrutiny in Karl Jaspers's The Future of Mankind (translated from the
German Die Atombombe und die Zukunft des Menschen) as well as Hannah Arendt's
"The Conquest of Space and the Stature of Man," published in 1963, where she seeks
critical purchase on the extension of science and technology into realms beyond
linguistic communication.40 During the same years, Lewis Mumford was in the process
of developing his own critical interpretation of technology, published between 1967 and
1970 in the two volume The Myth of the Machine, while Arendt's compatriot Herbert
Marcuse was developing the analysis begun in One-Dimensional Man (1964) into a
theoretical account necessitating the liberation of man by ending the domination of
nature.41
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The critique proffered throughout the 1960s was digested within the
environmental movement alongside other, more specifically ecological works. The
publication of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring (1962) provided readers with a brief glimpse
of the dangers of bioaccumulation, suggesting that such dangers were not only
devastating for bird populations but, by analogy, could easily affect human populations as
well. This was followed up in 1966 by a more extensive exposition of the environmental
impacts of modern production in Barry Commoners's Science and Survival. The
following year, Roderick Nash's Wilderness and the American Mind would situate the
newly emerging concerns about toxicity within a broader lineage of concerns about
nature.42
It was, however, Garrett Hardin's combination of an egoistic rationality modeled
on Hobbes's state of nature with Thomas Malthus's assertion that all creatures display a
"constant" tendency to increase in population beyond the nourishment prepared for them
that offered a bold, quasi-scientific vision for an environmental movement in the midst of
establishing a professional base of operations following the legislative successes of the
early 1970s.43 Although written in 1968, Hardin's work gained in prominence during the
1970s as concerns about population came to the fore during the legislative session that
produced the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and significant amendments to
prior legislation in the forms of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act.44 Also published
in 1968, Paul Ehrlich's The Population Bomb was one of many books that would appear
documenting the purported confluence of scarcity and intensive resource use. Thus, in the
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1970s environmental problems came to be couched primarily in terms of 'natural' laws
that would assert themselves through intentional or unintentional human activity, a
conclusion no doubt reaffirmed by the OPEC led oil embargo in 1974.
The focus on population and scarcity coincided with a strong role prescribed for
experts. This was later mirrored in structural changes within environmental advocacy
groups as many, such as National Resources Defense Council, Environmental Defense
Fund, and Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, found the ability to compete in courtrooms a
necessary adaptation to the ever-changing legislative landscape of the late the 1970s and
the passage of the Comprehensive Emergency Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (Superfund) in 1980. Furthermore, the professionalization of the environmental
movement was shaped, in part, by legal battles brought about by the Reagan
administration's attempts to nullify environmental legislation through inaction at the
Environmental Protection Agency, as can be seen following the appointment of Anne
Gorsuch as Director of the EPA. The routinized legal tactics employed by professional
environmental institutions have seen their role expand in the past decade and a half as
legislation has been less forthcoming and new policies more commonly result from
judicial and executive decisions.45
The transformed legal and institutional context of the 1970s correlates with the
rise of the need to assure an unfamiliar public of the scientific basis of environmental
policy as well as the ability of agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
to render accurate data. New informational mechanisms such as environmental impact
statements were introduced at the federal level under NEPA that would later develop into
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risk assessments.46 The notion of risk, while not officially endorsed at the EPA until
William Ruckelshaus's reinstatement in 1984, played a central role in the probabilistic
projections of harm by the Neo-Malthusians of the 1970s.
The convergence, then, of a critique of technologically-driven society, a
conception of nature as vulnerable to the disorders of that society, and computer-aided
thought experiments that calculate polluting behavior to its devastating terminus serves as
a finitary political imagination that is expressed in various ways during the formative
years of the modern environmental movement. In the 1980s, as the environmental
movement took on a more professionalized, interest-group approach to politics, this
imagination came to operate as both the discourse against which more 'practical' and
'pragmatic' groups would define themselves while also relying on some version of this
imaginary as the justification for their own activities. Thus, the finitary imagination
acquires its critical purchase by constructing a delegitimizing narrative that attempts to
erase its own imaginative role, thus inverting the state of nature and, as with Hobbes and
Malthus, asserting the scientific validity of doing so. To put the issue differently, the
finitary political imagination is a projection into the future that simultaneously seeks to
delegitimize some current state of affairs while also aiming to depoliticize its own claims
by treating them as determinate.
While this finitary political imagination has not been uniformly invoked within
environmental politics over the past few decades, just as the originary political
imagination is expressed in different versions of the state of nature, there are a few
recurring themes that can be found across variants. To begin with, the most radical
departure from the originary imagination employed by Kant is the replacement of a
46
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teleological conception of history with an evolutionary conception. Signaling the
dramatically different contexts within which these imaginaries operate, the finitary
imagination structures its projections into the future in terms of evolution. Jared
Diamond's Collapse and Thomas Homer-Dixon's Environment, Scarcity, and Violence
stand out as exceptions since both conduct their inquiry on the basis of previously
occurring events. This stands in stark contrast to the ideas of Garrett Hardin and William
Ophuls, both of whom draw upon the metaphor of a medieval commons to illustrate the
inevitable exhaustion of non-exclusive property without analyzing a single case where a
medieval commons actually failed in the ways that they suggest are inevitable.47 Instead,
both authors cite inconclusive examples to illustrate the modeled behavior. However, the
central feature in all of these works is an evolutionary account of humans exceeding an
acceptable range of physiological constraint that fundamentally undermines some
preconditions of modern society, which typically refers to resources that supply electrical
or caloric energy.48
Although the assumption of evolution is commonly exhibited across instances of
finitary political imagination, it takes two distinct forms as authors attempt to assert the
precise way in which current conditions lead to negative consequences. The first, and
initially the most common, form is the catastrophe. In this version, exceeding limits cause
a sudden collapse of conditions necessary for a consumption-based, disposable life of
convenience. The second, more recent, form revolves around a notion of degradation, a
progressive decline into disorder capable of being averted at most stages along its path by
addressing challenges instead of crises, although each challenge has the potential to
47
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blossom into a catastrophe. This version, while much less explicit about the irrevocability
of environmental destruction, is associated with authors that seek to align 'natural limits'
and ever-increasing economic activity.49 The entropic version of limitations, then, has
transformed discussions of 'sustainable development' from economic equilibrium to
environmentally non-destructive economic growth.50
Despite an evolutionary form of projection about limitations, finitary political
imagination relies upon a notion of illegitimacy arrived at by inverting the speculative
relationship between concepts of Nature and Society and reconfiguring them along
evolutionary lines (Figure 1.1) Furthermore, both imaginaries rely on antagonism to
explain projected changes. In the case of the originary imagination informing the state of
nature the speculated agent is an antagonism present within both Nature and Society
while in the case of the finitary imagination the speculated agent is an antagonism
between Nature and Society. The key difference, an implication of employing an
evolutionary structure, is that where the originary imagination depicts the transfer of the
order found in Nature to Society via cognitive faculties of reason or rationality, the
finitary imagination allows for this process to recur. Thus, it portrays Society as the
cause of disorder in Nature through excessive and irrational appetites only to have Nature
transfer this disorder back upon Society.51
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Figure 1.1

Stages of Originary and Finitary Imagination

Originary Imagination
... Society (disorder) →
Nature (order)

Society (order) → ... Present ... Equilibrium ...
Nature (order)

Finitary Imagination
... Society (order) ... Present →Society (order) → Society (disorder) ... Equilibrium ...
Nature (order)
Nature (disorder) Nature (order)
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Along with this structural inversion, finitary political imagination posits as a
collective choice the consequences of collective behavior. This is problematic for two
reasons: first, attributing the status of choice to all behavior overextends the supposed
role of cognition to acts undertaken with or without reflection. The assumption of rational
intentionality treats as unambiguous the neurological and cognitive processes involved in
acting, thus covering over the opaque source and uncertainty surrounding knowledge in
behavioral psychology as well as mimicking the originary imagination's need to cover
over the opaque sources of authority with the notion of consent. To put it differently, the
assumption of rational intentionality reinscribes the problem of the sovereign authority at
the level of the sovereign author or subject. Furthermore, assuming that all behavior
results from choice implies that the most effective means of dealing with environmental
problems is to change the information available prior to cognition, echoing the
'consciousness raising' campaigns to acknowledge agency during the 1960s and 1970s as
well as deliberative democrats calls for transformative will-formation endogenous to the
process of public reason-giving.
On the other hand, treating as a choice the effects of collective behavior need not
assume that action is the outcome of rational cognition. Instead, an action may be
understood as both intended and irrational in origin, as it is with the satisfaction of
consumers's appetites. However, in terms of environmental politics one must add those
interests, or particular interest, that cannot be overridden with rational proclamations
about the public interest. The issue is implicitly framed this way in more recent usages of
the finitary imagination where a concordant synthesis of 'economy and ecology' are
called for and which accompanies the entropic version of environmental destruction. As
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with Stuart Hart's reliance upon Joseph Schumpeter's notion of creative destruction, the
attempt to guide action by aligning 'economic' and 'ecological' interest rests precisely on
this notion of intentional irrationality.53 This, however, could already be seen in the
catastrophic imagery of the 1960s and 1970s as equilibrium or a steady-state economy
was posited as the solution to the displacing of disorder via overconsumption, which was
then transformed in the 1980s following the publication of Our Common Future into a
call for sustainable development.54 Insofar as the finitary political imagination parallels
the originary political imaginary by conceptualizing agency in terms of sovereignty, the
illegitimacy it describes in the present stands above the very actors and actions it refers to,
unable to articulate the closure between abstraction and actuality.

3. Politics of the Present, Politics in the Environment
The political imaginaries just described display a temporality that prevents the
corresponding notions of legitimacy from arriving at a particular, definitive claim. This is
to say that each takes on a perspective of projecting from the present and, treating that
projection as a determinate position from which to judge the present, ignores the
speculative nature of this position, and then turns toward the present to legitimize or
delegitimize its political arrangements. In the case of Kant's use of the originary
imagination, he is only able to confer legitimacy, but not to specify that any given act is
illegitimate. Thus, there is an inability to assign the status of legitimate or illegitimate to
any ongoing effect of a past action. On the other hand, the finitary imagination is able to
designate an entire mode of living as illegitimate, but is itself unable to legitimize any
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response to that condition. Thus, it is unable to specify what actions in the present are
legitimate and worthy of perpetuation. For the finitary imagination this, in part, results
from the difficulty of determining the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the present given its
inversion of the terms made available by the originary imagination. That is to say, the
terms of analysis made available by the predominant strands of liberal contractarian
thought were themselves insufficient for responding to the environmental problems that
came about during the middle of the twentieth century, a point brought up by many of the
authors that early on contributed to the critical context out of which the finitary
imagination emerged.55
The unidirectional, linear temporality that is employed in both imaginaries serves
as an impediment to political action. Utilizing the state of nature as the structuring
narrative to answer the question of the source of authoritative obligation, the originary
political imagination leads to the conclusion that this source is an indefinable moment of
consent. In the case of Kant, where society is assumed and what must be explained is
civility, this formalized notion of consent carries minimal substantive constraints. Instead,
legitimacy in its abstract, proceduralist guise refers to the average or patterned
performance of a political system over a series of iterations, which enables thinkers such
as John Rawls to explain how legitimacy persists despite invalid or unjust arrangements,
thus infinitely postponing any politically disruptive response.
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As discussed above, legitimacy becomes difficult to empirically distinguish from
veneration given that no specific government decision is illegitimate in any actionable
way.56 This is, in part, the result of underemphasizing accountability, an issue discussed
further along. Relying upon the notion of legitimacy that arises from the originary
political imagination leaves one unable to point to examples to justify political action.
The result is that justification of action must take place at a level of abstraction that, in
seeking to curb political instability by positing action as solely a consequence of
reasoning, operates at the level of 'meta'-concepts such as Society, Nature, and Reason.
Thus, the problem plaguing the historical contexts out of which the elements of the
originary imagination emerged ― conflict, strife, and instability ― remain as the points
of contrast that shape more recent usages of the concept of legitimacy by John Rawls and
Jürgen Habermas. To put it another way, the concept of legitimacy, despite the shifts in
meaning undergone in Germany in the early part of the twentieth century, sacrifices
specifiable terms of political action for regularized governability.57 After Kant wedded
an abstract source of authority to the narrative structure of an original state, the
conception of legitimacy employed in liberal contractarian thought has been unable to
avoid the overtones of arbitrary (because unspecified) and, hence, unreasonable reverence.
On my account, the centrality of the concept of legitimacy in both the originary
and finitary political imaginations that has come to substantially define the terms by
which constitutional democracy is evaluated did not so much succeed in attaching the
source of authoritative obligation to popular sovereignty as it did in justifying non56
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coercive mechanisms for deferring to authority. However, the environmental problems
that have emerged over the past century posed altogether unfamiliar challenges.
Attempting to deal with these challenges in terms of legitimacy is to hold on too tightly to
an insufficient notion that arose out of an entirely different set of concerns. The question,
however, is not whether to jettison the imaginary as a source of political inspiration and
motivation, a choice that is not available in any case. The question, instead, is what
elements are necessary for responding to the abundant variety of environmental problems
and how can these coextensively reside in a more adequate political imaginary.
A first step along the path to an answer is to build upon the limitations detailed
above, particularly with regards to the inability to delineate specific terms upon which
political actors may base their judgment of events. The failure generated by placing
legitimacy at the center of political imagination results from neglect of contextual
analysis. The speculative basis of legitimacy is necessarily abstracted from any particular
social and historical context, thus enabling the conceptual analysis to condense political
legitimacy into a unified moment of agency, whether as contractual consent or as
collective behavior. Furthermore, consensual legitimacy must be generalizable without
being universal. This is due to the dilemma that a single moment of consent must be
binding on some non-participants, citizens in the present that did not provide consent,
while not binding other non-participants, those outside of the relevant territorial bounds.
However, as we have seen with the originary political imagination, the apparently
arbitrary features of history reappear as an ineluctable residual context.
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The lack of contextual analysis appears prevalent in the finitary political
imaginary as well, a point demonstrated all too clearly by the rapidity with which many
predictors of catastrophe such as Paul Ehrlich found their premises under suspicion
following the successes of industrial agriculture's 'Green Revolution' in the 1960s and
1970s. Along the same lines, Garrett Hardin's metaphor of the medieval commons is not
demonstrated by historical examples, but by contemporaneous examples that occur
within a constitutional democracy fostering entirely different economic conditions,
despite his acknowledging that "morality is system-sensitive."58 Symptomatic of both the
originary and finitary imaginations is that when employing the state of nature or the
limitations-model neither is able to address specific places and specific peoples with
already operating social-behavioral norms governing the use of resources or other
environmentally destructive behavior. It is, in fact, around the role of social-behavioral
norms that I seek to turn attention away from a political philosophical inquiry into the
unreasonableness of convention-governed behavior and towards a more prudential
approach to the political weight borne by such conventions.
Social-behavioral norms constitute the world behind Nature and Society and, as
such, are not easily dealt with in political philosophical analysis, as Habermas
unwittingly demonstrates. The very structure of the state of nature as either fully
dissociated (Hobbes) or lacking in distributive justice (Kant) methodologically precludes
any reference to social-behavioral norms, as opposed to normative prescriptions. In the
terms provided by the state of nature and developed into a theory of authoritative
obligation, political institutions are pure artifacts that can be analyzed, designed and
manipulated without interacting with the background consensus provided by social58
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behavioral norms. However, Kant's ignoring the customs, conventions, and attitudes
underlying politics leads to overstating the case for obligation while, for Hardin and
Ophuls, it leads to overstating the case for authoritative coercion.
The drawback to focusing upon, and perhaps the reason for ignoring, socialbehavioral norms is that doing so leads to a more bounded set of claims. Since consistent,
spatially-unlimited behavioral norms are less readily identifiable this obviates political
philosophical articulation of universalizable justifications of moral and political
prescriptions. Thus, claims such as those made by David Estlund in his argument for an
'epistemic proceduralist' conception of democracy that avoids the thorny issue of consent:
By authority I will mean the moral power of one agent (emphasizing especially
the state) to morally require or forbid actions by others through commands. (To
forbid x is to require not-x, and so I will usually simply speak of the moral power
to require.) By legitimacy I will mean the moral permissibility of the state's
issuing and enforcing its commands owing to the process by which they were
produced. If the state's requiring you to pay taxes has no tendency to make you
morally required to do so, then the state lacks authority in that case. And if the
state puts you in jail for not paying, but it is morally wrong for it to do so, then it
acts illegitimately. Even without authority or legitimacy, of course, the state might
yet have enormous power. But we are not investigating brute power as such, since
brute power is not a moral thing. Like a knife, it can be used rightly or wrongly.
The moral questions about the use of knives are not much about the details of
what knives are like, and the moral questions about the uses of power are not
much about the exact nature of actual power.59
There are two points that I wish to make with regards to Estlund's argument. First, at the
same moment that Estlund appears to offer terms for judging a specific act legitimate or
illegitimate ― being jailed for not paying taxes ― he withdraws those terms by
subsuming them into a strictly abstract analysis that hinges on the always hypothetical
nature of its postulates.
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Second, and more importantly, Estlund, as we saw previously with Kant, treats
politics as an extension of morality. This is a categorical error that can be illustrated by
analyzing his knife analogy of power. He begins by acknowledging that "brute power is
not a moral thing," a point which I fully agree with. However, the relevant question for
political inquiry is whether power is a political thing. For Estlund, the "moral questions
about the uses of power" are about whether it is used "rightly or wrongly." Estlund, then,
bases his analogy upon this shared characteristic between power and a knife. However,
his analogy relies upon a crucial oversight that would firmly distinguish political from
moral inquiry: in the case of the knife, it can exhibit an inert state while in the case of
power it cannot. This is to say, power does not have a neutral state. It is exertion.
Acknowledging this difference would entail acknowledging that conditions exist in which
the necessity of action is judged according to different criteria than right or wrong. It is
the possibility of such conditions that demands a separate political analysis. By assuming
that such conditions are not possible, whether ontologically or logically, Estlund's
deontology neglects even the minimal experiential reference provided by Kant.

C. The Bounds of Authoritative Relationships
A more adequate political imaginary will not emerge fully-formed from a political
theory but from its instantiation during, and further reflection following, particular
environmental struggles. However, the adequacy of a new imaginary can be evaluated by
clearly defining the problems it must address, an approach begun above and further
developed in the coming chapters. What remains to be articulated for now are the
categories of evaluation that provide a more accurate and practical assessment of
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environmental politics. Recall that to be sufficient to the problems confronting it an
environmental politics must account for the inherent uncertainty of knowledge, a
practical orientation that recognizes that circumstances exist that necessitate action
(Barber's 'logic of consequences'), and acknowledges the inherence of projection and
speculation while providing a strong role for disputation based on evidence. The capacity
of citizens to work with speculations about limits while simultaneously accepting the
limits of speculation is certainly an open question. However, there are ways to improve
the likelihood of success through educating citizens about the principles of rigorous
research: narrowly-defined and clearly articulated assumptions, direct statement of
questions and hypotheses, researcher analysis of the quality of indicators and available
evidence, and stating the conditions for disconfirming cases, among others.
The emphasis on context-sensitive political inquiry does imply a restricted scope
for the arguments of political philosophers, albeit in exchange for more specific criteria
of judgment.60 To accommodate this greater sensitivity, I recommend a more prudential
approach to political inquiry that also allows for handling questions that are answerable
only through detailed comparison and analogous reasoning while remaining open to
disputing claims with contravening evidence. This more explicitly historical analysis of
politics is not new, although it hardly forms a coherent tradition. We see prudential
political analysis on display in Niccolo Machiavelli's The Prince and Discourses,
Montesquieu's The Spirit of the Laws, Karl Marx's The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis
Bonaparte and The Civil War in France, Max Weber's The Protestant Ethic and the
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Spirit of Capitalism, and Antonio Gramsci's Prison Notebooks, along with more recent
works such as Pierre Bourdieu's Distinction.
My concept of politics rests upon entirely different premises from deontological
approaches that position themselves within the Kantian heritage, including via John
Rawls or Jürgen Habermas. While these have been stated throughout the course of this
chapter, I wish to briefly recapitulate them for the sake of clarity. First, I reject the
assumption that politics is an extension or subset of morality that deals with public or
collective as opposed to private or individual matters. In its place, I assert that necessity,
in the form of the logic of consequences, can and does arise. Not all political
circumstances involve necessity, but all conditions of necessity are political. Second, I
reject the assumption that justification, understood as reasoning about the rightness or
wrongness of a course of action, is a prerequisite for political action. This is simply to say
that justification does not exhaust nor monopolize the questions that one may address as
the basis of action. Political action also follows from what one has at stake in a matter of
justice, equality, freedom, security, power or need but does not require consistent beliefs
about those matters prior to action.
The conception of politics that I employ is sympathetic to, but distinct from the
'agonistic' conceptions developed by political theorists such as Chantal Mouffe, Bonnie
Honig, William Connolly, and James Tully. I differ from these authors in that the
conception of politics I employ is ambivalent about pluralism, acknowledging its
potential to arise in any context without denying or affirming its political relevance until
after analyzing the specifics of a given situation. This differs dramatically from the
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treatment of pluralism as an inherent political value that is to be cultivated.61 I also differ
from the agonistic conceptions outlined by these authors in that I do not understand
politics to be primarily about conflict or contestation, instead looking at conflict as
connected to other, more fluid conventional relationships that are negotiated by actors in
both reflective and unreflective ways. While the influence of Michel Foucault on,
especially, Mouffe and Connolly prevents them from neglecting the role of socialbehavioral norms, I take a more nuanced approach to norms that does not celebrate the
transgression of norms so much as look to constructively apprehend their operation as a
source of motivation, albeit at times without rational cognition. The result of these
differences leads me to diverge with these authors about the role of spatial boundaries for
democratic publics and, thus, the ability to resolve large-scale problems democratically.
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1. The Arch of Vindication
Seeking to redirect attention from legitimacy to vindication, I aim to incorporate
into political inquiry a more practical notion of justification along with a strong sense of
the political work done by social-behavioral norms that ensure stability, even where that
stability is destructive. By embracing a conception of politics capable of giving sustained
emphasis to the conceptual dilemmas attending the notion of demos as well as those
arising from kratos, I focus on the contexts and particular uses of constituent power and
the social-behavioral bases from which commonality is constructed.62 In order to make
good on this plan, however, we must first provide the theoretical grounding of
vindication as a necessary complement to the justification that initiates an authoritative
instance of a political relationship.
What this means is authoritative relationships, that subset of political relationships
referring to a formal, collective assignment of duty to members or their representatives,
operate between two poles. At the one end, an authoritative relationship is initiated by
deferral. This deferral can be evaluated as more or less thoughtful, more or less
participatory, fair, equal, or inclusive. Thus, inquiry framed in these terms does not
preclude the work of deliberative democratic theorists. The focus on initiating an
authoritative relationship must be accompanied by consideration of the consequences of
that decision. Only by incorporating consequences can the terms justifying deferral
offered at the outset be evaluated as substantively good or bad, fair or unfair, just or
unjust, successful or unsuccessful.63 Even where only implicit, responsibility is assigned

62
63

Ober, 2008: 3-9.
The position I take on the necessity of knowing consequences merely extends the arguments made by
deliberative democrats that argue for substantive principles, as opposed to a procedural version, of
deliberation. However, unlike Gutmann and Thompson, 2003, who argue for substantive principles on

54

for consequences and the deferral is vindicated or not. While attributing responsibility is
a less formalized process than decision-making institutions, often vaguely imputable as a
reason for an incumbent losing an election or an agency's diminished funding, it is
fundamental to a notion of accountability as more than losing election.64 Thus, the two
poles, justification and vindication, and their accompanying devices of deferral and
assigning responsibility, serve as the arch linking the initiation and conclusion of a
political episode. As I intend to show, at work in this way of framing democratic politics
is a non-linear conception of time that more accurately captures the open-ended,
malleable interpretations of the past that are capable of establishing new grounds for
judgment retroactively.

2. Justification and Deferral
Deferral as a category of political inquiry provides a stronger conceptual link to
the role of consequences in evaluating the acceptability of a political arrangement.
Deferral carries two meanings, each contributing to a more robust conception of political
decision-making. The first meaning of defer, combining the Latin de- with ferre, is to
submit or permit, to allow another to carry away one's burden.65 The second meaning of
defer has a slightly different etymology, combining the Latin dis- with the same root
ferre, that suggests a postponement or a temporary putting aside. Framing the initiation of
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an authoritative relationship in terms of deferral foregrounds the sense of agency and
transfer of power alluded to by permission while retaining the sense of waiting and
incompletion suggested by postponement. Thus, deferral proclaims an expectation, that
which is awaited, at the same moment that it expresses the demand for fulfilling that
expectation. That is to say, the act of deferring already contains an assumption about the
need to hold responsible, to carry again one's burden.
In terms of the politics surrounding environmental problems, deferral serves as a
useful category of analysis precisely because it enables comparison between democratic
and non-democratic decision-making, capturing the varying degrees of participation as
well as leaving open the possibility that an authoritative relationship may be established
with no participation. To put it another way, deferral on similar issues can be compared
whether the relevant categories are democratic representation, participation or
deliberation or non-democratic categories such as convention-governed acceptance of
expertise. This comparability is important since it is a common feature of environmental
problems that participatory mechanisms such as citizen advisory panels may influence an
agency decision about the release of an untested compound in one instance and go
unconvened in another.66 Framing inquiry in terms of deference allows for comparison
across cases on topics such as the role of extra-institutional social-behavioral norms, the
expectations that are generated in the process of deferral that serve as approximate limits
on an authority's action, and the how judgments about responsibility inform
accountability.
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Mark Warren poses the issue similarly for deliberative democrats and arrives at a
similar conclusion. He writes that "a vast increase in the number and complexity of
decisions" as well as the limiting of "participation owing to their specialized discourses"
means that "if most decisions must be made outside deliberative mechanisms, then
authoritative decisions are relatively desirable" since "their terms of authorization may
also serve as standards of accountability."67 Furthermore, Warren highlights the link
between regulative decisions undertaken by unelected officials serving in an authoritative
capacity and the broader context of social-behavioral norms that shape how deferral
provides terms for a later judgment. He writes that, "Procedural authority cannot be
neutral: It depends upon beliefs within a political culture that support and define specific
procedures and upon which a commitment to these procedures, and not others, ultimately
rests."68 Similarly, Warren argues for a necessary link between deferral as a "limited
suspension of judgment" and a corresponding moment of accountability.69
Deferral is a process of arriving at what Henry Richardson refers to as
"contextually specific solutions."70 Thus, deferral does not preclude justification, it
simply allows analyzing how justification can occur at a different time and place from the
exercise of governmental authority, thus acknowledging that it is necessary to act upon
more issues than a democratically organized collective is able to participate in as a single
unit. Justification, however, plays a relatively undetermined role in processes of deferral.
As has been seen during debates in the United States around regulating carbon dioxide
emissions, calls for justification are susceptible to being used as a way to continue
67
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inaction or delay action. However, it is equally important to recognize that justification
assists in extending the horizon of concerns addressed, and thus contributes to long-term
planning. The open-ended nature of justification is crucial for understanding its role in
deferral.

3. Vindication and Accountability
Deferral heralds a future moment of judgment, tallying responsibility, and deserts.
This is to say that deferral prefigures accountability as a necessary correlate during which
a judgment is made as to whether an action undertaken in the meantime satisfies the
implicit and explicit terms of deference. Accountability, then, is the closure of a
particular authoritative relationship.
The concept of accountability as reckoning of responsibility, emphasizing the
calculative sense of the word, distinguishes the prudential approach to politics that I
recommend from that employed by more strictly deontological approaches that
emphasize reason-giving. The notion of accountability deriving from Kant is central to
deliberative democratic theories as contributing to the development of public reason and,
thus, providing substance to a theory of legitimacy that cannot be grounded in the consent
of individuals. As Carpini, et al., put it:
Accountability replaces consent as the conceptual core of legitimacy. A legitimate
political order is one that could be justified to all those living under its laws. Thus,
accountability is primarily understood in terms of 'giving an account' of
something; that is, publicly articulating, explaining, and most importantly
justifying public policy.71
Reasonable justification comes to replace consent as a result of a changed emphasis. No
longer is a collective will the philosophical foundation of legitimacy but the process by
71
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which that will is formed, a point made most forcefully by Bernard Manin.72 This line of
thinking is representative of a broader trend of which the formulations of Joshua Cohen
and Seyla Benhabib are prominent examples.73
Replacing consent with reasonable justification as a central tenet of democratic
theory coincides with a more narrow focus on maximizing the reasonableness of
justification at the expense of describing how collectives may hold themselves, or their
representatives, responsible. The deliberative democratic ideas of Amy Gutmann and
Dennis Thompson exhibit this conflation of accountability with justification that, even
where the authors claim to be advancing substantive principles for deliberation that
supersede a strictly procedural approach, reduces the totality of politics to the exchange
of reasons.74 Gutmann and Thompson begin from a notion of accountability as owing an
account, of representatives justifying their decisions. Thus, the fundamental question for
Gutmann and Thompson is whether justifying a decision is desirable or if it is sufficient
for a representative to "stand for election."75 In posing this choice, Gutmann and
Thompson erect a moral constituency in competition with the electoral constituency to
influence a representative's decision.
When constructing their answer Gutmann and Thompson slip between two
meanings of accountability ― as offering a justification and as holding responsible ―
that privileges one over the other. In fact, the authors limit their notion of responsibility
to the onset of the next election cycle, stating that, "Electoral accountability is an
important instrument with which democracies try to ensure that public officials look after
72
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the interests of all citizens."76 What is worrisome in this presentation is that the authors
are unable to conceive of a role for responsibility beyond interest-management. That the
exercise of collective power does not proceed predictably or as intended finds no place in
this sense of responsibility.
In attempting to contextualize environmental problems it is crucial to place equal
emphasis on the circumstances out of which political action is initiated as well as the
moment of responsibility that returns to and reinterprets those circumstances. The
concept of vindication involves a unique temporal displacement that is capable of
transforming an initially unjustified decision into a justified one retroactively or vice
versa. Jon Elster points out that the graphe paranomon allowed for this sort of retroactive
positing since "[e]ven if the Assembly had passed a decree, its proposer could be
punished later for having put it to a vote."77 This retroactive process constitutes a nonlinear concept of vindication capable of covering linguistic claims as well as the
relationship of expectations to outcomes, a point that is crucial for evaluating whether or
not a given set of environmental policies is effective. As Ivan Zwart has shown in his
analysis of local deliberations, for many respondents, the outcomes were as important in
evaluating the process as a whole while for some the outcomes played an important role
in evaluating the deliberative procedure itself.78
By incorporating consequences as a component of judging action, the justificatory
projections and specific terms offered at the initial moment of deference return as a basis
of judgment supplemented by the force of actuality. Such a possibility is anathema to a
deontological approach insofar as it rests on the penetration of circumstances into
76
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evaluations, thus breaking down their idealized status. The need to modify the notion of
accountability as holding responsible follows from the conception of political action as
entangled agency outlined above since it is not possible to "anchor responsibility, either
analytically or ontologically, in advance to the scene of power in which encounters with
others occur."79
Hannah Arendt's critique of the historical shift from a Roman conception of
freedom to a Christian conception of freedom as free will provides insight into what
accountability and responsibility mean in a world of uncertainty and irreversibility.
Arendt describes the loss of virtuosity as a component of freedom. What is borne of this
shift is a new tallying of responsibility that poses its question in either/or terms. Arendt
turns to Machiavelli precisely because he rejects this method of accounting. The result of
understanding freedom in terms of an interior decision of the will is that the actor was
reshaped in the image of the sovereign individual, an assumption central to deliberative
democratic claims to transformative and transcendent possibilities during willformation.80
This new mode of attributing responsibility is problematic for two reasons. First,
as Arendt is quick to point out, "it leads either to a denial of human freedom [...] or to the
insight that the freedom of one man, or a group, or a body politic can be purchased only
at the price of the freedom, i.e., the sovereignty, of all others."81 The establishment of
this zero-sum scenario is, according to Arendt, an illusion that "can be maintained only
by the instruments of violence." 82 The second problem is that the calculation of
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responsibility that the sovereign (or autonomous) self engenders is much more limited in
that one can only be responsible for the direct results of one's acts prior to other factors
intervening. Another way to say this is that once the transition from virtuosity to will is
completed, the potential for excess responsibility is nullified. It is this second issue that
is most illuminating for my purposes.
Arendt describes this excess responsibility as central to the notion of politics.
Allow me to quote at some length:
That deeds possess such an enormous capacity for endurance, superior to every
other man-made product, could be a matter of pride if men were able to bear its
burden, the burden of irreversibility and unpredictability, from which the action
process draws its very strength. That this is impossible, men have always known.
They have known that he who acts never quite knows what he is doing, that he
always becomes 'guilty' of consequences he never intended or even foresaw, that
no matter how disastrous and unexpected the consequences of his deed he can
never undo it, that the process he starts is never consummated unequivocally in
one single deed or event, and that its very meaning never discloses itself to the
actor but only to the backward glance of the historian who himself does not act.
All this is reason enough to turn away with despair from the realm of human
affairs and to hold in contempt the human capacity for freedom, which, by
producing the web of human relationships, seems to entangle its producer to such
an extent that he appears much more the victim and the sufferer than the author
and doer of what he has done.83
The notion of responsibility beyond an act cannot be fit into a moral calculus that must
assume an exhaustive connection between the intention and the outcome. What Arendt
reminds us of is another, political world in which uncertainty and irreversibility govern
action. It is this set of dynamics that is most important for penetrating to the core of
political action since it is this amalgamation of agency and necessity that makes actors
both more and less guilty. As Arendt puts it, the impossible accounting of responsibility
is not only the result of a non-nonsensical marriage of opposites, but is also a threat to the
very notion of action altogether:
83
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[...] to accuse freedom of luring man into necessity, to condemn action, the
spontaneous beginning of something new, because its results fall into a
predetermined net of relationships, invariably dragging the agent with them, who
seems to forfeit his freedom the very moment he
makes use of it. The only
salvation from this kind of freedom seems to lie in non-acting, in abstention from
the whole realm of human affairs as the only means to safeguard one's
sovereignty and integrity as a person.84
While Arendt grasps the significance of freedom and the paralyzing effect it can have,
she emphasizes only the initiation of the political act. For her, beginning is the
quintessential act.
Though she grasps the dynamics of prudential politics, Arendt truncates the
process in order to downplay the importance of accountability as a corresponding
political act. Iris Marion Young offers a corrective that focuses on responsibility in
highly complicated circumstances. Young critiques what she calls a "liability model" of
responsibility, focusing instead on the role of institutions as mediating relationships
across spatial boundaries. Young's shift of emphasis, which I deal with further in Chapter
5, enables us to analyze the operation of institutions in their social-behavioral context
while also providing a framework for understanding how justification preceding deferral
can mitigate but not eliminate responsibility.
There are two primary areas of ambiguity that remain to be theorized. First, by
equalizing the emphasis on deferral and accountability, I offer a more flexible conception
of political time than that seen in the case of deontological theories of legitimacy.
However, there remains the problem of how deferral and accountability can capture
differences in population as occur with long-term intergenerational problems. Must
authoritative relationships involve the same population for both the moments of deferral
and accountability? If so, how can an authoritative relationship be analyzed on the basis
84
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of long-term planning? Second, attending to consequences raises an epistemological
problem that is avoided by deontological accounts: if any particular policy successfully
eliminates an environmental threat there is not necessarily any evidence available to
vindicate the initial projections. While taking the uncertainty of projections seriously, it is
still necessary to answer what conditions distinguish an authoritative relationship
constructed on the basis of an accurate prediction from that premised upon an inaccurate
prediction?
The claims of deliberative democracy, framed in terms of communicative
rationality or of public reason, suggest that environmental political theorists are requiring
that democracy become a rational plan for approximately predictable behavior, a task that
I claim is beyond its capacity.85 The assertion that the reasonable exchange of arguments
and perspectives consistently transforms the will of political actors carries a great deal of
the conceptual burden for deliberative democrats, generally, and Habermasian
deliberationists, especially. However, the substantive preconditions for democratic
participation to forge commonality exist in the background and remain available to
participants through the operation of social-behavioral norms. The attempt by
deliberative democrats to make all norms explicit undermines the very background that it
presupposes, thus transforming an implicit resource capable of assisting democratic
participation into an obstacle just as capable of dividing participants. Despite the
unpredictable and unreliable nature of social-behavioral norms, a point that leads some to
reject relying upon them,86 they are an element of environmental politics that are
problematic to assume and detrimental to ignore.
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CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL LIMITATIONS TO ENVIRONMENTALLY ORIENTED
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION

As discussions regarding the desirability and preconditions of deliberative
democracy have been ongoing for two decades, deliberative democracy has achieved a
near-certain status - for democratic theorists of a liberal persuasion - as the only
acceptable form of political action.1 In discussions about the prospects for
environmentally responsive politics, the desirability and likely viability of deliberative
democracy are taken as something of a truism.2 While some debate remains around the
particulars of implementation and the relative approximation to formal preconditions that
are sufficient for effective deliberation, arguments that seek to establish the theoretical
limitations imposed by deliberative democracy are less frequent.3 Even where theoretical
concerns come to the fore, these are primarily posed in terms of legitimacy, a category
that I have argued is constrained in ways that close off important aspects of an
authoritative relationship between deferral and accountability, a relationship that
demands further exploration in the context of an environmental politics.4
The primary purpose of this chapter is to establish the theoretical limits of
deliberative democracy before turning to an analysis of the practical limitations of
problem domains in the following chapter. I develop this limitation by analyzing the
types of problems presupposed by Habermas‘s theory of deliberative democracy. The
1
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overarching thesis is that Habermas‘s deliberative democracy is structured in such a way
that it inevitably fails when confronted by ‗typical‘ but cognitively complex
environmental problems. Thus, while I approach the topic via the conception of a project
of modernity that forms the philosophical backdrop to Habermas‘s theory of deliberative
democracy, I do so with the intent of inquiring into the extent to which deliberative
democracy theoretically addresses issues of concern that arise in the context of the
environment. This approach is partially a response to what appears to be the assumed
plausibility of communicative action as the most appropriate conceptualization and
deliberative democracy as the most appropriate forum for addressing environmental
conflicts.5
Another, secondary purpose of this chapter consists of two challenges to the
purported relationship between norms and lifeworld: first, acknowledging the role of
behavioral norms as lying, partially, beyond subjective rational position-taking and,
second, challenging the assumed principle of motivation6 and the characterization of
interdependency7 that serve as the central step in Habermas‘s argument regarding the
transition from communicative action to collective purposive action. In the case of
behavioral norms, I detail the fragility that underlies the background of the shared
lifeworld within which norms break down and require communication to repair. I begin
from the claim that Habermas‘s diagnosis of the differentiation of system and lifeworld in
modernity leads him to attribute too great a role to the rationality inherently available in
norms. I argue that this attribution results from his reliance upon an originary political
imagination in which the initiation of a ‗project‘ of modernity located in the historical
5
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emergence of the political public sphere takes on the function of an ‗equiprimordial‘
moment that grounds constitutional democracy as the horizon of modernity.8 This
originary imagination, which Habermas criticizes in its ‗Germanist‘ variety, disguises the
leap of faith required to make his theory of communicative action appear as a successful
response to the diagnosis of a fragmented and persistently challenged lifeworld. That is,
Habermas‘s understanding of behavioral norms as transformable by rational deliberation
fails to redress the very conditions that lead to the fragility of the lifeworld under
modernity. More precisely, Habermas‘s own arguments regarding the internal relation
between subjective experience and lifeworld suggest that norms are more closely tied to
unthematized knowledge in the form of experience than to rational procedures. Thus, any
‗remedy‘ of the crises that emerge from the contingency of experience will necessitate a
fuller description of the relationship between subjective experience, intersubjective norms,
and political institutions, a matter that I take up throughout later chapters.
The second aspect of my argument regarding the relationship between norms and
lifeworld begins with a challenge to the assumed principle of motivation as well as the
assumed context of interdependence. These assumptions supply Habermas with the
argumentative resources to link the transition from communicative action in the form of
deliberative democracy to collective purposive action. Habermas supposes that the
changes in conviction that are the goal of communicative action (citation) are sufficient
for motivating behavior consistent with one‘s commitment to the anticipated
consequences of a course of action. I find this principle of motivation suspect in that it
posits behavior as fully determinable by rational decisions. Habermas derives this
assumption from a conception of the subject that is:
8
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a. fully aware of his/her own intentions and motivations,
b. willing to reflect critically upon these fully known motivations, and
c. capable of transposing seamlessly a rational decision into a set of behaviors
consistent with these beliefs.9
In challenging this principle of motivation I draw on Habermas‘s own claims regarding
the necessity of morally constrained coercive institutions, which fulfill the conditions of
legitimacy, for enforcing the reciprocity of commitments made by deliberative
participants. It is the need for a remedy to the Hobbesian anxiety regarding reciprocity
that belies the insufficiency of Habermas‘s theory of motivation.
The core of my argument boils down to the claim that both communicative rationality
and discourse ethics involve a projection of consequences to which discourse participants
commit themselves in the course of deliberation. However, the projection of
consequences that Habermas envisions rests on a presupposed chain of events that can be
predicted with near-certainty. The failure of deliberative democracy, then, occurs when
probabilistic claims, which are integrally uncertain predictions (e.g., multivariate
correlations with broad confidence intervals), serve as the basis for predicting
consequences as is the case with many environmental problems. As challenges to validity
move from the background of unthematized knowledge (lifeworld) to the foreground,
thus requiring positive justification, a new difficulty arises. Going from ‗absolute
certainty‘ to newly emergent assumption, background claims must be thematized in order
to function as propositions whose validity can be assessed.10 This theoretical move is
made possible by treating the ―projection of a moral world and the presupposition of an
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objective world‖ as functionally equivalent.11 However, the uncertainty that is subdued in
the communicative process is no longer operative when translated into probabilistic
prediction as opposed to a propositional claim. As environmental problems necessitate
discourses of justification and application, the probabilistic character of environmental
projection introduces difficulties that are best met by prudential, as opposed to principled,
political action. My burden, then, is not to provide an exhaustive analysis of the complete
array of environmental problems and the limitations of deliberative democracy in relation
to each. Instead, it is to establish that some relevant issues cannot be addressed
effectively within the framework of deliberative democracy. Determining which issues
will be the aim of the following chapter.

A. Modernity as Historical Diagnosis and as Unfinished Project
Modernity plays a crucial role as the diagnostic background against which
Habermas constructs his theory of deliberative democracy. While following Weber in
many ways, Habermas is at great pains to circumvent the conclusion that instrumental
rationality forms an ‗iron cage.‘ The bases for achieving this balance are located in the
initiation of the ‗project‘ of modernity, specifically in the translation of reflexive reason
into procedures of (political) argumentation. Famously characterizing modernity as an
‗unfinished project‘, Habermas spurred a series of responses to his conception of
modernity, both extending and criticizing his arguments.12 Given the depth and breadth of
the responses available I intend to focus on (a) summarizing those features relevant to my
argument and (b) explaining how they rest problematically on a set of temporal
displacements that replicate the problems with originary and entropic political
11
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imaginations outlined in Chapter 1. Thus, I do not seek a comprehensive account of
Habermas‘s conception of modernity nor do I intend to develop all of its implications.
Instead, I emphasize Habermas‘s description of modernity in order to allow discussion of
its connections to his theory of communicative action generally and to deliberative
democracy specifically.
Summarizing the notion of communicative action that Habermas employs below, I
begin with the historical narrative of the fragmenting of a pre-modern social order that
fused communicative and strategic action through institutions possessing a non-rational
component of sacred power. In my view, it is not coincidental that the very historical
moment that Habermas posits as the emergence of constitutional democracy –– the most
obviously political dimension of modernity –– is viewed by Max Weber as retaining a
strongly religious and unavoidably coercive component that upholds solidarity. On the
basis of this account it is possible to see the immensity of the problems Habermas poses
for his reconstructive theory and the leap of faith he must take in order to claim that legal
norms are sufficient for minimizing the risk of dissension. Viewed as a tale of authority
transformed, Habermas attempts to purge authority of its historically religious residue.
However, this residue is still discernable in conventions and norms, although not
necessarily justified by religious doctrines, as well as in the ‗authority‘ that Habermas
claims underlies them.
Adapting a diagnosis of modernity from Weber and the Frankfurt School,
Habermas views modernity as the encroachment of instrumental rationality into more and
more domains of social and political life. However, Habermas eschews the conclusion of
‗inescapability‘ drawn most poignantly by Adorno in his Negative Dialectics. For
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Habermas, the conditions that characterize modernity are the ―explosion‖ of a unified
realm of meaning. As he puts it, the ‗pluralizing of universes of discourses is a
specifically modern experience‘.13 This diagnosis informs two of the premises from
which Habermas‘s historical account of modernity departs: first, the increasing
differentiation of system and lifeworld and, second, the fragmentation of the lifeworld
into analytically distinct, constitutive domains. In order to arrive at a different conclusion
from Horkheimer and Adorno, Habermas must find the means of theoretically
encapsulating the domains of art, morality, and science within the lifeworld in such a way
that the lines that demarcate them no longer serve as a permanent obstacle to the
employment of reason across domains. This employment of reason across domains
within a differentiated lifeworld and between subjects at risk of being unable or unwilling
to engage in communication aimed at rationally motivated agreement constitutes the
promise of commensurabilty. This attempt is also confronted with the problem of
establishing a response that does not minimize or neglect the effects of divergence of
system and lifeworld.
From the outset, summarizing this conception of modernity poses a serious
difficulty insofar as Habermas employs the term modernity as both a historical diagnosis
and a project to be continued. This can be remedied to some extent by recognizing the
internal relationship between the two approaches. To begin with, Habermas in his
―Modernity: An Unfinished Project‖ works to disconnect the time-consciousness that lies
at the core of modernity from being ascribed solely to nineteenth century literaryaesthetic developments. Pushing the origin of modernity back a half-century, Habermas
locates a reflexive orientation to the present in Kant‘s critiques and, more precisely, in
13
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Hegel‘s interpretation of those critiques. To put this in terms of Habermas‘s own
philosophy, he shifts the terrain of modernity from the aesthetic to the cognitive
dimension proffered by the Enlightenment.
This, however, is only part of the tale. While Kant and Hegel mark the origins of
the project of modernity and the aesthetic characterization marks the cultural basis of
modernity, there remains a social dimension to modernity that encapsulates crucial
changes that define Habermas‘s historical diagnosis.
The historical diagnosis of modernity comprises five basic changes in the socialmaterial life of European society. The first, and most basic, change is the developmental
differentiation between lifeworld and system. The split between ‗traditional‘ modes of
social organization and action coordination through intimately corresponding structures
of authority serves as the key political transformation that designates the beginning of
modernity. Habermas, here, sees the new constitutional democracies, specifically the
American and French Revolutions, and subsequent development of an administrative
state as exemplary. This can be seen in a summary statement by Habermas:
―It is true, of course, that in the Conflict of the Faculties, Kant went beyond the
systematic boundaries of this philosophy and raised the French Revolution to the
level of a ‗historical sign‘ for the possibility of a moral progress of humanity. But in
the theory itself we find no trace of the constitutional assemblies of Philadelphia
and Paris –– at least not the reasonable trace of a great, dual historical event that we
can now see in retrospect as an entirely new beginning. With this event began a
project that holds together a rational constitutional discourse across the
centuries.‖14
Furthermore, this is accompanied by dramatic transformations in the relationship of
lifeworld activities to market incentives and the consolidation of a capitalist mode of
action-coordination that has instrumental rationality as its central principle of operation.
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The functional split between lifeworld and system can hardly be described as
completed at its moment of inception, but is nonetheless taken as a practical marker for
the beginning of modernity. However, a second process of differentiation becomes
visible within the lifeworld as the cultural, social, and personality-structuring domains
come to produce pressures of their own that individuals are left to navigate without
authoritative guidance. This second feature of the historical diagnosis of modernity is
characterized as much by the fragmentation of domains as by the pluralization of
potential attitude orientations within these domains. Habermas describes the effects of
these changes: ―Individuals, groups, and nations have drifted far apart in their
backgrounds of biographical and social-cultural experience. This pluralization of
diverging universes of discourse belongs to specifically modern experience; the
shattering of naïve consensus is the impetus for what Hegel calls ‗the experience of
reflection‘.‖15 Thus, differentiation within the lifeworld introduces the potential for
incommensurability.
The broad-scale differentiation of a once coherently unified lifeworld enables not
only the increased expansion of instrumental rationality but, as Habermas argues, new
forms of rationality tied to the onset of a time-conscious and other-induced reflexivity. In
particular, Habermas finds in this reflexivity the resources for a reconstructed
communicative rationality, which is inherently directed toward mutual understanding.
The increasing rationalization of the various domains of the lifeworld –– cultural, social,
and personality-structuring –– transforms the pre-modern fusion of facticity and validity
into a tension. According to Habermas‘s historical narrative, normativity and facticity
were ―fused‖ in pre-modern times in such a way that this fusion reduced the risk of
15
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dissension arising from ‗disappointing experiences‘ and historical contingency by
providing a coherent and internally-referential worldview. Habermas describes the
relationship between experience and risk of dissension:
For the risk of disagreement receives ever new sustenance from experiences.
Experiences disrupt the routinized and taken-for-granted aspects of life and
constitute a wellspring of contingency. Experiences frustrate expectations, run
counter to habitual modes of perception, trigger surprises, make us conscious of
new things.16
The fusion of facticity and validity in pre-modern social order erects relatively stable
boundaries around dissension by comprehensively referring experience to an
authoritative framework:
The three attributes of immediacy, totalizing power, and holistic constitution
belonging to this unthematically presupposed [background] knowledge may
perhaps explain the lifeworld‘s paradoxical function as ‗ground‘ (Boden): how it
keeps contingency in check through proximity to experience.17
To put the matter more precisely, experience and contingency were constrained by the
referential relationship between facticity and normative validity in that the justification of
‗what ought to be‘ always found corresponding support in ‗what is.‘
The fourth feature of Habermas‘s historical diagnosis is closely related to the
third—rationalization. The onset of modernity is simultaneously the erosion of
Christianity as the fundamental point of reference for philosophical thought, a point to
which Kant retained a strong attachment in his speculations on the origins of humankind,
as well as the more general loss of an authoritative ground of reference. This process of
secularization, as Habermas would have it, is crucial for explaining not only the openness
that would come to characterize encounters between pluralized lifeworlds, but also for
justifying Habermas‘s claim that modernity is beset by the need to supply authority on its
16
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own terms—that is, immanently. Here Habermas diverges most obviously from Weber‘s
diagnosis insofar as he is reluctant to acknowledge a residual sacred authority underlying
the shift to plural, but overlapping, lifeworlds that are capable of sustaining a sufficient
degree of solidarity to enable communicative rationality to function. I will elaborate on
this issue later.
As the loss of an authoritative center became expressed in the independent
operation of aesthetic, moral, and cognitive domains, modernity came to be experienced
as an epoch endowed with a greater degree of complexity. This fifth characteristic,
increasing complexity, takes on the form of specialization and accumulated knowledge
within each domain. Thus, on this account, the world of art develops its own vocabulary
and, in the nineteenth century, new ‗movements‘ take shape that situate themselves in
relation to the more narrowly defined terrain of the artist. Habermas invokes Baudelaire
as, if not the initiator, the exemplar of the self-referentiality of aesthetic discourse.
Such specialization is not limited to the aesthetic dimension of the lifeworld, as
Habermas points out. While morality comes to have a stronger, more formalized focus,
following upon Kant‘s claim to the priority of autonomy, it also solidifies around a rather
narrowly defined set of issues that mirror the loss of authoritative grounds. This, for
instance, is Habermas‘s means of understanding the role of Kant‘s categorical imperative
and the attendant need to establish grounds for obligation in a moral world whose
modality is practical reason.
In terms of the cognitive dimension of the lifeworld, science takes on the most
visible form of specialization in its attempt to deal with the complexity opened up by the
loss of a singular authoritative ground. Here, Descartes‘ concurrent attempts to locate the
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foundations of the autonomous subject and to establish verifiable knowledge of optics are
illuminating. The erection of object-bound disciplines and the quest for a generalizable
method of experimentation capable of persuading others on universally agreeable terms,
then, makes science in many ways the discourse par excellence of Habermas‘s modernity.
As I have suggested, though, this historical diagnosis finds its philosophical
counterpart in the claim to an ‗unfinished‘ project of modernity, initiated by Kant‘s
critical approach to reason and in Hegel‘s refashioning of the critical project into a
temporally situated reflexivity. Habermas recounts:
Kant had conceived of reason as the faculty of ideas which expand the manifold of
an endless multiplicity into a totality. On the one hand, ideas project the totality of
possible appearances in space and time connected under causal laws. On the other
hand, ideas also constitute a kingdom of ends, defined as the totality of intelligible
beings subject only to self-legislated laws. With Hegel‘s critique of Kant, ideas also
received the additional power of a self-reflective self-recuperation of their own
objectifications, and thus the power to consciously reintegrate an increasingly
higher-level differentiation. Reason with a capital ‗R‘ now gave the world process
as a whole the structure of a totality of totalities.18
Thus, the ambivalence of modernity derives from the centrality and priority of critical
and reflexive reason itself. On the one hand is the potential to generate the normative
validity underlying social order itself through processes of collective, public reasoning
embodying popular sovereignty. On the other hand is the notion of an immanent
normativity, a groundless self-grounding, which transforms the plurality of autonomous
subjects and varied lifeworlds into a matter of incommensurable arenas of
communication. Combined with the issue of incommensurability, popular sovereignty
takes on the tone of coercive imposition upon autonomous subjects with no recourse but
to fend for themselves.
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The project of modernity displays, according to Habermas, an ambivalence that can
easily transform into the pessimism of a negative dialectics or a ―new conservatism‖ that
attacks reason itself.19 Claiming not to lose sight of this ambivalence, Habermas seeks to
retain a productive tension without allowing reason to devolve into persistent aporia. As
Thomas McCarthy puts it, ―Habermas argues that the discontents of modernity are rooted
not in rationalization as such but in the failure to develop and institutionalize in a
balanced way all the different dimensions of reason opened up by the modern
understanding of the world.‖20 Posing this project within a philosophical context
circumscribed by metaphysics on one side and a strong form of contextualism on the
other side, Habermas claims that the ―metaphysical priority of unity above plurality and
the contextualistic priority of plurality above unity are secret accomplices.‖21 Habermas
purports to ‗balance‘ them by demonstrating ―the unity of reason only remains
perceptible in the plurality of its voices –– as the possibility in principle of passing from
one language into another.‖22 Thus, Habermas‘s conception of the project of modernity is
fundamentally a promise of commensurability through mutual understanding.
The project of modernity can be understood more precisely by identifying the three
problems that are overcome in the transition from metaphysical to postmetaphysical
thinking. Habermas characterizes this project as ―the humanism of those who continue
the Kantian tradition by seeking to use the philosophy of language to save a concept of
reason that is skeptical and postmetaphysical, yet not defeatist.‖23 While the obstacles
attributed to metaphysics are interrelated, they are not resolved in a single step. Instead, it
19
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is the grafting of Kantian critique onto a sociological conception of the individual, one
mediated by a universal pragmatics of language, that leads Habermas to his supposed
resolution.
The first two problems, then, are posed at the outset of modernity in a reinvigorated
reflection on metaphysical speculation and rational skepticism. In this instance, Kant is
viewed as initiating a mode of thought capable of overcoming the problem of the identity
of the One and the Many (Problem 1) and the problem of matter as non-being (Problem
2).24 The problems of identity passed on from Platonic metaphysics led Kant to confront
a ‗metaphysical paradox‘: because metaphysics poses its problem ontologically, ―it
vainly tries to subsume the one itself under objectifying categories; but as the origin,
ground, and totality of all beings, the one is what first constitutes the perspective that
allows the many to be objectivated [sic] as the plurality of beings.‖25 At the core of the
two problems that Habermas identifies is the ―transcendental illusion that the one and the
whole must correspond to objects.‖26 It is precisely in ―the turn away from a rational
unity derived from the objective order of the world and toward a concept of reason as the
subjective faculty of idealizing synthesis‖ that Habermas is able to attribute to Kant the
resolution of the metaphysical paradox.27 The positing of ontological status in terms of
reflexive epistemological relationships enables Kant to claim to have demonstrated that
synthetic knowledge upholds unity (the One) in difference (the Many).
By taking the totality of beings and making it dependent upon the synthetic
accomplishments of the subject, Kant downgrades the cosmos into the object
domain of the nomological natural sciences. The world of appearances is no longer
24
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a ‗whole organized according to ends.‘ Thus, although the transcendental concept
of the world traces everything back to one, it differs from the old metaphysical
concept of the world in that it can no longer also satisfy the need for establishing a
meaningful organization, an organization that would absorb contingencies,
neutralize what is negative, and calm the fear of death, of isolation, and of what is
simply new.28
Here we find repeated a primary component of Habermas‘s project, the unraveling
of a teleological metaphysics. In order to account for Kant‘s retention of a teleological
account of history as natural laws, such as those that propel humankind through war to a
state of peace, Habermas interprets Kant as ‗downgrading‘ the role of telos into a matter
of scientific verifiability. This interpretation is more reflective of Habermas‘s own
insistence on the revision and accumulation of claims to cognitive validity than any
definitive statement on the part of Kant to frame universal history as still in need of
revision. In fact, Kant must presuppose that such knowledge is, at least, near completion
in order to justify his political positions. It would remain for Hegel, who Habermas seems
to be reading back into Kant here, to articulate the conclusive nature of this telos.
However, the division of the world into noumenal and phenomenal realms places
the transcendental unity out of philosophic reach.
In exchange, Kant now offers the compensation of another world, namely the
intelligible. True, the latter remains closed off to theoretical knowledge, but its
rational core, the moral world, is nonetheless attested to by the fact of the ‗ought.‘
That is, unlike the cosmological idea, the idea of freedom finds support in the moral
law; it not only regulates but determines moral action […]. It is only the affiliated
concept of a ‗world of rational beings‘ that is regulative, a world in which each acts
as if, through his maxims, he were at all times a legislating member in the universal
kingdom of ends. In this way like theoretical reason, practical reason also projects n
unconditioned unity of all conditions in general –– but this time the whole to which
it is directed is that of an ‗ethical-civic‘ commonwealth.29
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Kant finds this unity manifested in the realm of practical reason as the identity in
difference of a categorical imperative rescaled and made concrete in the form of
consensual political association; that is, through a socially contracted legislative
procedure that universally binds each in their equal status as citizen. Thus, the
relationship between public and private reason takes on a special role as the only
expression of transcendental unity available. As I discuss below, the theoretical
grounding of unity in diversity is central to communicative reason as a promise of
commensurability, which retains a Kantian residue that needs to project a universal
community in order to justify the agreement made amongst subjects in an actual
association.
The third obstacle posed by metaphysics for a postmetaphysical project of
modernity was left unresolved by Kant. The ―inherited problem of the ineffability of the
individual‖ is, according to Habermas, poorly answered by the philosophy of
consciousness from which Kant and Hegel start out.30 In order to overcome this obstacle
while accounting for the possibility of communicative action in the context of plural,
differentiated lifeworlds, Habermas turns to G.H. Mead‘s arguments for a more situated
conception of the individual. By linking the subjective (1st person) perspective to an
intersubjective perspective (2nd person) via processes of socialized individuation,
Habermas reclaims the linguistic preconditions necessary for communicative action.31
Where the philosophy of consciousness upheld a strong subject in order to warrant the
unified synthetic judgment necessary to overcome the problems of difference in identity
and of the non-being of matter, it was insufficient for explaining how the individual
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comes about. Thus, the philosophy of consciousness introduces the individual subject
only to threaten to delimit the subjective perspective in such a way that individuals
interact only from an objective, third person perspective that leads to the
incommensurability of subjective perspectives. The subtext, then, is that for Habermas to
place communicative action as the answer to incommensurability he must find a means of
justifying the claim that the subjective, first person attitude is capable of being
transformed into an intersubjective, second person attitude without immediately passing
into an objective attitude. Mead provides this justification with his notion of socialized
individuation. Habermas develops this into a full-blown theory of communicative
rationality by articulating a universal pragmatics of language.

B. The Promise of Commensurability
At the basis of Habermas‘s argument for the unfinished project of modernity lies a
claim to avoid the Scylla and Charybdis of metaphysics and a strong version of
contextualism. Claiming to have resolved the problems posed by metaphysics through a
universal pragmatic reconstruction of Kant, Habermas must confront the threat posed by
a strong contextualism, which risks positing subjective experience in such a way as to
render any possibility of communicative action moot. If subjective experience ceases to
fulfill the basic communicative prerequisites that Habermas claims are inherent in speech
acts then a project that takes reason as translatable across differentiated domains fails. As
Habermas describes this demand, ―From the possibility of reaching understanding
linguistically, we can read off a concept of situated reason that is given voice in validity
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claims that are both context-dependent and transcendent.‖32 Thus, Habermas must
demonstrate that communicative rationality is not merely an assumption by establishing
the commensurability of subjective experience such that it is capable of sustaining
intersubjective action coordination.
The initial resolution to this problem lies in the notion of socialized individuation.
Beginning with a situated conception of the subject that admits of both the effects of
being ‗embedded‘ within an already existing social order and the inherent prospect of
fulfilling a unique life-plan, Habermas‘s notion of subjectivity remains consistent with
his diagnosis of modernity. However, the problem is not entirely resolved. While this
conception of the subject posits the preconditions of commensurability, the theoretical
burden is born by the linguistic capacities with which the subject is outfitted. Habermas‘s
account of language establishes the remaining conditions for his argument regarding
commensurability by locating within language an inherent reference to a shared lifeworld
background as well as subject orientation to that world and others encountered in it.
The account of a shared lifeworld derives from Habermas‘s account of language in
that the precondition for understanding is membership within a linguistic community,
which itself rests on the potential for reference to commonly recognizable features of the
world. Habermas describes this as the ―supposition of a common objective world […]
built in to the pragmatics of every single linguistic usage.‖33 While this common
objective world is limited to membership within a linguistic community, this feature is a
universal characteristic of language that necessarily applies to all linguistic communities
as a transcendental possibility. By positing a formal pragmatics of language as the key
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enabling him to work out of the purported ‗defeatist‘ impasse that his Frankfurt School
predecessors ran into, Habermas provides the philosophical underpinnings for his
argument regarding commensurability. As he puts it:
[C]ommunicatively acting subjects are freed from the work of world-constituting
syntheses. They already find themselves within the context of a lifeworld that
makes their communicative actions possible, just as it is in turn maintained through
the medium of these processes of reaching understanding.34
Habermas, then, establishes the referential precondition of commensurability, which is
itself the precondition for an immanent transcendence, on the basis of universal attributes
of language that stand in a relationship of mutual presupposition with the lifeworld
background.
The final condition of commensurability is the orientation of communicative actors.
Drawing on Searle‘s account of speech acts, Habermas posits a weak form of
transcendence inherent in the act of understanding. Distinguishing the first, second, and
third person perspectives taken up by actors in the use of language, Habermas develops a
theory of meaning on the basis of the orientation expressed in each perspective: first
person subjective, second person intersubjective (social), and third person objective. On
the basis of this categorization Habermas explains how subjects enter into varied
relationships with society and the objective world. Even in light of his revised notion of
understanding of speech acts as knowledge of the conditions for illocutionary or
perlocutionary success, Habermas upholds the centrality of intersubjective orientation.
It is important to note that reference and orientation are preconditions, but not
necessarily in the sense of a subject‘s choosing to adopt an orientation. Instead, these
features are built into language, incorporating a transcendental possibility into
34
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communication. Thus, even where subjects explicitly differ, Habermas finds the
preconditions for commensurability:
Convictions can contradict one other only when those who are concerned with
problems define them in a similar way, believe them to need resolution, and want to
decide issues on the basis of good reasons. / To be sure, it is also a characteristic of
modernity that we have grown accustomed to living with dissent in the realm of
questions that admit of ‗truth‘; we simply put controversial validity claims to one
side ‗for the time being.‘ Nonetheless, we perceive this pluralism of contradictory
convictions as an incentive for learning processes; we live in the expectation of
future resolutions.35
Of relevance, then, is the shared background built into disagreement through the
linguistic necessity of a common reference point, about which participants disagree, and
as the impetus for upholding a (contradictory) position in the first place.
The way in which future expectations come to assuage contradictions in the present
is not an accidental feature of Habermasian communication. By enclosing participants‘
contradictory positions within a unified lifeworld Habermas is able to assert that
communicative reason is simultaneously unified and differentiated, thus arriving at the
penultimate step in the project of modernity. He summarizes this:
My reflections point toward the thesis that the unity of reason only remains
perceptible in the plurality of its voices –– as the possibility in principle of passing
from one language into another –– a passage that, no matter how occasional, is still
comprehensible. This possibility of mutual understanding, which is now
guaranteed only procedurally and is realized only transitorily, forms the
background for the existing diversity of those who encounter one another –– even
when they fail to understand each other.36
Given that Habermas‘s conclusion for a fulfilled promise of commensurability under the
complex conditions of modernity includes important qualifications, the question remains:
Under such circumstances are procedural guarantees and transitory realization of mutual
35
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understanding sufficient for sustaining a lifeworld background diminished not only by the
intrusion of instrumental reason into forms of social interaction but also by problems
arising from within the procedures of deliberative democracy itself, e.g., abstention and
risks of dissension? When placed in the context of the fragility of the lifeworld in
modernity and the complications besetting the ability to rationally motivate actors, these
qualifications take the tone of serving as a last line of defense as opposed to a program
for furthering social integration. It is in the gap between the imperatives of a fragile
lifeworld and a suspect principle of motivation that I claim Habermas takes a ‗leap of
faith‘ with regards to the success of communicative action as a foundation for politics. In
order to remedy this leap of faith, Habermas is forced to rely on the threat of sanction
present in positive law in place of a sufficient principle of motivation.

C. Communicative Motivation and Legally Enforced Reciprocity
In the opening chapter of Between Facts and Norms Habermas restates the link
between communicative action and legal norms in terms of stabilizing normative order:
―how the validity and acceptance of a social order can be stabilized once communicative
actions become autonomous and clearly begin to differ, in the view of the actors
themselves, from strategic interactions.‖37 Posing the question of his political theory in
terms of stability relies on his specific historical narrative of the emergence of modernity.
In Habermas‘s recounting of modernization, the differentiation of lifeworld and system
are accompanied by the dislocation of the tension between facticity and validity.
Habermas here views pre-modern (European) society as characterized by the fusion of
facticity and validity in a relationship stabilized by ‗archaic institutions‘. The resulting
37
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image of modernity, particularly as it is presented in the first chapter of Between Facts
and Norms, is of a fundamentally fragile social order that must establish and sustain
normative validity without ‗metasocial‘ or metaphysical guarantees. That is to say,
modernity must generate immanently its own conditions of normative validity. However,
the fragility characteristic of Habermas‘s conception of commensurability is not
adequately resolved based on the terms he provides. The conclusion I draw from this is
that, despite the claim that legal norms effectively stabilize social orders by
supplementing processes of validation for normative claims, what is effectively of
greatest importance is the coercion supplied by the facticity of law, despite the minimal
role that Habermas allows for coercion. Furthermore, coercion leads to ―average norm
compliance‖ taking on a more important role than legitimacy in reducing the risk of
dissension and producing the social integration that is so crucial to deliberative
democracy.38
The different historical contexts that characterize pre-modernity from modernity
introduce an element of fragility in the form of increased risk of dissension. As the
lifeworld loses its unified character during modernization, two sources of dissension are
set loose from their previous certainties. Both disappointing experiences and
contingencies,39 meaning unexpected changes to a state of affairs, serve as the sources for
dissension once they lose the ready answers provided by a metaphysically endowed
lifeworld, which necessarily unifies facticity and validity. Under conditions of modernity,
however, such available answers are treated as uncertain assumptions. With the onset of
modern constitutional democracy opportunities for dissension increase. This is explained
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within Habermas‘s theory by the increase in opportunities for actors to take a yes or no
position on matters that have lost their consensus as unthematized background knowledge.
Specifically, the lifeworld background that was held together in pre-modern times by
transcendental grounds of judgment is transformed into ―permanently endangered
counterfactual presuppositions‖ during modernity.40

1. The Fragility of the Lifeworld
Habermas‘s description of the tension between facticity and validity as ―explosive‖
is only partly suggestive of the fragility of the lifeworld. More telling are the ―normal
options‖ he sees available for communicative action where ―the ever-present risk of
disagreement‖ is ―built into the mechanism of reaching understanding.‖41 He cites five
such options:
a. ―carrying out straightforward ‗repair work‘,‖ which seeks to reconstruct the
shared orientation to reaching understanding.
b. ―putting aside the controversial claims, with the result that the ground of shared
assumptions shrinks‖
c. ―moving into costly discourses of uncertain outcome and open to unsettling
questions‖
d. ―breaking off communication and withdrawing‖
e. ―shifting over to strategic action.‖42
The single factor that Habermas identifies preventing these risks from overwhelming
communicative action as the most likely candidate for social integration is
communicative action‘s relation to the lifeworld. Habermas writes: ―If communicative
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action were not embedded in lifeworld contexts that provide the backing of a massive
background consensus, such risks would make the use of language oriented to mutual
understanding an unlikely route to social integration.‖43 The problem, however, is that on
the basis of his historical account of modernization Habermas is in no position to describe
the lifeworld as providing a ―massive background consensus.‖ Such a characterization
fits more accurately with Habermas‘s account of pre-modernity rather than the
‗pluralized‘ version of the lifeworld that characterizes modernity. In order to illuminate
the differences allow me to begin by quoting at length:
As we engage in communicative action, the lifeworld embraces us as an
unmediated certainty, out of whose immediate proximity we live and speak. This
all-penetrating, yet latent and unnoticed presence of the background of
communicative action can be described as a more intense yet deficient form of
knowledge and ability. To begin with, we make use of this knowledge involuntarily
without reflectively knowing that we possess it at all. What enables background
knowledge to acquire absolute certainty in this way, and even augments its
epistemic quality from a subjective standpoint, is precisely the property that robs it
of a constitutive feature of knowledge: we make use of such knowledge without the
awareness that it could be false. Insofar as all knowledge is fallible and is known to
be such, background knowledge does not represent knowledge at all, in a strict
sense. As background knowledge, it lacks the possibility of being challenged, that
is, of being raised to the level of criticizable validity claims. One can do this only
by converting it from a resource into a topic of discussion, at which point – just
when it is thematized—it no longer functions as a lifeworld background but rather
disintegrates in its background modality. Background knowledge cannot be
falsified as such; no sooner has it been thematized, and thereby cast into the
whirlpool of possible questions, than it decomposes. What lends it its peculiar
stability and first immunizes it against the pressure of contingency-generating
experiences is its unique leveling out of the tension between facticity and validity:
the counterfactual moment of idealization, which always overshoots the given and
first makes a disappointing confrontation with reality possible, is extinguished in
the dimension of validity itself. At the same time, the validity dimension, from
which implicit knowledge acquires the intuitive force of conviction, remains intact
as such.44
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Beginning from the assumption that social orders ―exist through the recognition of
normative validity claims,‖ this account of modernization describes the disintegration of
validity and facticity, which were reconciled in the pre-modern lifeworld.45 It is important
to note that the lifeworld, even in its modern, differentiated form, continues to operate as
‗unmediated certainty‘. The lifeworld, then, stabilizes a set of customs, conventions, and
beliefs that establish the parameters of normative expectations. However, this background
remains unthematized by definition. Any attempt to transpose questions of validity into
issues of rational motivation, that is, any attempt to thematize the quasi-knowledge
inherent in this background, falls short. Although Habermas claims a communicative
basis for such unthematized knowledge, this is suspect, especially if we take
communicative action in its more precisely defined form as an orientation to reach
understanding with others through rational argumentation. To attribute a rational basis to
all pre-modern or ‗archaic‘ institutions –– institutions characterized precisely by their
ability to preclude rational thematization –– not only exhumes contingency and power
from the development of institutions, it also inscribes the solution into origins so that all
that remains is to recover them.
Habermas‘s historical narrative cannot admit of such a recovery precisely because
of the enormity of transformation that differentiates pre-modernity from modernity in
terms of the disruption of normative validity. As he puts it, ―positive law and
postconventional morality emerge co-originally from the crumbling edifice of substantial
ethical life.‖46 Instead, the problem of rationally stabilizing social order carries over into
modernity with important differences about the availability of the lifeworld as
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sufficiently stable and unified. This is made more intelligible by analyzing the stability of
behavioral expectations that occurs with thematized knowledge made available through
―archaic institutions‖47 since the continued influence of these institutions can only be
accounted for by a non-rational (even sacred) attachment that exists beyond the bounds of
Habermas‘s project of modernity.48

2. Dissension and Diminished Lifeworld Background
The lifeworld, then, exhibits a high degree of fragility that leads to an increased
reliance on the procedural guarantees of communicative action and a substantive, if
transitory, realization of communicative agreement. It is at this point that we can begin to
see how environmental problems exacerbate the difficulties of generating sufficiently
binding agreements. Although I limit my claims to environmental issues, it is possible to
generalize to a few other issues that display similar characteristics. In as much as
environmental problems typically involve complexity, probabilistic and uncertain
prediction, and context-dependent claims, attempts at communicative action through
deliberative democratic procedures are confronted with (a) challenges to the cognitive
competency of participants and (b) increased opportunities for participants to challenge
constative claims.49 To put the issue more concisely, environmental problems overburden
a procedural conception of deliberative democracy due to the increased risk of dissension
they introduce.
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In order to articulate this process of overburdening, it is necessary to understand the
way in which the principle of universalization operates as a moral principle that serves as
a logic of argumentation for discourses of justification while the principle of discourse
ethics ―stipulates the basic idea of a moral theory‖ without also serving as part of a logic
of argumentation.50 The principle of universalization (U) states:
Unless all affected can freely accept the consequences and the side effects that the
general observance of a controversial norm can be expected to have for the
satisfaction of the interests of each individual.51
While this specifies conditions that must be met by procedures of argumentation, the
principle of discourse ethics (D) provides the criterion for validity:
Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval
of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse. 52
Both principles involve at their very core a set of projections that establish them as
principles, as opposed to context bound guidelines. In the case of (D), the projection of
―all affected‖ must presume that the scope of the issue at hand is known prior to allotting
the status of an entitled participant. Furthermore, the conditions of approval, the ―could
meet,‖ are also based on a projection of what subjects would conclude if deliberating
based upon communicative reason. Habermas explains that the ―projection of a universe
of self-legislation on the part of free and equal persons imposes the constraints of this
[We-]perspective on the justification of moral statements.‖53 While I will take up the
issues raised by these projections in chapter four when addressing the role of place in
democratic responses to environmental problems, for now it is enough to point to the
necessity for projection itself as a fundamental component of validity.
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Turning to the principle of universalization (U), the element of projection takes on a
specifically temporal tone that is more central to the point at hand. While Habermas
draws attention to the relationship between the autonomous decision of the individual and
social integration (―freely accepted‖ and ―general observance‖), I would like to shift
attention to what is being accepted: expected consequences and side effects of general
observance. Here, projection is no longer about representational legitimacy, as it is with
the principle of discourse ethics. Instead, it combines the ‗as if‘ postulate of Kant‘s
categorical imperative with a set of empirical predictions. It is important to note that
projection of consequences serves more than a supplemental function in the principle of
universalization. As a moral principle, universalization is here defined in terms of consent.
However, for Habermas to claim that consent is a binding force that contributes to social
integration, consent must take on a specific substance – it must answer what is being
consented to. This substance extends beyond regulative claims and into the realm of
empirical claims for, although ―general observance‖ is a regulative matter, what is being
consented to is the expected effects of that regulation. Thus, consent gains its supposed
integrative force not from the exercise of autonomous, uncoerced reason, but from the
commitment to consequences, even if those consequences are not initially projected.
Habermas appears to recognize the centrality of this commitment to consequences
in that he limits the scope of issues that can be handled via deliberative democracy.
Consent as a prospective binding force is limited to instances in which consequences
maintain a high degree of certainty, even if they do not attain to complete certainty.
Habermas describes the limited scope of issues:
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Moral knowledge is obviously affected differently than empirical knowledge by the
history and historical constitution of the world. Indeed, this is the reason for the
peculiar bilevel nature of the moral justification of actions. I am referring to the
familiar point that well-grounded moral norms can claim only validity prima facie.
For ex ante, only the consequences and collateral effects of typical cases, which can
be anticipated, are considered. Unanticipated constellations of conflict situations
that occur subsequently give rise to a further need for interpretation that must be
met from within the altered perspective of a discourse of application. During the
process of application, the norm that is ―appropriate‖ to the situation is selected
from the plurality of warranted norms that might be applied in any given case. […]
universal norms can determine future actions only to the extent that typical,
probable circumstances can be anticipated –– that is, in principle, incompletely.54
So while consent is binding at the level of normative validity and, thus, ―ideal warranted
acceptability‖ establishes a communicatively arrived at norm, this is also a commitment
to an open state of affairs in the future. As Habermas puts it, even where unanticipated
consequences result from typical cases, consent to claims of normative validity also
serves as a commitment to treat such norms as settled regardless of whether the expected
circumstances upon which a subject based consent come about. Where dramatically
different consequences arise, one remains committed to such an extent that the only
actionable path of deliberation is that of interpreting circumstances to determine the most
appropriate validated norm.
In defining ‗rightness‘ or moral validity as ―ideal warranted acceptability,‖
Habermas attempts to rectify the seeming incongruity introduced by his deontological
approach in which one can find oneself committed to a principle based on specific
expectations that are then not met.
Indeed, the agreement that is reached in two steps through morals discourses of
justification and application is subject to a dual fallibilist proviso. In retrospect, we
can learn that we were mistaken about the presumed presuppositions of
argumentation and that we failed to anticipate relevant circumstances.55
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This incongruity appears to be circumvented by underscoring the dependency of
acceptability on the potential for future revision and invalidation, or what Habermas
terms learning. The potential for learning is a necessary correlate of a moral principle that
rests on projection for its content in that it enables Habermas to differentiate the moral
and empirical domains such that empirical contingency cannot disrupt the
unconditionality of consent.56 Habermas sums this up when he states: ―Whereas
successful learning in the public sphere of empirical problems may result in agreement,
learning in the moral domain is assessed in terms of how inclusive such a consensus
reached through reason-giving is.‖57 It is the lack of guarantee and retrospective nature of
learning as well as the insistence on separating moral and empirical problems that I claim
is relevant to assessing the likelihood that environmental problems overburden
deliberative democracy by increasing the risk of dissension.
Of particular relevance is the fact that revisions are not automatic. The settling of a
normative claim to validity allows that norm to return to the status of unmediated
certainty within the lifeworld. Thus, a two-fold problem emerges. On the one hand, a
validated norm may successfully return to the status of unmediated certainty and become
sedimented in such a way that inquiry goes uninitiated. On the other hand, the very
notion of learning demands that the boundaries of the moral (intersubjective 2nd person)
and scientific (objective 3rd person) domains are capable of being overcome. As Thomas
McCarthy points out, Habermas‘s theory does not offer an adequate explanation of how
moral and empirical-scientific claims, that is claims of rightness versus claims of truth,
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are accumulated in a continuous manner or are sufficiently reflexive. McCarthy
emphasizes this problem when he writes:
[E]ven if we grant Habermas his developmental-logical account of the formal
structures of consciousness in general, and of the formal structures of moral and
aesthetic consciousness in particular, there is no clear counterpart to this
accumulation of ‗content‘ across paradigm shifts. […] That is, advances at the
structural level do not seem to entail an accumulation of knowledge at the content
level. This suggests that we cannot put too much weight on the ‗continuous‘ and
‗cumulative‘ character of the production of knowledge in Habermas‘s schema of
rationalizable actor-world relations.58
To restate this in terms of the increased risk of dissension, the unguaranteed prospect of
retrospective revision demands of participants that agreement be made on the basis of a
separation of moral and scientific domains at the moment of commitment that in the
event of unsuccessful resolution will be reopened on the basis of communication across
these separate domains. Since future communication is neither guaranteed nor reopened
on the same terms –– as a discourse of application in place of a discourse of justification
–– the stakes of ‗getting it right‘ the first time are increased. The implication, then, is that
the need to challenge normative and cognitive claims will increase, thus increasing the
risk of settling for actor-relative reasons over actor-independent reasons.
Without repeating the discussion of characteristics entailed in environmental
problems covered in the previous chapter, it is possible to restate the epistemological
aspects of environmental problems relevant to the issue of increased risk of dissension.
To reiterate, these features are:
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a. Complexity: Refers to interdependent relationships that, as John Dryzek
describes them, cannot be captured by single-variable, non-interactive
measurements such that improvement on one variable can hide deterioration on
another variable.59 Thus, environmental problems manifest two forms of
complexity: complex relationships between objects and complex knowledge about
these relationships.
b. Non-linearity: Refers to the inability to assume linear, readily predictable
outcomes in light of the different patterns of recovery and deterioration that occur
within a given ecosystem. In studying an ecosystem it is necessary to take into
account the non-linear processes of recovery that occur. Ecosystems vary in their
sensitivity to stimuli such that a pollutant may cause gradual changes in one
ecosystem while the same pollutant in a different ecosystem must accumulate over
a long period of time before a reaching a sudden ‗tipping point.‘ Furthermore,
decreased levels or outright removal of a pollutant does not necessarily return an
ecosystem to its previous state, or does so only after it has passed through a series
of ‗recovery‘ stages.60
c. Uncertainty: Refers to the inherent limitations imposed on correlative or
probabilistic claims of the sort used in studying complexity. As the number of
variables increases and the relationships between these variables multiply, causal
claims give way to correlative claims that are accurate based on strictly defined
assumptions and within defined limits of confidence.
When it comes to assessing knowledge of environmental problems, claims are accurate
insofar as they are sensitive to context and assumptions about relationships within that
context. This context-dependence is not easily reconciled with the imperative to
universalize that underlies the justification of normative validity.
Habermas acknowledges that justification does not arise ex nihilo but is embedded
in an ongoing process of exchange between application and justification, stating that, ―the
idea of justice recedes from the concrete contexts in which it is embedded into forms of
an inclusive and impartial judgment formation.‖61 The claim that moral norms that merit
recognition evolve from specific contexts into abstract principles, echoing Kohlberg‘s
conception of individual moral development, is further clarified:
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The function of explicating an increasingly abstract idea of justice accrues to an
‗impartiality‘ that is transformed by questions of application and justification only
in the course of dealing with increasing societal complexity. The concrete
representations of justice that initially make possible an impartial evaluation of
individual cases are thus sublimated into a procedural concept of impartial
evaluation that then in turn defines justice. The initial relationship between content
and form is reversed in the course of this development.62
However, the high degree of context-dependence that characterize knowledge about
environmental problems curtails this developmental process since generalization across
cases is minimal. To put it another way, the typical environmental problem is atypical,
which in Habermas‘s model of deliberation returns participants to a discourse of
justification with every new problem. Environmental problems return unthematized
knowledge into the foreground with the initiation of rational deliberation. Such
continuous thematization exacerbates ―the ever-present risk of disagreement built into the
mechanism of reaching understanding.‖63 Opportunities for dissension, then, increase as
participants are able to challenge the validity of cognitive claims that cannot admit of
certainty while also removing the option of treating previous discourses of justification as
settled.
The complex, non-linear, and uncertain character of environmental knowledge
increases more than just the opportunity for dissension, it also increases the likelihood of
dissension as a result of the need for participants to possess high levels of cognitive
competence. Habermas describes the cognitive demands placed on participants in the
process of deliberation:
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[T]he abstractness of these highly generalized norms leads to problems of
application as soon as a conflict reaches beyond the routine interactions in familiar
contexts. Complex operations are required to reach a decision in cases of this sort.
On the one hand, one must uncover and describe the relevant features of the
situation in light of competing but somewhat indeterminate norm candidates; on the
other hand, one must select, interpret, and apply the norm most appropriate to the
present case in light of a description of the situation that is as complete as possible.
Thus, problems of justification and application in complex issues often overtax the
individual‘s analytical capacity.64
At both the moment of deliberative judgment and the later corroboration of successful
judgment, Habermas states that participants possess a less than sufficient ability to
effectively process the requisite knowledge. This minimizes the number of environmental
problems that can be dealt with deliberatively, further preventing thematized knowledge
from returning to the lifeworld background to serve as an unmediated certainty capable of
motivating individual moral action. Specific environmental problems that may remain
amenable to deliberation cannot serve as a precedent for a ‗type‘ of complex
environmental problem that is not also conducive to simple resolution. Even so,
environmental problems will tend, given the features described above, toward
intractability. With every new environmental problem justification must proceed without
a ‗typical‘ standard to draw on, thus signaling a diminished background of agreement to
assist in making a problem more tractable. As more problems tend toward intractability,
abstention serves as a way of preserving the rational orientation toward mutual
understanding without the burden of commitment. The result is a diminished lifeworld
background that has limited sources of rationally agreed upon norms.
The final point with regards to the diminishing of lifeworld background involves
precisely the tendency of environmental problems toward intractability and the option for
64
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participants to abstain from a ‗yes or no‘ position-taking in such instances. Habermas
describes this option:
[…] I think that such an abstention is also a rationally motivated position, as much
as a ‗yes‘ or ‗no,‘ and in no way relieves us of the necessity of taking a position.
Abstention in this context does not really signify a true declaration of neutrality, but
only signals that we are putting off problems for the time being and wish to suspend
our interpretative efforts.65
The problem that abstention introduces for Habermas‘s articulation of the necessary
orientation of participants is that without the necessity of taking a position during
deliberation he cannot claim that an orientation to reaching is actually present. The
difficulty, then, is that abstention contributes to the ―shrinking‖ of a background
consensus in the lifeworld without supplying the necessary ‗repair work‘ that
communicative action enables. Thus, the issue of whether abstention is or is not
rationally motivated is less important than the implication it has for future deliberations,
which necessitate a ‗massive‘ background consensus to remain viable. If we are to
assume future communicative encounters, there is an unspecified limit to how often
participants can abstain from position-taking with regards to normative validity claims
before the necessary background conditions are eroded. Another way of putting this is
that abstention, even if rationally motivated, always addresses an issue that is removed
from the realm of unmediated certainty and yet does not replenish the realm of
unthematized knowledge with new grounds of social integration. Habermas insists,
however, that, ―[w]e must take moral questions to be questions of knowledge even if the
lifeworld‘s font of shared ethical background beliefs is depleted.‖66
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If we take seriously, then, the problems entailed in the epistemological
complications of environmental knowledge and the fragility of the lifeworld that
Habermas describes, then it is not difficult to see how environmental problems put
pressure on the capacity of deliberative procedures to deal with dissension. Along with
exacerbating the limitations to the problems that can be resolved within deliberative fora
(typical with clearly expected results), complex knowledge of the sort present in
environmental disputes erodes the basis for a commitment to consequences that is so
central to Habermas‘s proceduralism. Insofar as deliberative democracy has only a
diminished lifeworld background to draw upon and difficulty arriving at agreeable
predictions to which participants can commit, the argument hinges on the theory of
motivation for actors to cooperate –– that is, Habermas‘s argument must provide a basis
for expecting reciprocity.

3. The Principle of Motivation and the Function of Legal Sanctions
The expectation and guarantee of reciprocity based on commitment is central to
architectural theories of politics. Borrowing from Habermas‘s account of the
fragmentation of pre-modern social order, we can view Hobbes as first posing this issue
explicitly. While reciprocity is obviously a central problem for social contract theories, it
is not limited to such theories. In what follows I treat the two guarantors of reciprocity
present in Habermas‘s theory –– rational motivation and legal sanction –– separately. My
reason for doing so is that this separation is built into the structure of his theory through
the distinction between communicative action in the political public sphere and legal
sanction legitimized in the constitutional democratic domain.
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The principle of motivation that Habermas employs can be viewed as an extension
of his previous equation of consent and commitment to consequences. Motivation
explains the direct link between commitment to consequences and actualization of normconforming behavior. The principle can be summarized with the proposition that consent
undertaken within non-coercive and fair procedures necessarily entails behavior on the
part of the consenting subject that is consistent with the terms of consent. Thus, the
principle of motivation states the determinate relationship between consent to obligations
and the carrying out of those obligations. Habermas summarizes this principle:
To be sure, speech-act offers can develop an action-coordinating effect only
because the binding and bonding force of a speech act that is both understandable
and has been accepted by the hearer also extends to the consequences for the sequel
of interaction that result from the semantic content of the utterance –– whether
asymmetrically for the hearer or speaker or symmetrically for both parties.
Whoever accepts a command feels herself obliged to carry it out; whoever makes a
promise feels himself bound to make it come true if need be; whoever accepts an
assertion believes it and will direct her behavior accordingly.‖67
The principle of motivation reflects a broader assumption that Habermas makes
about communicative action. Assuming that convictions are the seat of agency, Habermas
argues that communicative action aims to alter convictions. Based on participants‘
orientation toward reaching mutual understanding, the very process of deliberation serves
to transform convictions through the rational give and take of dialogue. According to a
‗classical‘ conception of practical reason, rationality is a ―weak motivational force‖ for
social integration insofar as it is reliant on individual morality.68 Habermas does not so
much reject this position as modify the terms of its operation in order to link individual
morality through the medium of communication oriented toward mutual understanding.69
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That is to say, the intersection of communicative action and normative validity is viewed
as a remedy to this weak motivational force, albeit one that still relies on the centrality of
rational motivation and demonstration of commensurability.
Even granting that deliberative democracy changes participants‘ convictions,
equating conviction with behavioral change is problematic. Not only is rationality a weak
form of motivation, as Habermas is willing to admit despite his modified notion of
practical reason, but it is all the more limited when addressing problems with
indeterminate consequences. Here, the same problem of predicted consequences as the
basis of commitment that limited the problems remediable through communicative action
returns to haunt the principle of motivation. The commitment to consequences inherent in
the act of procedural consent rests not only on the relatively high degree of certainty
underlying a prediction, but also entails a guarantee of reciprocity as an element of those
consequences. In the event of atypical problems, though, the uncertainty and
indeterminacy of outcomes –– whether incalculable or probabilistic –– extends to
reciprocity as well. While a participant may be able to take for granted that others are
motivated to act accordingly so long as the outcomes are highly certain, the reasons for
assuming others will act accordingly if outcomes are not as predicted are not as obvious.
In the end, the retrospective nature of evaluating consequences and the need for
participants to actually act according to the principle of motivation as well as assume all
others will as well leads to the conclusion that the weakness of rational motivation is
insufficient in itself. ―In weak communicative action actors do not as yet expect each
other to be guided by common norms or values and to recognize reciprocal obligations‖70
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Habermas accepts this insofar as he claims that motivation is learned in the process
of deliberation and, thus, is able to serve as a strong binding force; that is, Habermas
‗strengthens‘ his conception of motivation by shifting from mutual understanding to
agreement as the aim of communicative action. He writes, ―Since a discursive
competition for the better argument has, for conceptual reasons, agreement and not
compromise as its goal, the discursive vindication of the validity claim is left open until
actor-independent reasons make the contested truth claim rationally acceptable in
principle for all participants‖71 By shifting to agreement, however, Habermas increases
the theoretical burden for explaining what motivates participation in the learning process
itself.72
The need to reach agreement, then, introduces the need to answer simultaneously
for pre-deliberative motivation and reciprocity of commitments. Habermas presumes that
a shared lifeworld background is sufficient for resolving this dilemma. He states, ―[…]
rightness claims, with which illocutionary acts of this sort are connected, rely on
something in a social world in a manner analogous to the way in which the truth claims
connected with constative speech acts rely on something in the objective world‖73
However, Habermas‘s distinction between social and moral norms treats as separate the
simultaneous function of norms as bearer of social meaning and setter of behavioral
expectations. The existence of shared behavioral patterns, the customs and conventions
that Habermas categorizes as social norms, do not meet the standard of rationality that
Habermas claims for the symbolic role of social meaning. Insofar as social norms are not
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solely a matter of strategic action,74 this dual function of norms suggests a mode of social
integration that is neither strategic nor communicative that must be accounted for as an
integrating force.
Habermas‘s principle of motivation is not sufficient in itself for generating
agreement and guaranteeing reciprocity. At this stage he turns to a discourse theory of
law to supplement the motivational shortcomings of communicative action. Insofar as
communicative action in the political public sphere leads to actor-independent agreement,
thus necessitating a strong form of motivation, where this fails and actor-relative
understanding supplies merely a weak communicative action, law enables both to coexist.
As Habermas states, ―Law can compensate for the weaknesses of a highly demanding
morality that […] provides only cognitively indeterminate and motivationally unreliable
results.‖75
Positive legal norms offset the instability generated by increased risk of dissension
embedded in the fragmented social order of modernity by establishing a ―highly artificial
community.‖76 Insofar as an artificial form of freedom and equality is inscribed in legal
norms in the form of rights, social integration is formally possible.. Integration, then,
results not only from the attribution of formal legal standing but also from (a) the threat
of external sanctions and (b) the supposition of rationally motivated agreement.77
However, the legal community is never fully artificial, but rests on a residual mode of
sovereign authority in the form of ―archaic‖ institutions and ―naturally emergent‖
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conventions.78 The artificial community of law, then, serves to stabilize the
communicative preconditions of deliberative democracy only by retaining an element of
authority that predates the emergence of constitutional democracy in modernity.
Habermas claims that constitutional democracy reflects the co-originality of postconventional positive law and the self-authorization of popular sovereignty. In doing so,
Habermas seeks to escape the paradox of legitimacy (see Chapter 1) in which the terms
of legitimacy themselves must be legitimized in some prior (speculative) moment. As
Bonnie Honig has shown, Habermas‘s argument about the equiprimordial status of
positive law and popular sovereignty revolves around a set of temporal displacements
that come at the cost of democratic action in the present. She writes that,
when Habermas characterizes his hoped-for future in progressive terms, he turns
that future into a ground. Its character as a future is undone by progress‘ guarantee.
The agency of the present generation, on behalf of which Habermas lays out his
argument, is now in the service of a set of forces quite beyond itself, which it may
only fulfill or betray, speed up or slow down. It may not author or make or
inaugurate its future. It may only reposition itself in relation to its past.79
This lessening of democratic agency results from Habermas‘s need to retain both aspects
of constitutional democracy without prioritizing one over the other. If popular
sovereignty were to take priority over the formal equality provided by law then the
artificial community would not be able to stabilize the requisite communicative
preconditions. That is, the lifeworld background would have only a fragmented actuality
to supply communicative resources. If law takes priority over popular sovereignty then
the fount of political legitimacy –– self-legislating autonomous subjects –– becomes a
singular moment of consent that reduces law to a one-sided source of coercion. That is,
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the internal relation between coercibility and changeability is broken.80 Along with this,
continued involvement in the generation and reform of laws is necessary for actors to
adopt the proper political attitude as the source of law: ―It is only the participation in the
practice of politically autonomous lawmaking that makes it possible for the addressees of
law to have a correct understanding of the legal order as created by themselves.‖81
Habermas posits the co-originality of positive law and popular sovereignty as a way
of reconciling this tension. In his discourse theory of law, the strength of positive law lies
in its ambivalence about the source of norm-conforming behavior.82 Law then operates
through a series of abstractions that transform the actor of deliberation into a subject with
legal standing:
Law abstracts, first, from the capacity of the addressees to bind their will of their
own accord, because it assumes that free choice is a sufficient source of lawabiding behavior. Second, the law abstracts from the complexities that action plans
owe to their lifeworld contexts; it restricts itself to the external relation of
interactive influence that typical social actors exert on one another. Third, we have
already seen that law abstracts from the kind of motivation; it is satisfied with action
that outwardly conforms to rules, however such conformity might arise.‖83
The implication of the ambivalence regarding motivations is that, along with analytic
indistinguishability of norm-conforming intention means that the normatively authorized
validity of a law exists in an indeterminate relationship to obedience as either actorindependent motivation (Kantian duty) or actor-relative motivation (strategic calculation
of consequences).
Acknowledging the ambivalent nature of legal norms, Habermas is unable to locate
a unified source of solidarity in the validity dimension of positive law. Instead, he claims

80
81
82
83

Habermas, 1998c: 254.
Habermas, 1996: 121.
Habermas, 1996: 30-31.
Habermas, 1996: 112, emphasis in original.

106

that positive law takes up the tension between validity and facticity in the form of
permitting individuals to choose their motivation for adhering to legal norms. The
problem is that Habermas generates a serious lacuna in his theory. Having already
established the impossibility of analytically distinguishing the intentions behind normconforming behavior, he is forced to fall back upon his principle of motivation, which is
acknowledged as weak. The import of the weakness of rational motivation combined
with the analytically indiscernible nature of behavioral intentions points towards ―average
norm compliance‖ as the single most important function of law.84
Given that the principled morality arising from Habermas‘s deontological
commitments ―is meant to orient one‘s action but does not thereby dispose one to act
rightly,‖ there remains the option of external motivation in the form of sanctions.85 In fact,
law is only capable of addressing such external motivation: ―Only matters pertaining to
external relations can be legally regulated at all. This is because rule-conformative
behavior must, if necessary, be enforced.‖86 This potential necessity to enforce behavior
becomes more important as a fragile and fragmented lifeworld encounters problems, such
as those posed by new environmental challenges, that limit the capacity of deliberation to
replenish a shared background. This leads to a new interpretation of what constitutes
‗recognition‘ in Habermas‘s assumption that social orders exist through the recognition
of normative validity claims.87 On my reading, law achieves stability precisely because it
combines the issue of motivation with the establishment of expectations enabled by the
threat of sanctions. It is not so much that law stabilizes the tension between facticity and
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validity, as Habermas claims, as much as it presides over the risk of dissension in order to
ensure facticity during those moments when it is clear that an actor lacks the sufficient
deontological motivation provided by validity.
Just how law comes to serve as a substitute for communicatively based social
integration can be seen by the ―unburdening‖ of the moral subject that law performs.
Habermas describes three domains in which the postconventional subject is confronted
by ―unprecedented demands.‖88 According to Habermas, the transformation of the moral
subject into a legal subject serves to resolve the problems of (a) cognitive indeterminacy,
(b) motivational uncertainty, and (c) imputability of obligations (or what I have termed
reciprocity).89 Having raised these as significant problems for communicative action
above, it is not necessary to go into detail at this stage. Of importance is that at exactly
those points where communicative action is unable to operate as described under
conditions of modernity, Habermas turns to external motivation as a final arbiter that
enforces normative validity where convictions fail: ―Valid norms represent reasonable
expectations only if they can actually be enforced against deviant behavior.‖90
By claiming that ―[t]hrough a legal system with which it remains internally coupled,
however, morality can spread to all spheres of action,‖ Habermas is able to treat the
outcome guaranteed by law as a presupposition of law‘s legitimacy. In the end, however,
his theoretical reliance on law‘s sanctioning capacity to resolve the problems of cognitive
complexity, motivation, and reciprocity leads Habermas into territory for which his
model of a singular, linear conception of procedural legitimacy is insufficient. Insofar as
motivation and reciprocity are reliant on legal sanction, we are returned to the question of
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power and rule, a question that Habermas leaves open in relation to communicative
action. Simply assigning communicative action in the political public sphere the role of
warning system and pressure amplifier, as well as of system overseer, Habermas fails to
establish a bridge between deliberative democracy and collective purposive activity. That
is, he does not so much demonstrate the importance of communicative action as its
impotence at coordinating social action where democracy demands an emphasis on
kratos. Insofar as Habermas‘s framework of legitimacy encounters the authoritative
relations with the tools of coercion, such relationships are better captured in terms of
deferral and accountability specified in the first chapter.
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D. Towards a Prudential Politics of the Environment
In Habermas‘s account of the emergence of modernity, as opposed to its
construction, he emphasizes the future-oriented nature of modernity.91 This allows
Habermas to avoid speculating about the ―concealed beginnings of political authority.‖92
As we have seen, this leads him to neglect the important role of ‗archaic institutions‘ that
continue from pre-modern times, especially as manifested in the ―ritualized recollection
of founding‖ that continues to expunge such institutions in favor of a more rational
version of history.93 In order to sustain a concept of linguistically bounded lifeworld
backgrounds susceptible to rational processes of adjudicating disputes over normative
validity, Habermas inverts the paradoxical establishment of legitimacy that a speculative,
originary imagination presents.
The projection at the core of Habermas‘s reconstructive efforts exposes a sort of
‗retroactive legitimacy‘ that has no place in his theory. His claim that, ―[e]ven the
decentered society cannot do without the reference point provided by the projected unity
of intersubjectively formed common will,‖ must be read alongside the centrality of
projection to his principle of universalization and his discourse ethics, both addressed
above.94 Projection, here, inverts the linearity that ties legitimacy to speculative origins in
order to project forward to the present. Habermas attributes this dependence on an
originary imagination to a unitary conception of metaphysics: ―the unitary thinking of
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metaphysics, which, in emancipating itself from mythological thinking that focuses on
origins, still remains tied to the latter.95‖
While both the linear logic of legitimacy and Habermas‘s reliance upon a
procedural assumption that fair procedures result in consequences that must be treated as
fair, Habermas‘s inversion is instructive for the form of legitimacy it introduces. The
linear logic of legitimacy can be stated as:
a. Because of previous agreement X (speculated acceptance of terms), present
consequences Y are legitimate (acceptance must be upheld).
Habermas‘s logic of legitimacy can be stated as:
b. Because of future consequences Y (speculated acceptance of terms), present
agreement X is legitimate (acceptance as commitment that must be upheld).
In Habermas‘s case, projection operates as a temporal displacement that generates a
‗retroactive‘ legitimacy. However, this retroactive legitimacy is none other than deferral
disguised as acceptance that posits accountability prior to the terms for judgment such
that contingency cannot modify the agreement. In the originary, linear logic of legitimacy,
contingency has already intervened and simply must be theoretically accounted for.
As I discussed in Chapter 1, the temporal displacement of authority operates
between the poles of deferral and accountability. Deferral candidly recognizes the
openness of prediction and projection to contingency while accountability registers the
relationship between the terms of agreement, contingency, and the weight of actual
consequences. A prudential politics that seeks to determine the potential for democratic
relationships between deferral and accountability (a) builds upon the centrality of
prediction and (b) permits defining the limits that assist in establishing a productive
conception of the role of expertise in democratic authority (see Chapter 4). Habermas
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reads in Aristotle an internal connection between prudential politics and probability but at
the cost of foregoing a deontological approach: ―For Aristotle connects prudence, which
stems from practical judgment, with mere probability, so that the binding nature of moral
duties cannot be translated into the categorical validity of moral judgments.‖96 However,
approaching environmental problems that necessitate probabilistic prediction through a
prudential lense brings with it the added benefit of not relegating questions of application
to a derivative status.
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CHAPTER III
A COMPARATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING ENVIRONMENTAL
DELIBERATION
Discussions about the relationship between deliberative democratic theory,
practical policy-making, and specific environmental problems are fraught with
difficulties. For one, the structure of academic and policy analysis are built around
divisions that do not readily lend themselves to thematic discussion. Although studies
have appeared that attempt to discern what deliberative democratic theory has to offer
environmental politics, few have attempted to treat environmental problems as a site for
examining the viability of deliberative democratic theory by surveying the current
empirical landscape.1
The relatively one-sided nature of approaches is, no doubt, exacerbated by a lack
of agreed upon concepts and integrated terms of comparison for researching deliberative
democracy generally. Recent attempts to rectify this problem have become entangled in
debates over the proper degree of fidelity owed to theoretical arguments when
operationalizing concepts for empirical use as well as the methodological difficulties
associated with extrapolating from case studies or using large-n studies such as polls and
surveys to test the claims of deliberation.2 The problem was initially addressed in the
mid-1990s by Thomas Webler and Ortwin Renn in their introductory remarks for a
volume on evaluating approaches to environmental deliberation.3 At the time, Webler and
Renn focused their attention on standardizing criteria for procedural fairness and
participant competence as the best means of measuring the quality of decisions.
1
2
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More recently, an intensive discussion of the issue was staged between Dennis
Thompson, a theorist of deliberative democracy, and Diana Mutz, a critical but
sympathetic empirical analyst, in the Annual Review of Political Science. The exchange
between Mutz and Thompson is illustrative of the impasse besetting communications
between empirically and theoretically oriented students of politics. A few basic
differences manifest themselves in the arguments of Mutz and Thompson and, as such,
provide a point of reference for addressing their seemingly intraversible divisions. At
issue are differences in orientation towards one's object of study as well as expectations
about what analysis is to achieve. The resulting differences can be summed up as a lack
of agreement about:
1. Which conception of deliberative democratic theory to test.
2. Whether evidence can disconfirm or falsify the underlying theory.
3. Whether concepts can be standardized.
4. Which concepts are able to be operationalized.
5. What counts as an indicator; that is, what to treat as evidence.
The competing versions of deliberative democratic theory pose a series of choices
for empirical research, any of which entails specific gains and losses in the research
process. The variety, as well as potential incompatibility, of theoretical assumptions
requires foremost that researchers work within a consistently developed approach – for
instance, following the work of Joshua Cohen, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson,
John Dryzek, or Jürgen Habermas – or focus on precisely defined concepts that can be
compared across frameworks. If caution is not exercised then researchers encounter the
problem of superficiality described by Thompson when he writes that,
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They [empirical researchers] extract from isolated passages in various theoretical
writings a simplified statement about one or more benefits of deliberative
democracy, compress it into a testable hypothesis, find or (more often) artificially
create a site in which people talk about politics, and conclude that deliberation
does not produce the benefits the theory promised and may even be
counterproductive.4
However, even where research is based upon carefully constructed questions with
a direct connection to the concepts under investigation, this may not suffice for
communicating across disciplinary boundaries. Much hinges upon how the various
conceptions of deliberation pose the central question of their theoretical endeavor. For
instance, Thompson views deliberative theory as fundamentally asking, "[i]n a state of
disagreement, how can citizens reach a collective decision that is legitimate?"5 John
Dryzek elaborates:
The absence of empirical evidence of any sort in these sorts of treatments [by
Rawls, Habermas and Cohen] is not a fatal weakness, for these studies are
generally concerned mainly to present an ideal, from which real world practices
and possibilities can be expected to diverge to greater or lesser degree. Only if we
actually want to think about ways to make the real world more deliberative do the
limitations of such ideal theory become apparent.6
As I discussed in Chapter 1, relying upon legitimacy as the motivating concern
introduces a seemingly irreconcilable division between those who seek to approach
environmental politics from a strictly philosophical viewpoint, ignoring and immune to
the particular conditions, and more practically oriented inquiries, whether from a strictly
empirical or critical theoretical perspective. Thus, while Thompson's question of 'how
can' intends a speculative account insulated by the intrinsically valid terms of the concept
of legitimacy, Diana Mutz frames her purpose in altogether different terms: "The whole
reason deliberative democracy is normatively desirable is because it is thought to produce
4
5
6
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tangible benefits for democratic citizens and societies."7 The practical impetus behind
this line of questioning can be expressed succinctly: "Should citizens be encouraged to
deliberate about matters of politics?"8 Furthermore, such questions are not posed only by
more "practical" empirical researchers. Concern with the environment has led political
theorists to express similar desires: "The challenge for normative political theory, then, is
to assist in designing institutions and procedures through which fruitful deliberation over
sustainable environmental policy can take place."9
In attempting to provide a comparative framework capable of facilitating
discussion between theory and empirical research, I opt to focus on the deliberative
theory of Jürgen Habermas, treating his conception as a minimal test case for deliberation
in general because of the thoroughness and sophistication of the theory as well as its
influence upon other versions of deliberation. It is most likely, given the peripheral
dependence of many other conceptions of deliberation upon Habermas's theory of
communicative rationality (Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, James Bohman, and
Joshua Cohen), that if his approach is untenable then those borrowing key assumptions
and provisos from it will also likely be untenable. While this is no substitute for a more
thorough treatment of those theories independently, it does allow for a tentative reply to
the question: "Should citizens be encouraged to deliberate about matters of politics?"
Beyond decisions about whose version of deliberation to address, another
philosophical conflict awaits as to whether it is even possible, given the use of arguments
about intrinsic benefits, to prove a given deliberative theory false and, if so, on what
grounds. The answer goes, to a great extent, to the core of one's intent to contribute to a
7
8
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philosophical discussion on deductive and inductive grounds or to engage in a social
scientific pursuit on abductive grounds. Accordingly, Thompson – pursuing the first line
of discussion – envisions a limited role for empirical research in which falsification is
defined in terms of demonstrating the internal consistency or inconsistency of a
framework in practice.
The more penetrating (and ultimately more constructive) empirical challenge to
any normative theory seeks to show that the values that it prescribes conflict in
practice. The theory falters not because current democracies fail to realize its
values but because one of its values cannot be fully realized without sacrificing
one of its other values.10
Thompson points out, correctly, that the theory cannot be tested strictly as stated for the
simple reason that such conditions do not presently exist but are the objective to be
achieved. Drawing on a rather forced analogy between theory as the 'head' and research
as the 'hand' of political science, Thompson retreats from attempting to actualize the
potential for a more productive relationship within political science between normative
theory and empirical research.

A. From Normative Theory to Working Hypotheses
A key presupposition of empirical research that seeks to 'hypothesize, test, and
revise,' is that any assertion has an equivalent hypothetical statement capable of being
verified. As Diana Mutz points out:
The key difference is that, in normative political theory, the activity described as
deliberation is assumed to have certain beneficial outcomes, and in empirical
research, it is hypothesized to have those same desirable outcomes. Hypotheses
often turn out to be wrong, but assumptions, by their very nature, cannot be.11
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This abductive approach, in which a theory is merely a hypothetical explanation or
prediction regarding determinate phenomenon, finds a concept valuable only insofar as it
contributes to this process. On this account, theorists must accept some form of this
presupposition in order for dialogue to occur.
Although he avoids the thornier issues about how empirical and normative
accounts of deliberation may communicate more effectively, Jürgen Habermas offers
pertinent comments in his response to a special issue devoted to studies of deliberation.
His remarks deal with why, when operationalizing his "detranscendental ideal," it is
impossible to locate disconfirming evidence. He writes:
For the case of my own theory, the impact on design and method is easily
illustrated by the following implication. Whereas the observed behaviour of an
actor does or does not fit the paradigm of rational choice, the communicative
behaviour of participants in deliberative practices always fits the paradigm to
some degree, as long as the actor is participating in a practice of that kind. For the
rational presuppositions are attributed to the type of practice, whether it is
institutionalized or not. In this case, the intricate purpose of measurement is to
find out the degree in which a given sample of participants live up to rational
presuppositions that are constitutive of their practice.12
The role ascribed to empirical research, much as with Dennis Thompson, is to determine
the degree to which actuality fits its own rational presuppositions which are themselves
drawn from Habermas's counterfactual idealization of communication.13
Although it would appear that Habermas does not provide for the possibility of
falsifiability through disconfirming evidence, his conception of deliberative democracy is
an attempt to rectify the discrepancy between actuality and ideality by supplying a more
legitimate practice that invites such treatment. Michael Neblo suggests that the notion of
empirical invalidation is implicit in the very theoretical framework that he employs:
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It is true that one cannot ‗falsify‘ a normative theory in the same way one might
falsify a theory about fluid dynamics. However, Habermas consciously locates his
project in the ‗tension between facts and norms;‘ he intends that his theory help
guide practice. Consequently, it must be able to bear some of the weight of the
social world. If many of its implicit empirical premises and causal claims prove
false, there is a sense in which it could be rendered practically falsified. That is, if
his theory‘s ideal content were sufficiently incongruent with realizable political
goals, striving to achieve its ideal could lead to perverse consequences.14
While my own contention that empirical verification is necessary for an adequate
political theory of environmental problems follows from my argument for a more situated,
prudential form of political inquiry, as described in Chapter 1, I arrive at the same
conclusion. Having addressed those aspects of Habermas's argument that could only be
dealt with in philosophical terms in Chapter 2, the purpose now is to learn from the
available research on deliberative democracy, to understand its implications, and to
determine what remains to be learned.
The remaining differences between normative theory and empirical research
occur only after the decision to treat the assumptions and implications of deliberative
democratic theory as hypotheses capable of being tested. This introduces three related
problems: whether relevant concepts can be operationalized, which are the relevant
concepts to be studied, and what are the indicators for a given concept. Dennis Thompson
divides the study of deliberation into three parts: determining what counts as deliberation
(conceptual criteria), determining what counts as good deliberation (evaluative standards),
and determining what is necessary for producing good deliberation (empirical
conditions).15 Articulating the conceptual criteria for deliberative democracy, then, is the
province of political theorists and necessarily precedes an account of the feasibility of
deliberation.
14
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Thompson's guarding of disciplinary territory and its subsequent positioning of
empirical research as informed by, but never informing, political theory contrasts sharply
with Mutz's version of a more muddled process. As she writes, "[t]ransforming
deliberative theory into middle-range theory means replacing vaguely defined concepts,
and substituting hypotheses about specific relationships between those concepts for
grander theoretical frameworks."16 The prudential approach that I advocate, and which I
claim follows in the Frankfurt School tradition of critical, requires translating
philosophical claims into concrete terms. Mutz captures the basic thrust of this by seeking
to translate "grander theoretical frameworks" into claims about "specific relationships."
In the case of environmental politics, this requires attention to the particular type of
problem being addressed. Thus, I attempt to grasp deliberative democracy foremost in its
ability to handle each type of problem prior to committing to the view that it is effective
at resolving certain types of environmental problems.
In contrast to Dennis Thompson's version of deliberative democratic theory as
insulated from the burdens of arguing for the feasibility of its assumptions, I view the
conversion of implicit empirical premises – the 'conditions of possibility' – into
stringently defined conditions as enhancing the accuracy of theoretical claims. In the case
of deliberative democracy, Diana Mutz's claim that key premises are "inconsistent with
much of what is already known about political discourse in group contexts," has resulted
in advocacy for a broad application of deliberatively designed policies without sufficient
attention to the most plausible outcomes.17 Take, for instance, the following claim:
If realized, an ideal speech situation would be the source of habits of mind that
would establish the basis for a more enlightened and participatory form of
16
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democratic citizenship, one in which the risks associated with faction are less
severe than those of interest-group liberalism. That is especially important in the
environmental arena, where the general interest so often falls prey to the special.
So Habermas's procedural theory of democracy has substantive implications for
environmental rationality. […] And, as these are built into law, organizational
norms, and social expectations, they make possible a pragmatically grounded
analysis of the potentiality of Habermas's theorizing for constructing deliberative
environmental democracy.18
The authors state that as the 'substantive implications' of Habermas's theory are
implemented further analysis will become possible, neglecting to acknowledge the
limited grounds for persuading skeptics of increased deliberation in the absence of such
analysis. A more accurate method of analysis would differentiate "[t]ests of whether the
conditions necessary for deliberation are actually occurring […] from evaluations of
whether benefits accrue when the conditions do occur."19
In terms of which are the relevant concepts I go in a different direction than
Ortwinn Renn and Thomas Webler who have devoted much attention to operationalizing
Habermas's deliberative principles as measurable standards of fairness and competence.
Instead of focusing on fairness and competence internal to deliberation, my interest is in
enabling analysis of how a given type of environmental problem affects communication.
The first step is to establish terms of comparison that control for problem type in order to
begin comparing how the variety of ways in which deliberation can be organized may
influence the deliberative process.
Directing emphasis away from fairness and competence results, thus shifting
away from procedural arrangements, allows me to take more seriously the claim that the
substance and quality of communication within the deliberative process are sensitive to
the issue under discussion. In the 1990s and the turn of the century, the majority of work
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on the intersection of environmental politics and deliberative democracy focused on
procedural aspects.20 Only in the past few years have political scientists begun to evaluate
the discourse employed during deliberation, group dynamics, as well as the trade-offs
involved when increasing deliberation.21

B. Cross-Case Inference: Controlling for Problem Type
A sign of the maturation of deliberative theory is the generation of a framework
for speaking about the specifics of deliberative circumstances. In the case of evaluating
the performance of specific procedures, recent work by Michael Neblo attempts to
develop a model of the "macro-deliberative cycle."22 By enabling a cross-forum
comparison that encompasses formalized institutions as well as informal communication
within civil society, Neblo is able to disaggregate the larger set of Habermas's theoretical
claims to show how a "deliberative decision at a very high level could warrant
completely non-deliberative procedures at lower levels."23
Such work has contributed to the initial clarification of which procedures or
forums are most suitable for certain problems. In this regard, James Meadowcroft looks
at seven different deliberative mechanisms: public inquiry, referendum, citizen advisory
panel, citizen jury, environmental covenant, negotiated regulation, and mediation.24
Meadowcroft offers suggestions for matching mechanisms to an appropriate context:
"Nor are all mechanisms appropriate to every scale. Thus, regulatory negotiation and
environmental covenants are more applicable on the national level. In contrast, the
20
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referendum can be adjusted more easily to differently scaled jurisdictions."25 He also
incorporates insights from prior research, attempting to show how "opportunities for
participation vary at different stages of the policy process – setting an agenda, developing
frameworks for policy choice, and making the choices themselves. Again, a mechanism
that might be appropriate for defining policy priorities (a citizen advisory panel, for
example) might be less suited to channeling public inputs for a final decision."26
While the ability to compare procedure type is important for analyzing and
evaluating the operation of deliberative democracy, it tells only part of the story. As
empirical studies have found, there is broad variance between one case of, for instance, a
citizen jury and another case, even within the same general location. Dennis Thompson
suggests that the "main reason for the mixed results is that the success or failure of
deliberation depends so much on its context."27 The issue of how sensitive deliberation is
to context has been further refined to go beyond declarations of success or failure to the
disposition of participants given the gender makeup of the group.28 Where "outcomes
appear to be mediated by the nature of the discussion," inferences about procedure type
are meaningful only insofar as the comparison controls for problem type.29 This
conclusion is consistent with the premise, outlined in Chapter 1, that environmental
issues constitute a unique domain of political problems, which demands careful analysis
before extending a set of procedures to handle environmental issues wholesale.
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Controlling for problem, as I propose doing, offers immediate benefits such as
explaining what have appeared as perplexing observations to others who emphasize
procedure type. In a series of case studies on forest management and hazardous waste
siting in the western United States, Daniel Press assesses the desirability among
participants for "a decentralized or centralized mode of control."30 The results of his
survey lead to a paradoxical conclusion with regard to preference for local, state, or
national control:
After asking respondents whether they favored local control, I asked whether
people living near the national forest would manage it better than remote
agencies, or if the waste problem would have been this bad if respondents had had
more input. Generally, environmental activists, legislators, and legislative staff in
the toxics debate assumed that increased local participation and control would
result in better environmental outcomes but held the opposite view on forestry.31
The author describes a situation in which the perceived outcomes of "local participation
and control" following deliberation are attributed differently depending upon whether the
issue is logging or hazardous waste. Since the study is focused strictly on procedures and
seeks to test the hypothesis, "People perceive that local control over environmental
management results in more desirable environmental outcomes than central control (e.g.,
state and federal)," this finding appears as an inconsistent preference for decentralized
and centralized control by the members of the same groups.32 Press asks: "How can we
account for the differences across cases and respondent groups in how local control and
environmental outcomes are thought to be linked?"33 He goes on to explain the variance
thusly:
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The tendency of environmentalists to use most means available to achieve
physical outcomes may explain why the environmentalists in the toxics cases and
those in the forestry cases viewed the effects of local control so differently.
People who have never been 'active' on anything but environmental problems may
exhibit a single-issue focus; they may pragmatically adjust their strategies in
whatever way necessary to achieve their objectives, and if that means appealing to
a national constituency on one issue but not another, no ideological or moral
commitment will have been breached.34
It is possible to avoid conjecture about the motives of interviewees, both stated and
unstated, by beginning from the different characteristics of forest management and
hazardous waste as environmental problems. Doing so would lead to treating the
observed outcome – holding differing views on 'local' participation in forestry and
hazardous waste siting – as expected rather than counterintuitive.

C. Constituting Cases
Although deliberative democratic theory is still dealt with primarily in terms of
normative theory and a great deal of work remains to operationalize and test key elements
of the theory, there is sufficient basis for formulating a newer sets of hypotheses based
upon already concluded studies. The process of abductive reasoning, in which hypotheses
are tested, revised and the entire process reiterated, stands in contrast to the large-n
quantitative analysis more commonly encountered in political science. Whereas
quantitative analysis relies upon induction from "a preexisting population of relevant
observations, embracing both positive and negative cases," qualitative analysis
employing abductive reasoning is more concerned with clearly delimiting the parameters
for the cases under consideration, although at the cost of negative cases to serve as a basis
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of comparison.35 Thus, as Charles Ragin notes, "relevant cases must be properly
constituted through a careful dialogue of ideas and evidence involving the reciprocal
clarification of empirical categories and theoretical concepts."36 While this method does
not yield disconfirming cases it does provide a more transparent process of translating
theoretical arguments into empirical claims.
This method serves the study of deliberative democratic theory well as it enables
each set of cases to serve as a starting point for understanding the next set of cases while
keeping the question of relevant similarities firmly in the foreground. As Habermasian
deliberative democracy has come to inform an increasing number of institutional models
it is necessary to take the available cases into account in order to further refine one's
testable hypotheses. It is precisely this stage of generating comparisons and making
'accountable' that I seek to facilitate by articulating criteria of environmental problems
relevant to the operation of deliberative democracy.
In large-n, quantitative analysis it is necessary to expand the selection criteria for
what counts as an instance of deliberation in order to generate enough cases to draw nontrivial conclusions. However, as the disagreement between Dennis Thompson and Diana
Mutz makes clear, the stringency of conditions described by deliberative democratic
theorists offer only a limited range of variation to work with before the feedback between
empirical research and normative theory is broken off. I have opted to retain many of the
stringent requirements assumed or implied by Habermasian deliberative democracy
precisely for the purpose of granting the larger theoretical framework of communicative
action an irreplaceable status in the argument for deliberation. Although this severely
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restricts the number of cases that are to be included, I supplement my analysis not by
expanding the selection criteria, as may be assumed, but by focusing on carefully
developing hypotheses about environmental deliberation based upon the most feasible
assumptions available from the larger body of studies on deliberation – that is, by
drawing upon the strength of the abductive method of analysis. This is not to say that
quantitative analysis is to be neglected, simply that in the case of deliberative democratic
theory there is no guarantee at the outset that a sufficient number of cases is available on
a given set of criteria to draw conclusions with any leverage.
I begin by outlining the criteria for comparing environmental cases according to
their relevance to deliberation. Doing so involves treating the problem type as a function
of three variables. Next, I transpose the implications of Habermasian deliberative
democratic theory into more specific hypotheses. As stated above, this entails developing
indicators based upon the most feasible assumptions suggested by the conclusions of
other similar studies. I then develop a means of treating cases in which each observation
is located within a three-dimensional concept space (X-Y-Z scatterplot) to look for
clustering by problem type. Once clusters have been located, thus controlling for problem
type, and their fitness tested, it is possible to compare across procedure type according to
stages of deliberation.

1. Assumptions and Implications: The General Set of Deliberative Cases
In order to establish criteria for comparing cases of deliberative democracy it is
first necessary to ensure that the cases are drawn from qualitatively commensurable
contexts. To that end, I rely upon findings from Australia, England, Germany, and the
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United States. These cases all fit the minimum set of political criteria that Habermas
identifies.37 Along with being representative democracies, including both parliamentary
and congressional legislatures, these countries have central environmental agencies that
coordinate a broader effort to increase participation. Furthermore, each country is
involved in the Local Agenda 21 program for environmental 'capacity-building' as
resolved at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de
Janeiro, 1992. Thus, each country has implemented a series of participatory initiatives
that, beginning in the mid-1990s, developed into a coordinated effort aimed at
implementing deliberation influenced by Jürgen Habermas and translated into specific
policies by Ortwin Renn in Germany. In the United States, the general process is
organized into 'Analytic-Deliberative Procedures' under the auspices of the National
Research Council [Paul Stern and Harvey Fineberg (editors). Understanding Risk:
Informing Decisions in a Democratic Society. (Washington, D.C.: National Academy
Press, 1996).].38 Finally, despite large differences in population size and density, these
countries all have similar levels of development as measured by gross domestic product
per capita: Australia ($48,253), England ($43,544), Germany ($44,363), United States
($45,230).39
Before proceeding to looking at tentative hypotheses based upon expectations of
deliberation in general, it is necessary to reiterate that I use the term complexity in the
very specific sense described in Chapter 1. There I defined complexity as exhibiting
37
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interdependent relationships incapable of being captured by single-variable, noninteractive measurements where improvement on one variable may mask deterioration on
another variable.40 Of significance is the reference to relationships. By defining
complexity in terms of interactive relationships I differentiate between complexity,
covering ecosystems and knowledge about them, and complications. Complication
designates a large quantity of elements involved in causal relationships that vary as to the
degree to which causality can be identified. To restate the difference figuratively,
complexity refers to mutually constitutive relationships between even a few elements, or
what we may call organic relationships, while complication refers to unidirectional
relationships between numerous elements, or what we may call mechanical relationships.
Along with their previous work on measuring fairness and competence within
deliberative procedures, Ortwin Renn and Thomas Webler have also argued that
deliberation is shaped by the level of complexity and intensity of conflict involved.41
Although this is not applied to environmental issues specifically, it is important to
acknowledge both the relevance of these criteria as well as the difficulty of establishing
functional indicators for the concept of complexity. Since no adequate criteria have yet
been developed to measure complexity, I leave this aspect of my argument to the
theoretical critique offered in Chapter 2 and my account of challenges posed by
complexity for communication between expert and non-expert deliberators in Chapter 4. I
now turn to a brief survey of studies on deliberative democracy in order to establish the
terms of feasibility for a more precise comparison of cases of environmental deliberation.
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a. Individual Disposition and Group Dynamics
Two issues have raised concerns for deliberative theorists since the first wave of
critiques in the early 1990s: the character traits and disposition necessary for deliberation
and the way in which interpersonal dynamics serve to transfer political problems into
deliberative settings. A recent study of deliberators conducted by Diana Mutz raises
significant questions for the conception of the subject underlying Habermasian
deliberation. 42 Mutz analyzes what motivates participation in politics along with what
motivates deliberation about politics and finds these motivations in conflict. Participation
correlates with a strong interest in politics and is increased by a high degree of certainty
about the correctness of one's views that is reinforced by likeminded peers. Deliberation,
Mutz finds, is motivated by precisely the opposite disposition, correlating with only a
limited interest in political topics, lesser certainty about one's views, and reluctance to
arrive at a decision on controversial matters. This conflict suggests that those who are
most likely to be involved in deliberative procedures are the least likely to possess the
requisite disposition for successful deliberation while those most likely to have such a
disposition are the least likely to get involved. The correlation between high partisanship
(as a measure of certainty) and low inclination to deliberate was reconfirmed more
recently during a more comprehensive study of "discursive participation."43
Finding that the makeup of a group has a strong impact on the way in which
deliberation is carried out, more specific studies by Menelberg and Karpowitz have
looked at the gender composition of groups to determine the effect on communication.44
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Specifically, Mendelberg and Karpowitz seek to understand how groups become
polarized around pre-existing identifications, whether based on opinion or attribute. What
they find is that in face-to-face meetings group norms are generated in the course of
discussion that impact individual evaluations of the topic under discussion. A similar
view was offered as a theoretical warning by James Bohman when he wrote that, "If
conflicts of interest require adjudication, conflicts of principle, if deep enough, preclude
this solution: what higher order principles such as fairness consist of may be precisely
what is at stake. Democratic arrangements may only exacerbate these problems of
pluralism."45 The 'possibility' invoked by Bohman, however, functions in very specific
ways depending upon the composition of the group.
Further confirming the way in which composition affects intergroup cooperation,
Jacobs, Cook and Delli Carpini offer a comprehensive analysis of deliberation according
to a series of socio-economic indicators such as education, income, race, and sex, which
are then aggregated according to procedure type.46 While the authors find that only slight
impact can be attributed to socio-economic status per se, the intersection of socioeconomic status and political capital come to explain a great deal of rates and intensity of
deliberation.

b. Procedure Type and Problem Type
As outlined in Chapter 2, the roots of Jürgen Habermas's conception of
deliberative democracy lie in his work on communicative action and its purported ability
to maintain the legitimacy of modern democratic systems through a reinvigorated public
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sphere. Interest in Habermas's notion of the public sphere waxed following the
publication of The Theory of Communicative Action and translation of The Structural
Transformation of the Public Sphere in the latter 1980s. As theories of deliberative
democracy were articulated throughout the 1990s, including by Habermas, the broader
reference to constructive discourse within civil society increased in appeal. This has led
to attempts to compare cases of informal deliberation in civil society to more formal
involvement in government policy. Michael Neblo offers a useful model of the ideal
"circulation of communicative power" that enables research into procedures to be
compared to a broader social context.47
Despite the benefits of this approach, I include only formal involvement in
environmental governing while excluding cases where no input was publicly gathered
from citizens for two reasons. First, implicit in the arguments for Habermasian
deliberation is an assumption that communication takes place in person. Although
Habermas has more recently registered his approval of internet-based forums as
potentially productive sites of deliberation, the way in which conditions of equality,
reciprocity, and publicity are portrayed by Habermas strongly suggests that interaction
occurs face-to-face.48 Second, including both formal and informal communication makes
the criteria for case selection too broad with the result that some negative evidence can be
"made up for" with positive results elsewhere.49
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Neblo, 2005: 177.
See Habermas, 2005. The implicit assumption of face-to-face communication has been affirmed by other
analysts of deliberation, both from theoretical and empirical backgrounds. See Zwart, 2003: 29; Young,
2000: 44-47; and Mendelberg, 2002: 155.
See Dryzek, 2007: 244-5.

132

The extensive work carried out by Archon Fung on types of deliberative
procedure offers a useful starting point for articulating assumptions on a wide array of
issues from the mode of deliberation, the number of participants, the acquisition of
information by citizen as well as by officials, and the bias of deliberation according to
socio-economic status. While none of the cases Fung covers involve environmental
matters, they enable me to establish initial expectations on key aspects of the deliberative
process that will inform my own hypotheses.
Most important are two cases that track similarly on many key aspects.50 Both the
Chicago community policing and the participatory budgeting process in Porto Alegre,
Brazil, scored high on the design for efficacy of the policies produced as well as
registering the two highest scores on empowering citizens, stakes for participants, and
monitoring, which registers long-term participation and potential for learning. In terms of
outcomes, on information pooling both outscored other deliberative procedures such as
polling and citizen summits, although this may also indicate that the issues covered by
these procedures were less demanding than their more information intensive counterparts,
e.g., the Oregon Health Plan. Both procedures also reflect their relative orientation to
underrepresented groups in their bias scores, which show an inverse socio-economic bias.
However, the two diverge at the justice of the policy, with the participatory budget
process receiving the highest rank and Chicago's community policing program receiving
the lowest score.
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Fung, 2007: 180, Figures 8.2 and 8.3.
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Given that Fung finds the degree of empowerment built into the procedure and the
subject of deliberation to be the two most significant influences on the outcome of
deliberation,51 this suggests that since the two scored 'moderate-high' (Chicago) and 'high'
(Porto Alegre) on empowerment, the difference falls to the subject of deliberation as the
most likely explanation: "Neighborhood public safety" (Chicago) and "Capital
infrastructure investments" (Porto Alegre).52 This interpretation needs to be tempered by
the importance of the mode of deliberation – the organization of discussion, including the
use of a facilitator – which was found to be an important factor in shaping the justice of
policies.
c. Dimensions of Comparison
These findings suggest that when translating the assumptions of Habermasian
deliberative democracy into hypotheses it is important to allow for inclusion of how
participant disposition and group composition both perpetuate and magnify existing
social norms while holding out the possibility of transforming such norms. It is feasible
to conclude that the operation of significant group norms is context dependent; that is,
group norms are impacted by the scope of problems in space (by political institutions and
cultural media, for instance) and that as the size of groups increases the issue of
composition intensifies. Thus, the spatial axis represents political boundaries as indicative
of the relevant geographic scope of an environmental problem (Figure 3.1).

51
52

Fung, 2007: 171, Figure 8.1.
This finding is supported by Hajer and Kesserling, 1999: 13.
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Figure 3.1: Axes of Environmental Problems

X = Spatial

Y = Temporal

Z = Concentration

X1.0 = Boundless:
Global

Y1.0 = Irreversible:
Intergenerational

Z1.0 = Aggregate: Multiple

X0.75 = Transboundary:
Regional (bi- or
multilateral)

Y0.75 = Modifiable:
Intergenerational

Z0.75 = Aggregate: Single

X0.50 = Bounded:
National

Y0.50 = Modifiable:
Intragenerational

Z0.50 = Mixed: Identifiable
and Aggregate

X0.25= Transboundary:
Subnational

Y0.25= Modifiable:
Prior Initiation

Z0.25= Identifiable: Multiple

X0.0= Bounded:
Local/Municipal

Y0.0= Irreversible:
Prior Initiation

Z0.0= Identifiable: Single

When incorporated with the correlation between increases in uncertainty of
knowledge as projected timelines increase (presented in Chapter 1 and developed in
Chapter 2), the spatial and temporal axes offer a way of locating instances of
environmental deliberation relative to the scope and depth of the environmental problem
under consideration. The temporal axis, then, simultaneously registers the duration of a
given environmental event while converting this into political terms as a generational
measurement of modifiability or irreversibility.
Finally, if we start by treating Habermas's discourse ethic (the 'all affected'
principle) as relevant to the number of participants then, by including Fung's separate
indicator for "stakes" as a measurement of engagement, it is possible to acknowledge the
concentration of relevant population. While concentration is an important indicator, in
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order to make it more directly a function of problem type, I scale concentration in terms
of the number of identifiable actors with readily identifiable agents offering the least
complicated deliberative case. The result is that concentration ranges from problems
encompassing a single polluter to multiple, discrete aggregate polluters with the middle
of the range covering cases in which environmental damage by an aggregate population
constitutes approximately half of measurable sources of pollution with the other half
made up of discrete, identifiable sources. This is the case with carbon dioxide (CO2)
emissions in a developed nation where a single cement manufacturer emits as much CO2
in a year as thousands of cars.53 In all cases, the axes employed are scaled according to
the degree of complication as a function of scope and mobility outlined in this section.
Thus, the further away from 0.0 along any axis the more movement involved in the
problem and the more complicated the corresponding procedure is presumed to be based
on problem type.
Given that each axis preserves the requisite conditions, it is necessary to test for
fitness using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sample test. The ordinal scaling of each axis
allows cases to be treated as a cumulative frequency where the observed distribution SN(X)
can be compared to the theoretical cumulative distribution F0(X) for a null hypothesis H0.
By testing the maximum deviation D along each axis, it is possible to make sufficiently
significant comparisons. This also serves to establish a basis for later examining clusters
that occur in the three dimensional X-Y-Z scatterplot.
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The precise number of cars depends upon the regulations in a given country. For an explanation of how
this effects international cooperation on global warming see Chasek, Downie, and Brown, 2010: 16-17.
I use the term developed nation to refer to the categories described in the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol.
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Performing a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test will also assuage concerns about whether
measurements of 'Concentration' track too closely to 'Spatial' measurements. Such
coincidence is to be expected in some cases, for example, forest management, where
mobility is less of an issue. However, there is no necessary correlation. In the case of
nuclear waste disposal in the United States, the issue of locating disposal facilities
typically involves a small number of readily identifiable nuclear producers operating
under significant federal restrictions that interacts with larger populations during
transportation (Z0.50) but crosses state boundaries without being national in scope (X0.25).
Some distortion does occur due to indicators not controlling for differences in
geographical proportion between nation-states. In the case of transboundary air pollution,
the issue in Europe under the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
(CLRTAP) is similar in scope to sulfur dioxide pollution in the midwestern region of the
United States but in Europe would be considered a regional issue (X0.75) while in the U.S.
would be a subnational issue (X0.25).

2. Comparisons and Hypotheses: The Particular Set of Environmental Cases
In order to generate significant explanations of deliberative democracy it is first
necessary to establish hypotheses based upon feasible expectations. By focusing
specifically on environmental problems I seek to move the discussion of Habermasian
deliberation away from more abstract formulations. The drawback is that in an already
sparse area of study further refining the unit of analysis decreases the number of available
cases. The upside, however, is that the comparative approach increases the leverage of
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findings.54 Each of the ten available cases is coded along the x-y-z axes described above
(Table 3.1) and is accompanied by a brief summary of the problem addressed and the
procedure employed (Figure 3.2).

Table 3.1: Cases of Environmental Deliberation
Case 1: Nuess County, Germany
(x = 0.25, y = 0.50, z = 0.50)
a. Problem Description: Waste management (treatment technology and incinerator siting)
b. Procedural Information: Nine mediation sessions were held from March 28, 1992,
through August 27, 1993, in Nuess County, North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany. The
meetings included representatives and members of 27 organizations. Resolutions were
officially non-binding but unofficially binding by promise of the County Council if
consensual agreement were obtained. (Holzinger, 2005)
Case 2: Columbia River Comprehensive Impact Assessment
(x = 0.25, y = 0.0, z = 0.25)
a. Problem Description: Hazardous waste storage and cleanup; prevention and cleanup
contamination of surrounding water supply (drinking and crop irrigation) and fisheries
b. Procedural Information: The Hanford, Washington, area is a Region 10, CERCLA site.
The U.S. Department of Energy organized a citizen advisory board (Site-Specific
Advisory Board) that included three federally recognized tribes as well as officials from
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Oregon State Department of Energy,
Washington State Department of Ecology, and Hanford Advisory Board (local), to
conduct a comprehensive risk assessment. Resolutions were non-binding and channeled
through a Project Management Team. (Kinney and Leschine, 2002)
Case 3: Far North Queensland Citizens' Jury
(x = 0.25, y = 0.50, z = 0.50)
a. Problem Description: Maintenance plan for Bloomfield Track, a 'road' traversable only
with four-wheel-drive that runs through the outback between Cairns and Cooktown
passing between the tropical rainforests of Daintree National Forest and Cape Tribulation
in North Queensland along coast fringed by coral reefs.
b. Procedural Information: A twelve member citizen jury, randomly selected from
amongst solicited respondents, was convened in Cairns, Australia, in January 2000. The
jury was facilitated to select among presorted policy options and provide officials with
non-binding information about citizen preferences for the road. (Niemeyer, 2004)
Continued on the next page.
54

See Collier, Brady, and Seawright (2004): 229-266.
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Case 4: Hampshire County Citizens’ Advisory Committee
(x = 0.25, y = 0.50, z = 0.50)
a. Problem Description: Waste management (strategy planning)
b. Procedural Information: Citizens advisory committees (CAC) involving three groups
of 16-20 people were selected as a representative sample in Hampshire County, England.
The group met six times over six months followed by a ‗core forum‘ after the assessment
was completed that met four times over ten months. Decisions were non-binding and
intended to provide information about public opinion to county officials. (Petts, 2001)
Case 5: Essex County Citizens’ Advisory Committee
(x = 0.25, y = 0.50, z = 0.50)
a. Problem Description: Waste management (strategy planning)
b. Procedural Information: CAC involving three groups of 16-20 people were selected as
a representative sample in Essex County, England. The group met five times over nine
months. Decisions were non-binding and intended to provide information about public
opinion to county officials. (Petts, 2001)
Case 6: Hertfordshire County Citizens’ Jury
(x = 0.25, y = 0.50, z = 0.50)
a. Problem Description: Waste management (strategy planning)
b. Procedural Information: In Hertfordshire, England, a citizens‘ jury involving 16 people
recruited for their representative statuses and paid for their involvement were directed by
facilitators before being divided into small groups for focused discussion. Decisions were
non-binding and intended to provide information about public opinion to county officials.
(Petts, 2001)
Case 7: Lancashire County Citizens’ Jury
(x = 0.25, y = 0.50, z = 0.50)
a. Problem Description: Waste management (strategy planning)
b. Procedural Information: In Lancashire, England, a citizens‘ jury involving 16 people
recruited for their representative statuses and paid for their involvement were directed by
facilitators before being divided into small groups for focused discussion. Decisions were
non-binding and intended to provide information about public opinion to county officials.
(Petts, 2001)
Case 8: Fort Collins’ City Dialogue
(x = 0.0, y = 0.50, z = 0.25)
a. Problem Description: Urban growth planning
b. Procedural Information: A public forum held in Fort Collins, Colorado, involved more
than 500 randomly selected participants with the goal of advising the City Council. The
process involved a community wide information campaign (20 page newsletter) with
questionnaire followed by two independent sample surveys, and an opportunity for public
input. Proposals were officially non-binding. (Weeks, 2000)

Continued on the next page.
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Case 9: Shaping Eugene's Future
(x = 0.0, y = 0.50, z = 0.25)
a. Problem Description: Urban growth planning
b. Procedural Information: In Eugene, Oregon, a multistage process brought together up
to 1500 participants with the goal of advising policymakers. The process began with
randomly assigned small group discussions focused on developing policy options. This
was followed by public commentary, an information packet and questionnaire as well as
community workshops. Discussions were facilitated. Although decisions were nonbinding, the policy options were open. (Weeks, 2000)
Case 10: Glenorchy City Council
(x = 0.0, y = 0.50, z = 0.50)
a. Problem Description: Waste management (Review services: curbside recycling, refuse
collection, landfill, yard waste collection, backyard burning, litter and public refuse bins)
b. Procedural Information: This multi-stage deliberation in Glenorchy, Tasmania,
Australia, in May 2000, involved convening precinct meetings to assist with carrying out
a non-binding review of the city's waste services. The precinct meetings were divided
into twelve smaller groups mediated by an annually elected three-member citizen
committee. Review also involved a public survey and a public information-sharing
campaign. Finally, each precinct elected one member of a taskforce to advise City
Council as well as relay information back to the public. (Zwart, 2003)
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Figure 3.2: Coding of Cases

Spatial (X)

Temporal (Y)

Concentration (Z)

Case 1

0.25

0.50

0.50

Case 2

0.25

0.00

0.25

Case 3

0.25

0.50

0.50

Case 4

0.25

0.50

0.50

Case 5

0.25

0.50

0.50

Case 6

0.25

0.50

0.50

Case 7

0.25

0.50

0.50

Case 8

0.00

0.50

0.25

Case 9

0.00

0.50

0.25

Case 10

0.00

0.50

0.50

D

0.4327

1.0

0.4327

p-value

0.04727

4.122

0.04727
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a. Interpreting the Cases
The limited number of cases addressing environmental problems and fitting the
relatively stringent criteria of Habermasian deliberative democracy means that the pvalue is too high and no significant inferences can be made yet based upon demonstrated
clustering. Given that studies of Habermasian deliberation in general are of recent origin
and coverage of environmental cases has often been of secondary concern for researchers,
it is to be expected that most of the available case studies would be reliant upon
accidental local arrangements. A more robust analysis will have to await approximately
twenty more future studies, some of which are already underway at places such as the
Centre for Deliberative Democracy and Global Governance at Australian National
University as financial and institutional support are provide by national governments.
Although the limited number and similarity of cases severely restricts the power
of the statistic for the comparative data, it does not mean that preliminary and tentative
inferences cannot be generated for the purposes of developing hypotheses based on the
available cases. For instance, we can see that the spatial difference (X-axis) in county
level versus city level meetings is represented in the similarity of cases 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7,
on the one hand, and the isolation of case 10, on the other. By comparing across the mostsimilar cases (1, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7) and contrasting it with the most-different case (10), it is
possible to render a more precise comparison of the changes effected by moving up one
level of government, that is, by increasing complication one unit of measurement, that is,
how differences diminish or exacerbate features found elsewhere or whether these
differences play little to no role.55

55

For discussion of most-similar and most-different case comparison see Gerring, 2007: 131-144.
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i. Most-Similar Cases
The county level deliberations covered in cases 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, provide
grounds that can inform hypotheses for a larger study. One of the first issues confronted
by deliberative participants in the Hampshire and Essex County citizens' advisory
committees (CAC) was how as participants became more informed about the issue of
waste management, beginning to perceive some of the more complex issues involved,
they also became aware of how much remained to be learned. This led to a situation in
which, despite the evident learning, "it was clear that the time was insufficient for all
questions to be dealt with and for an iterative process of discussion to take place."56
Although the CACs offered only a limited opportunity for learning, they offered more
than the confrontational style of the citizens' juries. The citizens' juries in Hertfordshire
and Lancashire did, however, offer an opportunity for deliberators to find moments of
commonality along the way that allow the "final process of consensus building […] to
capitalize upon agreement of outcomes during the process."57 The differences between
the CACs and the citizens' juries led the author to recommend restructuring future
deliberations in such a way as to combine the learning opportunities present in the CACs
with the opportunities to accrue agreements provided by the citizens' juries. As I discuss
in Chapter 4, it remains to be determined whether knowledge and trust can be
harmonized within a strictly deliberative framework.
Of equal significance are the conclusions presented about the expression of
generalizable interests within this set of cases. Case 3, which expressly attempted to test
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Petts, 2001: 216.
Petts, 2001: 220.
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the claim that environmental issues necessarily involve a generalizable interest.58 The Far
North Queensland Citizens' Jury resulted in recommendation to regional policymakers
that the Bloomfield Track be closed in stages over a 10 to 15 year period. The seven
votes against five leading to this conclusion, however, recommends against accepting the
claim to generalizable interests in any straightforward manner. Niemeyer explains the
difference in positions to dissenters being "less environmentally risk averse" and
"needing more definitive evidence before supporting any far-reaching action."59 He goes
on to conclude:
From these observations it appears that deliberation did not increase concern for
the environment so much as dispense with competing symbolic perspectives.
Once liberated from symbolic politics, jurors increasingly formulated policy
preferences on the basis of a pre-existing environmental consensus. This
consensus reflects a 'true' generalisable interest to the extent that it was widely
supported and withstood the deliberative process.60
That the generalizable interest encompasses the narrowest possible majority in this case
casts doubt upon this conclusion and raises further questions about what is legitimized in
the deliberative process if a generalizable interest is merely what is 'widely supported' by
a single vote, thus 'withstanding' deliberation.
Casting further doubt on the assertion that environmental issues are inherently
general are the findings in Case 1 on modes of communication. The author argues that
"[w]hereas factual and value conflicts can be resolved by pure arguing, in conflicts of
interest bargaining and arguing will appear together."61 The author compares two cases,
with the Nuess County mediation serving as the 'conflict of interests' test case. By sorting
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John Dryzek refers to "the human life-support capacity of natural systems" as "the generalizable interest
par excellence." See Dryzek, 1987: 204. See pages 58-60 for further elaboration.
Niemeyer, 2004: 356.
Niemeyer, 2004: 360.
Holzinger, 2005: 239.
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speech acts during deliberation into 'bargaining' and 'arguing' and performing content
analysis the author is able to show the frequency of types of statements within each mode.
Of relevance to the question of generalizable interests is that even where the exchange of
arguments is underway, the most common form of communication was 'to contradict,' at
21% of all arguing speech acts. While 44% of all arguing claims are a variety of neutral
claim, the author correctly points out that communication periodically switched over to
bargaining where 29% of all bargaining speech acts were 'demands' on other parties.
Those cases in which arguing seeks to build a general interest, the author remarks,
constitute only 10% of arguing speech acts while similar instances of bargaining amount
to a higher 20%.62 While not indicative of environmental deliberation per se, the rate at
which bargaining occurred (34% of all speech acts) and the more frequent gestures at
'generalizable interests' suggest that the claims made by participants must be analyzed
more closely to understand whether their bargaining and arguing purposes become mixed.
If mixing of purposes is found then it becomes necessary to draw upon explanations
besides inherent generalizable interest to explain outcomes.

ii. Most-Different Case
The question about generalizable interests is taken up by the author of Case 10.
He interprets participants' claims in light of the failure of interviewed respondents to
change preferences throughout the deliberative precedings.63 The author finds that in the
more local deliberation that he observes, "the concept of a generalisable interest was used

62
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I utilize the 'to concede' category included by the author when calculating constructive communication
as a percentage of 'arguing' while also incorporating the 'to offer,' 'to accommodate,' and 'to accept'
categories.
Zwart, 2003: 36.
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by citizens to defend their own interests."64 In the case of those holding the minority view,
they "claimed not only to be defending their own rights, but those of all responsible
incinerator users."65 Participants favored views that presented their private interest as an
indivorcible component of the generalizable interest, thus avoiding the negative
perceptions associated with an argument based solely on private interest.66

To

what extent this is a result of studying a more local problem is inconclusive. Distinctive
to Case 10, however, is that many of those interviewed percieved the group as
insufficiently representative of the relevant community. This perception affected how
participants weighed the various aspects of the deliberation, leading to considering the
"aggregative mechanism of the survey [...] to provide a more legitimate expression of
citizens' preferences than the deliberations they participated in through the precinct
system."67
The findings from the Glenorchy City Council case also offer a relevant point of
convergence with the most-similar set of cases. The reports from the citizens' juries in
Hertfordshire and Lancashire suggest that agreements reached at one stage in deliberation
can resound at a later stage, leading to improved outcomes. A parallel inference is made
by the author of Case 10, who writes that "over the less contentious issues people did
appear to take a 'deliberative' stance, which enabled an outcome to be achieved that was
fair for all involved."68 Although the impact of this similarity remains to be determined,
the occurrence in cases of proximal but distinct spatial measurements indicates that it is a
relevant topic for the next era of cases. At this stage, I will say only that how trust is built
64
65
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Zwart, 2003: 37.
Zwart, 2003: 37.
Zwart, 2003: 38.
Zwart, 2003: 39.
Zwart, 2003: 38.
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within deliberative groups is insufficiently known to be considered a constant of
deliberation.69 Furthermore, the relationship between Habermasian deliberation and
legitimacy, as well as the function of trust in conceptualizing legitimacy, is inadequately
theorized at this stage to begin integrating the empirical and theoretical findings.

D. Extending the Framework to Comparisons of Procedure Type
A larger number of cases are needed to infer about the interaction between
problem type and procedure type. As the number of case studies increases in the
foreseeable future it will become possible to compare procedure type on a case by case
basis. With the fitness of the present data being skewed it is not yet possible to apply the
remaining component of my comparative framework. However, since the purpose of the
comparative framework is exploratory, that is, intended to generate hypotheses, it is
useful to proceed with exposition of this final step.
Drawing on the work of Ortwin Renn and James Meadowcroft, I have constructed
a qualitative stepwise matrix to delineate the processes involved in successful
deliberation.70 Renn, et al, argue that when looking at cases of environmental deliberation
the relevant criteria are the intensity of conflict between participants and the degree of
complexity. Although these criteria are gauged at three discrete levels, I do not include
complexity because the definition used by the authors makes it incompatible with the
concept of complexity that I employ. While maintaining the criterion 'Intensity of
Conflict,' I have modified it to correspond to problems arising at specific stages of
deliberation.

69
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See Weatherford and McDonnell, 2007, on background trust.
Renn, et al., 1997; Meadowcroft, 2004.
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The second criterion for analyzing procedures on a case-by-case basis for later
comparison is drawn from Meadowcroft (2004). Meadowcroft exscinds procedures into
modes of interest representation and three stages: participation, output, and execution.71
The matrix for analyzing procedures utilizes these same stages to illustrate the most
generic features of deliberative democracy (Figure 3.3). At each stage in the procedure,
deliberation may be unsuccessful (0.00) or successful (0.33). The results are additive (as
opposed to multiplicative), thus allowing for comparisons within statistically significant
groupings graphed in the three-dimensional scatterplot.72
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Meadowcroft, 2004: 192.
These groupings are to be tested for proximity with nonparametric cluster analysis. The number of
clusters K to be tested is problematic since K must be defined in advance. I offer the three-dimensional
scatterplot to define K, using a k-means algorithm for the number of clusters thought to be present. This
involves further limitations on what may be inferred but increases the validity of the inference.
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Figure 3.3: Procedural Components of Deliberative Democracy
Stage of Procedure
Intensity
of Conflict
Reciprocity
(Interaction)

Tractability
(Agreement)

Sufficiency
(Solution)

Participation
(Interaction)

Decision
(Agreement)

Execution
(Solution)

(0) Unable
or unwilling
to engage
(0.33) Able
and willing
to engage

(0) Unable
to obtain
agreement

(0.33) Engage

(0.33) Able to
obtain agreement

(0.33) Engage

(0.33) Obtain
agreement

(0) Not
actionable

(0.33) Engage

(0.33) Obtain
agreement

(0) Not
enforceable

(0.33) Engage (0.33) Obtain
agreement

(0) Not
effective

(0.33) Engage (0.33) Obtain
agreement

(0.33) Implementable,
enforceable, and
Success
effective plan

E. Proposed Hypotheses for Future Research on Environmental Deliberation
The abductive approach – to hypothesize, test, and revise – lacks the definitive
findings of other empirical approaches, which is both its strength and its weakness. The
purpose of employing the abductive approach is that it formalizes in a rigorous manner
the same learning processes assumed by positivist approaches but substitutes
transparency for conclusiveness. This transparency contributes to a broader goal of
circumventing disciplinary divisions that limit exchanges between political theory and
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empirical political science. The division of labor between fields alluded to by Dennis
Thompson with his 'head/hand' analogy ignores the imbrication of implicit theoretical
assertions in empirical research and the assumption of empirical conditions in theoretical
arguments. The sorts of fine grained distinctions enabled by the most rigorous analysis
collapse when viewed in motu and captured by the ambiguities of the concept of
feasibility.
In order to avoid the charge of superficiality against ad hoc readings of deliberative
democratic theory leveled by Dennis Thompson, I have focused solely on preparing
hypotheses grounded in a thorough examination of Jürgen Habermas's conception of
deliberative democracy as it emerges out of his theory of communicative action. Having
paved the way for this by establishing a means of comparing cases of environmental
deliberation, it is now possible to generate hypotheses informed by the theoretical
implications developed in Chapter 2 as well as drawing on conclusions from presently
available case studies, keeping in mind that current findings offer minimal purchase on
the totality of Habermas's theory. Recall from Chapter 2 the assumptions made by
Habermas about the 'normal' course of deliberation:
a. ―carrying out straightforward ‗repair work‘,‖ which seeks to reconstruct the
shared orientation to reaching understanding.
b. ―putting aside the controversial claims, with the result that the ground of shared
assumptions shrinks‖
c. ―moving into costly discourses of uncertain outcome and open to unsettling
questions‖
d. ―breaking off communication and withdrawing‖
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e. ―shifting over to strategic action.‖73
I combine this set of assumptions about the 'normal' course of deliberation and the
assumptions about the role of learning with the survey of empirical findings presented in
this chapter. These are then correlated with indicators constituting the three-dimensional
scatterplot. Stating the assumption for the low, medium, and high points of each axis and
translating each into a predictor of success results in hypotheses for nine of the fifteen
axis indicators (Figure 3.4). Answering the need for more systematic claims about the
effects of scale and scope than the scattered remarks offered previously, each hypothesis
is both revisable and refutable.74
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Habermas, 1996: 21.
Meadowcroft, 2004; Renn, Webler, and Wiedemann, 1995; Fiorino, 1996.
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Figure 3.4: Hypotheses Regarding Environmental Deliberation
Dimension

Assumption

Probability
of Success

Spatial
X1.0 Boundless:
Global

Minimal shared 'background conditions' are offset
by appeals to a generalized or universal condition

High

X0.5 Bounded:
National

Political and institutional obstacles are
exacerbated by decreased background consensus

Low

X0.0 Bounded:
Local

Shared 'background conditions' increase
adherence to norms

High

Y1.0 Irreversible:
Intergenerational

Limited available data is compounded by
probabilistic calculations of risks; uneven
distribution of risks is subject to discussion

Low

Y0.5 Modifiable:
Intragenerational

Limited data allows knowledge claims to be
challenged as incomplete while the perception
of time to alter behavior allows postponement

Low

Y0.0 Irreversible:
Prior Initiation

Available data are less apt to be challenged and
are assisted by arithmetical calculations of harm

High

Temporal

Concentration
Z1.0

Aggregate:
Multiple

Complications in attributing responsibility are
magnified by incentives to postpone action

Low

Z0.5

Mixed:
Identifiable
and
Aggregate

Because some actors are already identifiable as
responsible parties while secondary actors are
identifiable only in the aggregate a strong incentive
is created for placing blame unfairly and not
communicating as equals

Low

Z0.0

Identifiable:
Single

Minimal disputation of facts; difficult to present
private interest as generalizable interest

High

Predicted Areas of Deliberative Success: (X1.0, Y0.0, Z0.0) and (X-0.0, Y0.0, Z0.0)
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F. Conclusion
The foregoing approach provides a constructive starting point for dialogue
between researchers of deliberation from different backgrounds along with an
opportunity to refine and optimize deliberative democratic arrangements. I end this
chapter with a conjecture that serves to link the analysis covered in this and the previous
chapter with what follows: many of the non-deliberative, and sometimes downright
undemocratic, institutions that result in the sorts of "distorted communication" that force
deliberation off course are also a necessary precondition for Habermasian deliberative
democracy. The reliance of 'modern' governments with complicated administrative
structures upon non-deliberative elements – the governments of western Europe and the
United States that Habermas singles out as exemplary of modernity – is deeply troubling
to proponents of Habermasian deliberative democracy. And yet, the relationship between
administrative government, decried as 'technocratic' by those advocating deliberation as a
means of resolving environmental problems, and citizen involvement remains
undertheorized by Habermas as well as proponents of deliberation in general.75
The most emulated model of environmental deliberation in the countries covered
in this chapter is Renn, et al (1997), which divides deliberation into three stages:
1. Identification and selection of concerns and evaluative criteria.
2. The identification and measurement of impacts and consequences related to
different policy options.
3. Conducting a rational discourse with randomly selected citizens as jurors and
representation of stakeholder groups as witnesses.76
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Approximating this version of arrangements, as occurs in most of the cases handled
above, results in a disjointed form of participation in which citizens are permitted to raise
concerns or brought in to identify problems. This is typically followed by a stage without
participation during which some information is deemed relevant and gathered by officials
inside or outside of the deliberative process, who then develop policy options for later
presentation. Though it is rare, so far, for deliberative groups to decide upon policy
options, although this can occur de facto if enough electoral pressure can be brought to
bear, deliberation often resumes in order to prioritize policy options. In some instances,
citizens are able to go beyond evaluating and modify a policy's parameters. As one author
included in the above cases concludes, "the optimum process for strategic waste planning
is one which […] integrates public involvement with the assessment of decision-making
process."77
The assertion that non-deliberative procedures are not accidental but essential and
that these very same procedures undermine the potential for deliberation to deliver on its
promises serves as a subtext to what follows. This is less a condemnation than an
invitation to further explore the theoretical implications of Habermasian deliberation. The
question is relevant for three reasons. First, if this dependency is inherent then it should
be foregrounded and elaborated upon as opposed to ignored. In part, the next chapter
takes up this line of inquiry. Second, acknowledging a necessary interplay between
deliberative democracy and non-deliberative (or even undemocratic) procedures opens
the door to a new set of empirical problems.78 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in
the context of environmental problems, which as I argued in Chapter 1 constitute a
77
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relatively new class of problems, deliberation is an attempt to substitute for a
―background consensus‖ where none has previously existed in 'massive' way.
Figuratively speaking, in the case of environmental problems, Habermasian deliberation
is forced to rebuild the ship while at sea, a situation that reinforces the need for precision.
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CHAPTER IV
THE AUTHORITY OF EXPERT JUDGMENTS
UNDER DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

Essentially, [risk analysis] is a kind of pretense; to avoid the paralysis of
protective action that would result from waiting for 'definitive' data, we assume
that we have greater knowledge than scientists actually possess and make
decisions based on those assumptions.
- William Ruckelshaus, former Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency1
In the weeks prior to the Copenhagen round of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, a set of emails taken from researchers at the University
of East Anglia's Climatic Research Unit were posted on the World Wide Web.2 The
exposed communications between researchers have been interpreted variably as
suppression of evidence on climate change, mere lapses in judgment, or poorly chosen
terms for calculations.3 Prior to the release of the emails, a Pew survey had already found
a decrease in public acceptance of climate change among Americans, a trend that it is
reasonable to presume the email scandal, dubbed "Climategate," will only exacerbate.4
Polling data from Britain indicates a similar retrenchment taking place.5 Even more
recently, errors ranging in severity from typographical mistakes to baldly incorrect
assertions in the International Panel on Climate Change's fourth assessment report have
been subjected to public scrutiny.6

1
2
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4
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Revkin, 2009.
Editorial, 2009.
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Rosenthal, 2010.
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The rapid succession of disclosures is having an immediate impact in the United
States where passage of a cap-and-trade bill in the House of Representatives last summer
and the Environmental Protection Agency's recent endangerment finding on greenhouse
gases have raised the profile of regulating carbon dioxide emissions. Throughout the
latter half of 2009 the issue appeared to be whether regulation would be done through
legislative action or by agency ruling. However, in recent months, on the tail of
deadlocked negotiations at Copenhagen and the stalling of climate legislation in the U.S.
Senate, challenges to domestic action on greenhouse gas regulation are on the rise.
Legislation has been introduced in both houses of Congress by members of the majority
party attempting to stay EPA authority to regulate greenhouse gases.7
Across the aisle, proposals go farther by attempting to overrule the EPA's
endangerment finding on carbon dioxide, removing it from the regulatory purview of the
Clean Air Act8. Governors of Texas and Virginia, citing the EPA's reliance on the IPCC's
Assessment Report 4, are also challenging the endangerment finding and seeking to
prevent EPA regulation of carbon dioxide within their states9. Given presidential reliance
upon the Senate to negotiate a binding climate treaty, it appears that the next round of
talks in Mexico in 2010 may already be in jeopardy of failing to achieve significant
targets for reduction.
The relatively dramatic impact of changes in public perception of climate science
should not appear out of proportion for even the casual observer. The gravity of a 35ppm
shift in CO2 in the atmosphere can result in computer models altering predictions by more
than a degree Celsius for global mean surface temperature, as advocates from Bill
7
8
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McKibbens' 350.org have pointed out, with serious implications for how to resolve the
issue. It comes as no surprise, then, that scrutiny of the scientific process is intense and
references in the "Climategate" emails less than cordial, at times the hyperbole reaching
such a pitch as to recommend violence against one sceptic. The tense atmosphere in
which climate scientists conduct research was offered by the researchers themselves as a
significant reason for withholding raw data and intentionally overstating the case in their
communications. The researchers worried that any suggestion of uncertainty on a
particular calculation would cast doubt on the entire enterprise.10 Their concerns were not
unfounded.11 It is precisely this give and take, the breakdown of not only public trust in
the work of these scientists, but the scientists' own trust in the receptivity of the public
that goes to the core of deliberative democracies' ability to respond to environmental
problems.
In order to illuminate the interactions between experts in positions of authority
and non-experts in terms of mutual trust I begin by detailing the need for deliberative
democratic theory to engage the issue of authoritative expertise in order to address
environmental issues. I then explain the logic underlying deliberative democracy, which
is posited as preferable to the aggregation of voter preferences through numerical
indicators such as voting or polling on the grounds that deliberation offers better
informed decisions. This argument from the epistemic value of deliberation requires
differentiating between the basic approaches that have been developed. Thus, I adjudicate
between three popular approaches, coming down in favor of an Aristotelian conception
formulated by John O'Neill that offers the most fertile concepts for understanding the
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potential for democratic involvement in environmental regulation, particularly with
regard to the role of trust. Turning to a more direct discussion of trust, I respond to
O'Neill's call for a 'political epistemology of trust.' The chapter concludes with a brief
assessment of how Kantian theories of deliberation necessitate a commitment to the
precautionary principle in order to make up for the lack of a well articulated conception
of authoritative expertise.

A. Accounting for Authoritative Expertise within Deliberative Democratic Theory
As the epigraph indicates, there is an intraversible gap between the equivocal
claims of scientists and the certainty assumed in the formulation of policy that strains the
relationship between those who generate research and those who rely upon and live with
the results of it. Thus, a tension is built into our technologically advanced commercial
society, with the need to regulate and administer a vast array of potentially harmful
compounds that are often closely bound up with the financial success of producers. To
locate such an extensive administrative process within a constitutional democracy risks
heightening the tension by exposing policy formulation to public scrutiny without
significantly increasing public input.
Calls for more open, participatory processes have arisen from policy planners and
political theorists with a special emphasis on deliberation as a means of containing, if not
actually reconciling, this tension.12 The surge in work on deliberative democracy over the
past two decades introduced more stringent conditions for democratic legitimacy than the
aggregation of preferences attributed to the pluralistic polyarchy that preceded it as a
topic of study. Common to most formulations of deliberative democracy is a strong role
12

Habermas, 1996; Dryzek, 2000; Bohman, 1996.
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for public reason, communication amongst affected citizens with the goals of expressing
claims intended to rationally persuade others and of being open to such persuasion
oneself. Consequently, the amount of time devoted to an issue is dramatically increased
compared to forms of aggregation that require nothing more than voicing one's opinion.
This increased commitment of political resources is, according to deliberative democrats,
a boon for legitimacy. However, placing greater demands on citizens when they do opt to
participate poses choices about whether a political system can continue to address as
many issues or, barring a significant downsizing of government functions, must rely upon
gains in legitimacy to enable a further delegation of tasks to non-deliberative institutions.
Currently, only a small amount of work has been devoted directly to the issue of
democratic authority, the need to delegate tasks on an array of questions to institutions
with limited popular input. Mark Warren prompted serious reflection on the issue as early
as 1996. At that time, authors such as James Bohman acknowledged the limited
opportunities for deliberation but were reluctant to explore them further, instead
cordoning them off from discussion.13 However, Warren's assertion that authority is not
supplemental to but a prerequisite of deliberative democracy redirects our attention to the
necessity of going further than acknowledging limits and to begin elaborating particular
limits. Doing so involves refraining from categorical assertions about the beneficial
impacts of deliberation upon democratic authority, such as:
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The production and distribution by government of policy relevant information is
the most obvious solution to the problem that neither capacities nor acquired
knowledge can be assumed to be evenly or widely distributed in the deliberative
environment. The efficacy of this epistemic division of labor would depend on
public trust. That trust would increase rather than deplete through use, as ordinary
citizens are successful in using information supplied by government to redirect
the course of government. There will also be a need for institutional reforms that
would create new forms of bureaucratic organization more consistent with
participatory deliberation.14
At the same time, when analysis of democratic authority is being conducted
attention must be paid not only to epistemic matters but to how delegating tasks
attenuates authority. The 537 elected officials in the federal government head a
bureaucracy comprising nearly 2 million civilian, non-postal workers. To take the Clean
Water Act as an example, citizens elect members of Congress through voting, an act that
involves significant ambiguities about which aspects of a candidate's platform are
supported and which are not. Through a series of amendments various representatives
modify previously enacted legislation, issuing directives to a previously erected
Environmental Protection Agency where the chief administrator tasks staff members
located in regional offices with handling more intricate matters such as developing
measurements for nonpoint source pollution as well as standards for wastewater
treatment. With further delegation not out of the question, this sequence raises significant
theoretical questions about how authority is altered as it is transferred. Since it strains
credulity to suggest that increasing opportunities for citizens to participate in the political
process will eradicate the need to delegate tasks to administrators, it is important to
consider how the more stringent conditions of deliberative democracy involve an
increased reliance upon democratic authority.
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Observing the inconspicuous involvement of scientific advisory panels in most
aspects of environmental regulation, Sheila Jasanoff concludes that, contrary to the
notion of political legitimacy employed in Habermasian deliberation, experts are not
granted a role on the basis of legitimate authorization but provide a source of authority
that is perceived as external to the political process. Jasanoff describes the situation
thusly:
Faced with ever-changing arrays of issues and questions − based on shifting facts,
untested technologies, incomplete understandings of social behavior, and
unforeseen environmental externalities − governments need the backing of
experts to assure citizens that they are acting responsibly, in good faith, and with
adequate knowledge and foresight. The weight of political legitimation therefore
rests increasingly on the shoulders of experts, and yet they occupy at best a
shadowy place in the evolving discourse of democratic theory.15
Jasanoff attributes the rise of a 'fifth branch' in the United States to a reconfiguration of
the relationship between the government, technologically-driven corporations, and
research-equipped universities in the decades following World War II.16 Constituting a
"new social contract," newly formed agencies found themselves assigned the task of
monitoring synthetic compounds as they entered the environment at an unprecedented
rate.
As we saw in Chapter 2, Jürgen Habermas picks up on the way in which new
sources and modes of knowledge production in western Europe and the United States
have reshaped the democratic landscape. The historical narrative that he provides of
deeply fragmented social systems resulting in a legitimation crisis offers deliberative
democracy as a last-best hope. The role of authoritative expertise grounded in controlled
experimentation as a source of legitimacy, as opposed to recipient, is not absent from
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theoretical accounts of deliberation. Instead, this role remains implicit insofar as
deliberation is presented as providing better informed decisions than competition between
interest groups or aggregation of individual preferences through voting.

B. Epistemic Grounds of Deliberative Democracy
A common thread to deliberative accounts of democracy is a suspicion of
aggregation as a wholesale mechanism for political decision-taking. Reliance upon
aggregation as the general form of democracy, thereby reducing citizenship to the act of
voting, is amenable to quantifiable modes of analyzing political participation. This
conception, however, opens proponents to the charge by deliberative democrats of
supporting rule by ill-informed and interest-driven actors unable to consistently align
their own preferences, particularly in complex cases where the entry cost of acquiring the
relevant training is high. As James Fishkin poses the matter: "Can the simple expedient of
statistically averaging responses by hundreds or thousands of ordinary citizens, nearly all
of whom are uninitiated into these complexities, really represent the kind of 'rational'
opinion that democratic theory would ask us to expect of citizens?"17 Undergirding
Fishkin's question is a sense of the challenge posed to the legitimacy of democracy when
answered in the terms made available by a more polyarchic account.
Seeking to justify a strong attachment to democracy when confronted with the
meager offerings of aggregation, deliberative democrats have sought to bolster the case
for an epistemic value to deliberation. Habermas paints the issue in terms of modernity:
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Fishkin, 1997: 88.

163

We should keep in mind the reason why normative political theory has bought
into an epistemic notion of deliberative politics: it is for solving the ‗problem of
legitimation‘ that the secular state faces in view of the ‗fact of pluralism.‘ Once
the acceptance of binding political decisions can no longer be based on
justifications derived from a substantive world view that is, or can be expected to
be, shared by all citizens, the burden of legitimation finally falls only on what we
may expect from the democratic process.18
Democracy, then, is justified not only on procedural grounds for its fairness but also for
the ability to transform citizens' preferences by educating them as well as displaying a
tendency to arrive at correct answers on some, less complicated issues. The notion of
deliberation's epistemic value has carried over to environmental political theory where
advocates view deliberation as correcting a narrow, technical approach to addressing
environmental problems. As one proponent succinctly put it:
As well as transforming normative perspective, group deliberation is also said to
have an epistemic dimension. It can help to overcome the problem of bounded
rationality, where complexity of (ecological) problems far outweighs the
cognitive capacities of the ordinary citizen. The transformative mechanism may
simply involve group deliberation reducing the ‗costs‘ of acquiring information
through information pooling, or combining cognitive powers in much the same
way as multiple processors working in series increases the power of
computers.19
In this formulation echo themes that I aim to pull together in reflecting upon the
role of authoritative expertise: an admission of a fundamental disconnect between the
magnitude of many environmental problems and the training needed to acquire the
requisite capacities for putting information into context; disavowed potential for
misplaced faith in the prospect that citizens will be transformed through involvement in
deliberative institutions since, by implication, citizens constitute an as-yet untapped store
of cognitive resources; and that the limitations imposed by technical calculations –
'instrumental' or 'bounded' rationality – will be transcended by alternative forms of
18
19
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rationality. Instead, I uphold a weak version of deliberation that reverses the valuation
made by Habermas specifically and Kantian theories generally. In place of arguing for
institutions on the grounds of their presumed ability to enact normative and cognitive
transformation, I advocate prioritizing institutions that have demonstrated their ability to
be, at minimum, normatively neutral but cognitively sufficient. What this means is that
deliberative democratic institutions are to be preferred where they do not inhibit
resolution of the most threatening and complex environmental problems. As will be seen
further along, when combined with democratic practices that promote trust over
improved collective cognition what appears to be a largely diminished role for
deliberation will, I hope, offer a more secure place for political participation that does not
invoke citizens in transcendental terms employing 'public reason,' but as here-and-now
actors concerned about harmful conditions.
Despite the assertion of an epistemic value to deliberative democracy,
engagement with the issue of authoritative expertise is, at best, undertheorized where it is
not altogether neglected. I understand expertise to refer to training in a body of concepts
and subsequent internalization of assumptions and standards about what constitutes
acceptable objects of analysis and the relevant methods for conducting recognizable
analysis. Recognition by a certifying body, whether academic or professional, indicates
possession of the requisite qualities for judgment, granted by dint of a relevant area of
knowledge the holder is presumed to have acquired. That this process is neither
thoroughly standardized nor infallible is assumed as I proceed to a more precise
articulation of the conditions for trust. For now, it is important to reiterate that expertise
is not defined in terms of its truth-value.
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The context of debates over the relationship between democracy and expertise
regarding environmental problems, outlined in Chapter 1, is not completely determined
by constitutional and bureaucratic rules. In at least one significant way, the relationship is
reflective of a dichotomy between an ignorant populace permitted the reins of power by
democratic institutions and a numerically smaller but enlightened group. This gross
caricature appears in Platonic political thought. As recent political theory has drawn
heavily upon Kant, this caricature inherited from Plato remains implicit in a conception
of the 'mature' citizen as relying solely upon his own reason.20 As deliberative democrats
have attempted to accommodate the demands posed by environmental problems, the
notion of the citizen self-reliantly engaged in public reasoning according to the force of
the better argument polarizes ambiguous lines of inquiry around a commitment to
proceduralism or government by technocrats.
Instead of setting the poles at strict proceduralism and rule by experts, I
foreground the aspect of expertise as initiation into a normalized, and often
professionalized, language. In doing so, the terms of discussion are no longer limited to
the likelihood of correctness by democracy or the legitimacy of expert rule. The focus,
rather, is on what one observer of deliberation refers to as the "clear tension between
modes of expressions," with "members of the public using anecdotal and personal
evidence whilst experts used systematic and generalized evidence based on abstract
knowledge."21 Analyzing expertise in terms of modes of expression is not to assume that
all modes of expression are equally valid and commensurable. In fact, it is precisely to
highlight the differences in what gets expressed and how it is expressed that I opt for this
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angle. Expertise, as I have sketched it, is premised upon increasing transparency amongst
initiates by exposing the various steps used in argumentation in order to clarify what is
contested. This aim coincides prima facie with the overarching goals of deliberation as
provision of reasons. Attempts to ground deliberation in public reason, however, run into
the problem that along with offering qualitatively distinct forms of knowledge that may
not be commensurable, the ideal of transparent knowledge runs the risk of sabotaging
itself when confronted with more experiential and anecdotal claims. This is due to
experiential claims being indisputable in a way that expertise is not. Anecdotal evidence
is neither reproducible nor open to challenge and revision. While such standards do not
exclusively define what is admissible in political dialogue, it must be granted that the
burdens born by each presenter differ in kind.22
Expertise is not the only valid source of knowledge claims and the distinction
between controvertible and incontrovertible claims does not exhaust the variety of
sources that can be drawn upon. The task is to define valid claims to knowledge in such a
way as to avoid the false dichotomy offered in the Kantian conception of maturity while
also retaining the capacity to distinguish claims that are ontologically mutually exclusive.
That is to say, it is imperative to distinguish competing claims about environmental
phenomena where both offer assertions about a verifiable state of affairs. Seeking a
middle ground between a relative constructivism that abandons arguments about
environmental phenomena to competing discourses and an absolute naturalism that takes
knowledge to be a transparent discovering of discrete phenomena involves placing
knowledge production within a social context without treating that context as determinate.
22
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In as much as experiential or anecdotal evidence differs from the qualities sought
in more rigorously designed experimental research or in-depth case studies, it is the
difference between what Sheila Jasanoff terms regulatory science and research science
that is most relevant for parsing authoritative expertise. The standards undergirding
research science – peer reviewed, large-n control-group or double-blind experiments – is,
as Jasanoff points out, distinct from the conclusions drawn when establishing regulatory
standards. Take, for example, the 2006 decision by the EPA to lessen the amount of daily
exposure to fine particle matter in the air while leaving unchanged the annual standard
against the advice of its Clean Air Scientific Advisory Council which had voted 20-2 in
favor of lowering the annual standard as well. Coming in for much criticism, the decision
by EPA administrator Stephen Johnson was taken by the editorial staff at the New York
Times, among others, as yet another sign of science being overruled by political
considerations.23 Jasanoff's distinction between research and regulatory science draws
attention to the issue of judgment, which neither pretends that the production of
knowledge is walled off from external concerns nor directly accessible by all. Instead,
focusing on judgment involves a broader conception of authoritative expertise that
combines rigorous processes of validation as well as the socio-economic cues attached to
producers. As she puts it,
Judgment in the face of uncertainty, and the capacity to exercise that judgment in
the public interest, are the chief qualifications sought today from experts asked to
inform policymaking. In these circumstances, the central question is no longer
which scientific assessments are right, or even more technically defensible, but
whose recommendations the public should accept as credible and authoritative.
That question leads immediately to a second-order query: whose judgment should
we trust, and on what basis?24
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In order to show how a prudential approach favoring the political authority of
considered judgments offers a better suited democratic involvement than Habermas's
discourses of justification and application, it is necessary to first explain why this
approach is preferable on the grounds that it is better suited to environmental problems.

C. Deliberative Approaches to Authoritative Expertise via Epistemic Value
The proliferation of deliberative democratic theory, despite only limited
engagement with the issue of authoritative expertise, offers sufficient basis for comparing
approaches. We should be wary, however, of posing the issue in overly stark terms, as
suggested above, between rule by a group of truth-possessors and rule by the uninformed
majority. Putting this version aside and allowing our conception of expertise to retain a
stronger sense of the Latin experiri from which both expertise and experience derive,
clears the way for a less dichotomous analysis.
Within recent literature on deliberation, two lines of inquiry have emerged on the
issue of authoritative expertise: the need for mutuality between laypersons and experts,
on the one hand, and whether expertise meets the requirement for publicity.25 As James
Bohman has pointed out, "Good democratic arrangements and their normative constraints
promote [reasonable] solutions by ensuring deliberative liberties and the conditions of
mutuality in dialogue."26 To put the matter more succinctly, arriving at democratically
acceptable decisions requires mutual and complementary contributions from each
member. The question is what form of contribution is required by experts and does it
violate the qualifications of deliberation. I adjudicate between these approaches to
25
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determine which offers the most constructive account of authoritative expertise for
addressing environmental problems, distinguishing them by how each construes the
relationship between laypersons and experts, either symmetrically or asymmetrically.27

1. Epistemic Symmetry
Those theories that exhibit epistemic symmetry either discern no relevant
differences between experts and non-experts in their capacities as democratic participants
or, where differences are seen, the positions are treated as incomparable and, as a result,
equally valid. The extension of deliberative democratic theory to environmental issues
has benefitted tremendously from the work of John Barry, who argues for a strong role
for public participation in environmental decision-making. More specifically, Barry
claims that the distinction between what constitutes a technical or non-technical problem,
with serious implications for the role assigned to experts in political proceedings, should
be determined by the deliberations of the affected public, regardless of any demonstrated
technical competence.28 The point is to establish, on political grounds, the equality of
contributors to deliberative proceedings in order to gain the benefits of summation
without dismissing the need for democratic participation to offer some epistemic value.
The arrangement seen in Barry's approach raises the fundamental question as to
whether or not a purely symmetrical conception can be defended while still upholding the
need for mutual contributions. To be in a position to make such a distinction requires
some basis for judgment. Treating technical knowledge as exclusive, as Barry does, leads
to treating experts as the only ones in possession of both technical and non-technical
27
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knowledge (in their capacities as citizens). Since non-technical knowledge is considered
non-exclusive, experts are the only group to retain access to both and, on these grounds,
would be better positioned to make such a distinction. In order for Barry to conclude
laypersons, lacking technical knowledge but possessing non-technical knowledge, are in
equal standing with regard to distinguishing between the two he must also claim that
laypersons and experts are in equivalent positions or that technical and non-technical
knowledge are interchangeable. Since claiming that technical and non-technical
knowledge are interchangeable would negate the need to make any distinction, it is to be
expected that Barry opts to defend the symmetry of the two parties.
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To reiterate, the question is not simply whether experts and laypersons can be
treated symmetrically but whether it is possible to do so while maintaining the condition
of mutuality according to which experts should contribute to the collective any technical
knowledge that is deemed useful. Where laypersons are viewed as having non-technical
knowledge but lacking technical knowledge, being deficient in one domain and
competent in another, strict symmetry would indicate that experts are deficient in nontechnical knowledge and competent in technical knowledge. In support of the claim to
symmetry, Barry asserts that how a problem is defined will impact the available solutions.
He argues that viewing environmental problems as technical issues leads to technical
solutions and, since laypersons are not privy to exclusive technical knowledge, the
implication is that laypersons are written out of the picture. While this claim makes sense
in light of his starting point, attempting to defend the symmetry of the parties as opposed
to restructuring deliberation to increase the complementarity of their distinct domains
leads Barry to an unfortunate conclusion. He states that technical expertise should not
exclusively define the problem or the solutions, claiming that science should inform
democratic deliberation without "authoritatively determining" the outcome.
On this account, neither laypersons nor experts should exclusively define a
problem or solution, a conclusion that appears acceptable at first glance. However, this
balance can only be achieved by treating experts in a one-sided manner. When the topic
up for discussion falls within their field of expertise, experts possess both non-technical
knowledge in their capacity as a citizen and technical knowledge in their capacity as one
competent in the specialized language of a field. Barry runs into the problem that he must
treat experts as lacking in non-technical knowledge, denying their status as citizen-
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layperson in most matters, or proceed without acknowledging how one's standing is
altered by the topic under discussion. The remaining option is to return to the view that
there is no relevant difference between the two forms of knowledge, thus removing the
need for any distinction between technical and non-technical while falling back on the
assumption that democratic decision-making is inherently valuable. To do so, however, is
to fail to offer any support for the claim that deliberation possesses epistemic value; that
is to say, Barry defends symmetry at the expense of epistemic value.
Barry expresses a need to retain a place for technical knowledge, stating "this is
not to say that green politics is anti-science, but that scientific or technocratic assessments
of social-environmental relations should be placed within the wider political-normative
context of those relations."29 Despite his claim, Barry's vision of environmental politics
provides only a reluctant space for judgment, reserving the ontological commitments
entailed in judging for after democratic deliberation. By conflating the equality of
citizens to offer assessments with the equal quality of those assessments, Barry's own
faith in democracy risks overgeneralizing its value.
Of relevance, however, is the need to understand authoritative expertise in an
embodied form as always both expert in a small number of matters and layperson in
others. This condition, referred to by James Bohman and others as 'epistemic
dependency,' places everyone within a web of relationships that are constantly reshaped
by the topic of discussion. Unfortunately, Bohman offers only a rather ambiguous
demarcation of when this dependency operates and even less assistance understanding
how it affects environmental politics specifically. Bohman himself articulates support for
the epistemic value of democracy in a way that only partially clarifies the claim to
29
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symmetry. Dividing issues into typically complex, which remain amenable to being
resolved through deliberation, and excessive or 'hyper' complex, which confound
attempts to make rational public decisions, Bohman points the way toward a clearer
delineation. He states that, "[e]ven when self-critical and aware of its limits, use of public
reason cannot gain full knowledge of hypercomplex effects on intentional forms of social
coordination."30 Such issues are, according to Bohman, characterized by highly
interdependent relationships between differentiated and independent social causes and the
non-linear effects they have on their environment.31 He concludes that,
[I]n tightly coupled systems there is constant monitoring of the environment, with
minimal flexibility regarding the time and the resources needed for immediate
intervention. Maintaining such a system demands increasingly specialized expert
knowledge, which in turn multiplies experts' authority over decisions pertaining
both to the system's maintenance and (more fatal to democracy) to the monitoring
of the system's environment.32
Although Bohman does not use the term environment to designate ecological systems, he
makes a point of stating that such relationships are not limited to cases of technology,
citing agricultural production as an example of such a system.
The point of this line of analysis is to illustrate the general direction if we allow
for the possibility that authoritative expertise and lay knowledge of citizens are
asymmetrical. By acknowledging that authoritative expertise is not an open invitation to
permanently empower a class of individuals on all matters, as suggested by the notion of
expert rule, and that some topics pose problems which deliberative democracy is
incapable of addressing, we are able to see that an asymmetrical conception will involve
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further exploration of the role of trust.33 Before proceeding further down this path,
however, it is necessary to survey how asymmetry has been dealt with by current
approaches to deliberation.

2. Epistemic Asymmetry I: Kantian Approach
The first view of expertise and lay knowledge as asymmetrical derives expressly
from the critical tradition of Kant, emphasizing awareness of the limits of knowledge as
well as viewing politics in terms of normative justification. Recent ideas along these lines
come from those developing the work of John Rawls or Jürgen Habermas. In the Kantian
version of asymmetry, the division between expert and layperson is reshaped by a more
fundamental distinction between empirical and normative knowledge that leads to
conceptualizing deliberation not only in terms of public reason but as the collective
establishment of normative principles prior to determining how such principles apply.
The prioritizing of normative over empirical issues is called for by Habermas,
which he divides into discourses of justification and discourses of application. However,
application of previously decided norms is not entirely straightforward. Retaining the
critical awareness of Kant, Habermas first designates the limits of deliberative democracy,
that is, he defines the scope of what problems can and cannot be rectified through
deliberation:
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Moral knowledge is obviously affected differently than empirical knowledge by the
history and historical constitution of the world. Indeed, this is the reason for the
peculiar bilevel nature of the moral justification of actions. I am referring to the
familiar point that well-grounded moral norms can claim only validity prima facie.
For ex ante, only the consequences and collateral effects of typical cases, which can
be anticipated, are considered. Unanticipated constellations of conflict situations
that occur subsequently give rise to a further need for interpretation that must be
met from within the altered perspective of a discourse of application. During the
process of application, the norm that is ―appropriate‖ to the situation is selected
from the plurality of warranted norms that might be applied in any given case. […]
universal norms can determine future actions only to the extent that typical,
probable circumstances can be anticipated –– that is, in principle, incompletely.34
Organizing deliberation according to discourses of justification which precede discussion
of application introduces a significant limitation in terms of environmental problems
insofar as deliberative democracy contributes epistemic value only in cases where
"typical" and "probable" circumstances can be anticipated. Where normative issues are
treated as comfortably within the purview of all individuals, presumably eliminating any
distinction between moral 'experts' and laypersons, the domain of application involves
empirical questions whose typicality requires an awareness of a larger set of cases.
Furthermore, as suggested by Bohman above, many environmental problems involve
complex calculations about thresholds, unpredictable rates of recovery, or highly specific
questions about resilience that defy broad categorization and comparison. As I discuss in
Chapter 2, it is necessary to account for the insight that many environmental problems
fall outside of the scope defined by Habermas.
As a case of epistemic asymmetry, Habermas's distinction between normative and
empirical discourses, when overlaid onto the issue of authoritative expertise, raises
serious doubts about whether deliberation must exclude some individuals on the grounds
that they lack the relevant competence to participate. This impression is reinforced
34
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elsewhere in Habermas's theory when he acknowledges that some issues are beyond the
abilities of individual participants without specifying how the relevant knowledge may be
shared:
[T]he abstractness of these highly generalized norms leads to problems of
application as soon as a conflict reaches beyond the routine interactions in familiar
contexts. Complex operations are required to reach a decision in cases of this sort.
On the one hand, one must uncover and describe the relevant features of the
situation in light of competing but somewhat indeterminate norm candidates; on the
other hand, one must select, interpret, and apply the norm most appropriate to the
present case in light of a description of the situation that is as complete as possible.
Thus, problems of justification and application in complex issues often overtax
[überfordern] the individual’s analytical capacity.35
It would appear that we have returned to a scenario that reproduces many of the features
of the exclusionary and problematic 'rule by experts' while also avoiding any commital
statements about the quality of decisions − the epistemic value − to be expected from
deliberation.
In a more recent effort to clarify the role of authoritative expertise, David Estlund
seeks to combine the normative import of Rawlsian proceduralism with the epistemic
value he argues arises out of deliberative democratic arrangements. Compensating for
Habermas's lack of articulation of the quality of democratic decisions, Estlund offers an
extended treatment of authoritative expertise. Distinguishing between authority as the
moral power to require action and legitimacy as the permissibility of coercively enforcing
commands, Estlund posits the relationship between expert and layperson as one of
deference, construing the issue as whether laypersons are obligated to suspend judgment.
Here, the separation of normative and empirical questions intervenes to keep the
epistemic argument from overwhelming the procedural issue. Estlund admits that, "We
are permitted to doubt the moralist even though it would be irresponsible to doubt the
35
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physicist in parallel circumstances" and that determining how expertise on the two issues
differs "is all somewhat puzzling."36 He salvages his arguments by relegating such
problems to stronger 'correctness theories' that "say the minority ought to obey the
outcomes of majority rule because this gives them their best evidence about what the
substantively correct decision is."37 He views his own solution, which he refers to as
epistemic proceduralism, as avoiding the need to clarify such matters since the "reasons it
gives the citizen are moral reasons to comply, not epistemic reasons to believe."38
By setting the claim in favor of democracy's epistemic value at 'better than random,'
Estlund need only show that deliberation performs well in severe cases by preventing
what he calls 'primary bads.' It is at this stage that Estlund's treatment of the issue
introduces a highly suspect premise for an asymmetrical argument. He writes that:
When we ask whether democracy makes good decisions, we must recognize that its
decisions include any law or policy, whether produced by direct popular vote or
not, whose legitimacy or authority is held to derive from its democratic production
broadly conceived. The regulatory decisions of an appointed agency are surely
included. The commissioners are appointed, but in a democracy (characteristically,
if not by definition) any government official is either elected or appointed by
someone who is elected, or at least by someone whose appointment is traced in this
fashion back to someone who is elected. All the official decisions of all these
people must be counted as among the democracy's decisions.39
The rather tenuous assumption that authority is transferred without dimunition begs for
qualification. Estlund, however, does not substantively account for how authorization
occurs. Instead he focuses on ideal justification, which leads to an innovative theory of
null non-consent, or 'normative consent' as the basis of democratic authority.
Unfortunately, the theory of null non-consent results in pushing the issue of trust between
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experts and laypersons, so evidently called for by the suggestion that authority extends
without alteration, off the table by reinscribing a division between normative and
empirical knowledge. Although Kantian approaches do not preclude an inquiry into trust,
it is telling that few in this lineage feel compelled to pursue such an inquiry. It remains,
then, for the second account of epistemic asymmetry to articulate a relationship between
experts and laypersons that includes a role for trust in place of an argument about consent.

3. Epistemic Asymmetry II: Aristotelian Approach
The second version of epistemic asymmetry draws upon an Aristotelian
conception where expertise is learning how to scrutinize received opinion. Viewing
knowledge acquisition as a process of training and accumulation of relevant experience in
judging, this conception treats the relationship between expert and layperson as a
specialized division of labor. Thus, the contiguity between doxa and endoxa does not
allow anyone to monopolize claims to participation, much like the normative-empirical
categorization, while retaining the relevant distinctions regarding the development of
experts' capacity to make judgments, a point that is lost when experts are relegated to
providing empirical support.
Of equal importance to the conception of expertise as experienced judgment is the
way in which treating the lay-expert distinction as a specialized division of labor gives a
prominent place to the role of trust. This change of emphasis is made explicit in the work
of John O'Neill who poses the question: "When is it rational and defensible for citizens to
accept the judgement of another individual, the grounds for which they are not in a
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position to appraise?"40 The issue of rational deference is approached differently than by
Estlund, who understands deference to be about whether one is under an obligation to
suspend judgment. O'Neill writes: "The statements of those whom we take to be
authorities we accept not simply because we have not the time to corroborate the grounds
for their utterances, but because we lack the relevant judgements in the absence of an
apprenticeship in the practice."41 By qualifying the statement as he does, O'Neill divides
judgment in two: judgment of an epistemic claim and judgment of deference to another
person. Obligation is irrelevant on this account since he is not claiming that rational terms
of deference are binding. By attaching a qualifier, O'Neill treats the issue of
commensurate knowledge claims as a settled matter since he grants that the layperson is
not in a position to evaluate the particular claim. The issue, then, is considered a matter of
practical knowledge, of accomplishing a task that one is ill-equipped to address: no more
a moral issue than calling a doctor or electrician.42
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The shift in emphasis becomes apparent when, having defined asymmetry as
about the significance of a given claim, O'Neill is now able to introduce the question of
what knowledge is required to arrive at a rational judgment about reliance upon other
people's specialized knowledge. At this stage, the credibility of the speaker involves both
an epistemological and an ethical dimension.43 Where viewing the relationship between
democracy and expertise in dichotomous terms, this leads to the conclusion that where
uncertainty exists, expertise must admit failure. On the contrary, the Aristotelian
conception leads to the conclusion that recognizing uncertainty supports turning to those
who possess a sense of proportion in terms of the significance of uncertainty for a
particular study. That is, judgment becomes all the more pertinent in such cases.
Insofar as expertise is seen as practical knowledge, as the proper application of
more abstract, theoretical principles, O'Neill is able to find a constructive role for
participation and for a contribution from the lay 'users' of expertise. Of greater
significance to my own analysis, though, is the introduction of external factors affecting
the way in which laypersons and experts interact. O'Neill makes the case that laypersons
may draw upon formal principles of logic to assist in adjudicating between claims by
competing authorities as well as arguing that equality (isonomia) is a precondition for
rational deference to authority. The call for equality arises from a need to separate
positions premised upon possessing expertise, what O'Neill calls internal authority, from
standards external to a given area of knowledge such as wealth or prestige, which he
terms external authority. O'Neill argues, "[J]ustifiable scepticism of the external source of
authority infects the credentials of the internal source and can lead to scepticism about all
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authoritative judgements."44 Where inequality does exist, however, rational deference
demands inquiring into the credibility of a source:
The existence of a strong link between power, wealth, and special interests and
particular authoritative judgements does provide prima facie grounds for
scepticism about their claims. What is often presented in logic books as an
example of the 'fallacy of relevance' -- questioning a person's judgement by
reference to her having an interest in saying it -- is a legitimate tool in the
practical art of suspicion.45
Without entrenching experts as a stable class of persons possessing inexorable decisionmaking power, O'Neill upholds an asymmetrical version of the lay-expert relationship
necessary for evaluating environmental knowledge claims as considered judgments and
foregrounds the role of trust in maintaining that relationship. He accomplishes this while
retaining a strong role for participants utilizing tools of suspicion.
Given the argument presented in Chapter 1 that environmental issues constitute a
unique set of problems due to the uncertainty and complexity generated by the interaction
between societies and natural phenomena, it is possible to draw a few conclusions on the
basis of the preceding analysis. To begin with, an asymmetrical conception of the
relationship between experts and laypersons is preferable because it is necessary to
preserve criteria for rigorously evaluating competing claims regarding environmental
impacts. This, however, does not entail designating a stable class of experts with
exclusive rule since specialized fields of knowledge render some experts in one field but
laypersons in others and environmental research often partakes of multiple fields of study.
With regard to the competing asymmetrical versions of expertise and lay
knowledge, I view the Aristotelian conceptualization of epistemic asymmetry as best
capturing the fraught relationship present on the issue of authoritative expertise. Not only
44
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does the version covered by John O'Neill avoid relying upon the false dichotomy that pits
deliberative democracy against rule by experts, but it provides a great deal of flexibility
for thinking about how participation usefully improves expertise while simultaneously
being dependent upon it. The Aristotelian version is, however, open to objections from
proponents of the Kantian view that it relies upon an instrumental defense of deliberative
democracy and that it involves a slackening of the standards for deliberation. To the
charge of employing less stringent standards for deliberation, the issue is less relevant for
an Aristotelian conception. If authority is primarily concerned with "moral reasons to
comply, not epistemic reasons to believe," as David Estlund puts it, where one is under
an absolute obligation then deliberative democracy must offer a categorical account of its
moral legitimacy.46 This is reflected in the approach taken by Habermas as well as many
followers of Rawls.47 If, instead, authority is about having reason to believe that another
is better positioned to understand and address a problem then practical reasons are
sufficient for establishing authority. I come down on the side of the Aristotelian
conception precisely because it offers an account of authoritative expertise capable of
specifying conditions for withholding trust, as opposed to a justification of authority
defined in the general terms of legitimacy described in Chapter 1.
The second hypothetical criticism is that the role of authoritative expertise
implied by the Aristotelian account suggests deliberative democracy is heavily dependent
upon external circumstances for its value. Deliberative democracy, then, cannot be
viewed as inherently desirable since it will perform unevenly. Granting the criticism, it is
worth pointing out that deliberation is also not inherently objectionable on this account,
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but valuable with regard to some aim. Where a strong commitment to proceduralism has
led to the charge that deliberation falls prey to supporting incorrect outcomes, a charge
David Estlund views as sufficiently problematic to warrant a theory of epistemic
proceduralism, there is a feasible alternative that need not deny striving for the most
accurate empirical judgments. As we have seen, environmental problems are especially
difficult to address deliberatively due to the complexity and uncertainty involved in
measuring changes in ecosystems and in determining the impacts of a phenomenon.

D. A Political Epistemology of Mutual Trust
As argued by Mark Warren in his exploration of democratic authority, it is
necessary for a deliberative democratic theory to argue either for a massive down-scaling
of political structures or to specify conditions for authorizing non-democratic decisions.
That collective decision-taking cannot occur on most, or even many, important topics is a
constraint that is recognizable when dealing with the broad range of environmental
problems. However, insofar as authorization is conceived of in terms of a handover of
popular sovereignty it rests on an inherently fragile relationship of trust between grantors
of collective power and users. Trust, in this instance, encompasses both the scope of
authority as well as the extent to which violations of trust will be rectified. Warren
elaborates:

184

Inherent in a trust relationship is that the truster does not monitor the background
of interests and conditions. When one trusts another, one forgoes whatever
opportunities one has for monitoring – although it is important that the
opportunities exist and may even sometimes be used. But if one monitors
continually, not only would the advantages of trust in terms of existential security,
reduction of complexity, and extensive divisions of labor be lost, but the one who
is monitored would herself feel untrustworthy, subject to a suspicion corrosive of
trust. And yet, there is nothing more corrosive of social relations than trust that is
abused, typically arousing in the victim a moral bitterness that not only damages
future relations with an individual or institution but also reflects upon all other
potential relations of vulnerability, producing a downward spiral in trust.48

Warren illustrates the contours of the dilemma: trust is fragile precisely because it is a
two-way relationship, a mutual composition. Too much scrutiny and the relationship is
transformed into an instance of supervised activity that risks dictating the trustee's actions;
too little scrutiny and one risks engendering in trustee's a sense of self-authorization that
treats violations of trust as undetectable.
This account of the role of entrusting poses special challenges to a democratic
vocabulary that offers transparency and accountability as the solution to the need for
authoritative expertise. In the case of the Climatic Research Unit's exposed emails, it is
clear that operating in a context of heightened suspicion contributed to presenting data in
ways that were expected to diminish doubt. Such attempts by scientific advisers to shape
relationships between themselves, regulatory bodies and affected publics, underscores the
asymmetry that exists as well as the dependence upon those with the requisite capacities
for informed judgment. The challenge arises from grafting conditions premised upon trust
onto conditions for punishing violations of trust.
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In her attempt to compare social contexts of trust, Sheila Jasanoff develops
criteria for measuring 'civic epistemology,' that is, the "institutionalized practices by
which members of a given society test and deploy knowledge claims used as a basis for
making collective choices."49 Jasanoff treats trust as a function of accountability, that is,
as following from the characteristics of institutional procedures for holding experts
accountable. Implicit in her criteria is that trust is coterminus with procedures for
challenging trustees (Figure 4.1).
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Figure 4.1 Trust and Accountability
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Without discounting the value of Jasanoff's analysis, she captures but half the
picture. Although accountability is necessary for relationships of trust to develop between
regulatory bodies informed by scientific advisers and democratic publics, it is not
sufficient by itself. Recalling the temporal displacements described in Chapter 1, trust as
the motivation for deferred judgment is granted on rational grounds but is defined by an
evaluation of the likelihood that those grounds will be redeemed. Where grounds for trust
are vindicated, accountability is moot. The scope of authority, as I argue in Chapter 1, is
defined in motu as ambiguous circumstances are acted upon and actors are evaluated by
citizens in light of the consequences of their action. It is this non-linear conception of
politics that most completely differentiates my own analysis from Kantian deontology
and whose dangers are best mitigated by Aristotelian virtue-ethics.
It is necessary, however, to articulate a more nuanced idea of trust to illustrate
how authoritative expertise in the context of a political institution differs from expertise
more generally. Claus Offe, drawing on his research on emergent institutions in postSoviet Europe, provides a pivotal starting point. Offe begins by distinguishing trust
relationships built upon repeated interaction and familiarity, or experiential trust, from
trust that goes beyond familiar relationships, or generalized trust. The problem of
generalized trust for thinking about democracy is posed by Offe: "Why is it that I have
more to fear from the discretionary powers of autocratic (though at least conceivably
benevolent) rulers than from the (potentially highly detrimental to me and 'my' values)
legislative will of democratically constituted representative bodies or popularly elected
governments?"50 Offe analyzes possible responses: 'vertical' trust in "elites' wisdom and
fairness," "confidence in the robustness and durability of institutions, specifically in the
50
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institutional setup of a liberal democracy," or "attaching some abstract and indirect bonds
of trust to the citizenry as a whole.51 Offe sees vertical trust, between citizens and elites,
as fraught with difficulties and abstract attachments as too reliant upon signaling
trustworthiness where the "increased use of trust-inviting signals is responded to by the
spread of distrust in the cognitive value of these signals, which in turn is responded to by
heavier doses and the accelerating innovation of such signals."52
Of greater significance to my argument, Offe views as faulty arguments
suggesting that institutional procedures to ensure accountability on the back end are an
apt substitute for trust on the front end by making trust dispensable. Offe offers two
reasons for rejecting substitution. First, the incomplete coverage of rules leaves large
areas in need of implementation that remain open to conflict between justifiable positions.
Second, the contestability of institutions leads Offe to understand them not as
"conventions, but rather the opposite, namely patterns of precarious and potentially
contested cooperation."53 Instead of viewing institutions as a means of substituting for
trust, Offe argues that institutions build trust by serving to coordinate normative
expectations amongst strangers. He summarizes his position:
[I]t is this implied normative meaning of institutions and the moral plausibility I
assume it will have for others which allows me to trust those that are involved in
the same institutions. […] 'trusting institutions' means something entirely different
from 'trusting my neighbor': it means knowing and recognizing as valid the values
and form of life incorporated in an institution and deriving from this recognition
the assumption that this idea makes sufficient sense to a sufficient number of
people to motivate their ongoing active support for the institution and the
compliance with its rules.54
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For Offe, this "anticipated formative impact," along with the protection granted by rights
significantly decreases the risk of trusting others since citizens come to find a set of
normative expectations built into institutions.55 Designating the specific set of values that
promote generalized trust (truth-telling, promise-keeping, fairness, and solidarity), Offe
claims that "their capacity for mediating trust is most critically undermined if any or all
of these values are seen to be betrayed or insufficiently enforced."56
I applaud Offe's efforts to draw attention to the formative potential of institutions
and his willingness to elaborate the particular norms that he views as best able to build or
enhance trust. However, a problem arises in thinking about the applicability of such a
theory to environmental issues. It is crucial, on Offe's account, that at least some pertinent
assertions be made good. As he describes it, promise-keeping is,
truth telling not about 'given' facts in the world, but actively redeeming
propositions concerning my own future action, thereby making them true. […] the
perceived failure of policy makers to redeem their own promises or hold other
actors liable for keeping promises, be it due to their lack of effort and intention, or
be it due to circumstances beyond their control, will undermine the general level
of trust.57
Generalized trust, as an argument for the contribution of democratic institutions, falters
when confronted with what is a regular occurrence in environmental politics: the lack of
verifiability. Offe's notion that the redemption of propositions is necessary for trust
among citizens parallels Habermas's attempt to construct communicative ethics around an
orientation toward redeeming one's assertions implicit in the act of communication. In
both instances, though, the ability to redeem assertions is taken for granted. Such a view,
however, is unwarranted in light of the central place of counterfactuals in identifying
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problems and foreseeing problematic effects of environmental trends. 58 In many cases,
the need to act on a given environmental problem is not because impacts are complete but
because ongoing processes stretch out in time so as to make changes appear singular and
anomalous or as merely a recurrence of a pattern. The reliance upon counterfactuals is
amplified whenever the issue is a low-probability, high-risk event where the only
verifiable predictions are those that are not averted.
By removing opportunities to establish shared normative meaning through
promise-keeping, as Offe requires, the notion that a broadly shared trust will occur
beyond familiar relationships remains unsatisfying. The prudential response lies not in
attempting to transcend the uncertainty and fragility surrounding authoritative expertise
but to embrace rational deference in all of its precariousness. As John O'Neill claims,
citizens' tools of suspicion – the application of logical criteria to the competing arguments
of experts and awareness of potential conflicts of interest for those producing
information – cannot replace informed judgment, but are not insubstantial either so long
as the signals used in applying the criteria for credibility are rendered as direct as possible.
Authoritative expertise involves an elaborate, if faulty, system of credentials,
certifications, and institutional vouching to signal credibility. The context that must be
sought to allow for authoritative experts to trust citizens' reception of judgments is one
where generalized trust enables a more refined form of scrutiny to suffice. On the other
hand, citizens will only be in a position to do so if accountability does not have to fulfill
the role of trust.
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E. Institutional Fragmentation and the Precautionary Principle as Unifying Norm
The notion that accountability may substitute for or generate relationships of trust
becomes problematic in the context of environmental politics where temporal and spatial
scale readily exceed any single experience, where low-probability, high-risk events are
known entirely through forecasting, and where solutions are posed as counterfactuals.
Thus, along with the 'tools of suspicion' citizens possess, further adjustments are called
for to develop trust between those capable of informed judgment and those dependent
upon such judgments. Accountability is merely an opportunity to punish violations of
trust.
But if the inability to disconfirm the judgments of authoritative experts undercuts
the formative power of institutions for generating trust, what options remain for building
such relationships between publics and experts? I propose a three part answer that, while
falling far short of a guarantee, answers to the deficiencies identified thus far without
foreclosing opportunities for deliberation. First, decrease the risk involved in trusting by
encouraging a proliferation and unbundling agencies with highly circumscribed authority.
Second, replace recent 'transparency' campaigns with more selective but higher profile
publicity of information to invite scrutiny. Third, mandate the precautionary principle as
a regulatory decision-taking standard in order to establish the normative significance of
environmental institutions.
The first proposal to build trust involves providing a context for trust to flourish
by decreasing the risk involved in trusting. This is the same idea that guided Claus Offe's
claim favoring the proper normative meaning of institutions. However, once a key
component of his theory is not operative, i.e., promise-keeping, then it is necessary to
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find an alternate route without presuming the success of institutions' ability to transform
citizens. Since it is unwarranted to assume that institutions employed to address
environmental issues through some degree of citizen involvement are to be equally
successful in building trust, the goal is to divide consolidated sites of authority into
smaller units performing separate functions. While this idea introduces significant issues
for coordinating activities across environmental institutions, threatening to undermine
trust if such coordination proves illusory and ineffective, this is merely transferring a
problem of coordination within current hierarchies to coordination across networks.59
The second change I argue for is replacing transparency as open access to
information with a more selective form of publicity. The notion of transparency in
government parallels the notion of information in economic exchange as a theoretical
innovation capable of ensuring fair transactions. In the case of economic exchange, so
long as parties to an exchange are in possession of complete and accurate information
about the objects being exchanged (and are entering the exchange voluntarily) then
equivalence is established between the objects and the transaction can be said to be fair.60
Transparency, in terms of political representation, serves as the mechanism by which
correspondence between citizen preference and governmental decisions is established as
legitimate. To put it differently, transparency imposes the economic idea of consumption
onto a political process.
If, instead, we focus on building mutual trust between authoritative experts and
citizens then publicity is equally as important as participation. That is, hearing takes on as
much significance as voicing. Publication of government decisions may count as
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transparency, but is incomplete when it comes to developing trust. Publicity involves not
only the announcement of significant decisions but opportunities to learn. Thus, publicity
as I understand it, includes availability of research conclusions along with question-andanswer sessions between researchers and public. This more selective scrutiny, vastly
different from the open-ended processes described in Chapter 3 in which challenge takes
place at every stage, would be restricted to questions for clarification. On the basis of
such publicity, a second stage for political participation can be implemented for more
thorough challenges to regulatory decisions, as distinct from informational reports.
Along with a more diffuse institutional landscape and effective publicity, it is
necessary to establish clear expectations regarding authoritative expertise. A version of
this idea is advocated by Mark Warren, who writes that "desirable forms of trust are
facilitated by political contexts that provide actual recourse to monitoring, specifically
through institutional devices that […] align the interests of truster and trusted, thus
limiting the risks of trust."61 Warren argues that "it is a less complex matter to judge the
configuration of interests that motivate a trusted individual or institution than it is to
judge the information, knowledge, and competencies upon which the truster relies when
he trusts" and that "even in the absence of necessary information, it is relatively easy to
design institutions to facilitate commonalities of interest and block conflicts of interest."62
Warren's argument dovetails with the 'tools of suspicion' called for by John O'Neill.
However, Warren overstates his case by claiming that blocking conflicts of interest
between an expert and third parties is similar to creating common interests between
experts and those who are dependent upon them. While aligning interests may encourage
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trust, trust in expertise is predicated upon identifiable interests on the part of experts.
Thus, I recommend focusing on safeguards against conflicts of interest, such as full
disclosure policies without exceptions for proprietary information, while simultaneously
seeking the greatest clarity about the normative significance, as Offe puts it, for
environmental institutions. This is best accomplished through the use of single-purpose,
well-defined mission statements that employ the precautionary principle as a decisiontaking standard.
A number of factors recommend the precautionary principle, understood to
attribute the burden of proof for technologies or practices with the potential for lowprobability, high-risk catastrophes to producers prior to manufacture, not regulators
seeking to restrict after the fact. Although some formulations of the precautionary
principle have been drawn more broadly to encompass any probability at any level of risk,
I begin with a minimum definition precisely because it avoids "encouraging a public
debate about every possible consequence that a technology or social practice might
have."63 However, the point is not the particular threshold that is set but the shift in
burden away from proving harm to proving non-harm.
As Kerry Whiteside argues, the emphasis built into the precautionary principle is
on consequences, focusing discussion on beneficial environmental impacts in place of
more complicated cost-benefit or cost-cost analysis. Employing the precautionary
principle as the standard for regulatory decisions serves to decrease ambiguity about an
agency's mission, thus requiring less discretion for implementation. Furthermore, the
63
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precautionary principle decreases opportunities for conflicts of interest between
regulators and regulated as the default position is inaction for all parties. Finally,
committing authoritative experts to the precautionary principle through agency mandates
promotes trust by clarifying the normative significance of environmental institutions,
giving an evaluable purpose to regulatory agencies and deliberative bodies.
Committing environmental institutions, including deliberative fora, to the
precautionary principle runs counter to the arrangements of Habermasian deliberation in
which deliberative bodies must first settle 'discourses of justification,' that is, the
normative principles to be used during 'discourses of application.' When confronted with
the novelty of environmental problems deliberation should, in Habermas's theory, serve
to build 'background consensus' where none previously existed. As I address in Chapter 2,
this promise fails on both theoretical and practical grounds. Although Whiteside salvages
a strong case for why deliberative democratic theory should employ the precautionary
principle, I go further. Versions of deliberative democracy grounded in a Kantian notion
of public reason necessitate a version of the precautionary principle as a substantive,
general norm in the absence of 'background consensus.' The precautionary principle
would then constrain the majoritarian tendencies of deliberative democracy in the
absence of citizens' perspectives being transformed in much the same way as
constitutional principles operate in Habermas's political theory.
Although the precautionary principle would operate as a pre-democratic
constraint on the decisions of a deliberative body, the notion that deliberation assumes
substantive normative content is not new.64 Increasing the degree of trust between
authoritative experts and lay citizens involves only a limited commitment insofar as the
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precautionary principle settles only one portion of 'discourses of justification' without
precluding agreement upon other non-contradictory norms. Employing deliberation to
accompany decision-making around low-probability, high-risk events while permitting
authoritative expertise to cover routine regulatory decisions grounded in the
precautionary principle involves sacrifices both in terms of what decisions may be arrived
at democratically and in terms of what decisions may be arrived at administratively.
Utilizing the precautionary principle as a general, substantive norm does not
exclude more conditional norms shaped by local context to emerge at the rate of events. It
is this risk which, as discussed in Chapter 2 and returned to in Chapter 5, is implied in
Kantian visions of cosmopolitan politics where consistency is brought about through the
universalizing of state functions and done so in a way that is disavowed. The
arrangements I envision remove regularized decision-making power over numerous highrisk phenomena from any single authoritative body. While environmental problems occur
irrespective of political boundaries, I do not argue that the institutional alterations I
support are comprehensive in their ability to meet all possible challenges. But neither do I
subsume the necessity for non-democratic institutions within promises of citizens
transcending politics in order to preserve the environment.
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CHAPTER V
DEMOCRACY OUT OF BOUNDS: CITIZENS, MOVEMENTS, AND STATES IN
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS

[T]he adequacy of the state's response to the ecological challenge needs to be seen
as analytically separate from the extent to which the character of the state has in
fact evolved or changed (although there may be important interconnections). […]
the ecological challenge has indeed been one of the most important factors
contributing to the changes that have taken place in the changing normative
structure of international society. And yet, even in relation to the environment,
there is a real danger that transformationist claims overstate the scale of the
changes that have actually taken place and, more important, that this exaggeration
might lead to a misdiagnosis of the challenges to be faced.1

The formalization of international environmental law, dating to the Trail Smelter
arbitration between the United States and Canada in 1935, developed in response to
problems that were previously unnoticed or nonexistent. However, it was not until the
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 1972 that sustained
international attention began to replace ad hoc cases. In less than four decades, hundreds
of bilateral and multilateral environmental treaties have been negotiated to address issues
from the depletion of whales due to commercial hunting to the ratio of greenhouse gases
in the atmosphere. With an array of issues being recognized and handled in a relatively
short period of time, it is little surprise that the various legal frameworks have achieved
radically divergent levels of success.
Subsequent conferences aimed at diagnosing and preventing irreversible damage
to the atmosphere have taken place in the context of 'globalization,' the increased
movement of capital, expansive production and communication networks, and to a lesser
extent the mobility of persons. In the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union,
1
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the internationalization of capitalism and the emergence of international political
institutions under the auspices of the United Nations (e.g., UN Environmental Program)
or international financial institutions (e.g., World Trade Organization and International
Monetary Fund) have shaped the terms of political discourse. If one is to believe New
York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, these developments are related insofar as liberal
democratic institutions and capitalism are mutually reinforcing so that the emergence of
'green' capitalism offers the best hope for resolving global environmental problems.2
The emergence of global environmental conditions that overflow the territory of
sovereign states have led in recent years to formulations of global democracy that
supersede existing government institutions. This vision is informed by the view that
states are rapidly declining as a result of an inherent inability to confront transboundary
environmental problems, generating substantial opportunities for non-institutional
democratic politics along the way.3 Dovetailing with the recent scholarship on
'globalization,' this vision attempts to resituate calls for environmental protection outside
of the authoritarian lineage of the finitary political imagination explored in Chapter 1.
Retaining the impulse for more experimental and non-institutional conceptions of
democracy that animated the environmental movement in the United States of the 1960s,
this version of the finitary political imagination articulates its environmental projections
as more indeterminate, provisional commitments. At the other end of the spectrum is a
thoroughly articulated vision of a global democratic state that functionally consolidates
multilateral state power.

2
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A point of commonality for proponents of transnational democratic politics who
reject state-based solutions is the focus on international environmental activists and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) construed as part of a global public sphere. The
emergence of international NGOs working against nuclear energy following events at
Three-Mile Island and Chernobyl or monitoring human rights violations (e.g., Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch) in the late 1970s and early 1980s was
accompanied by more expressly environmental groups. Along with the growth of
international environmental NGOs like Greenpeace out of Canada, World Wildlife Fund
from Switzerland, and Friends of the Earth headquartered in Sweden was the
establishment of research networks focused on global environmental problems. These
ranged from the nongovernmental advocacy of the Worldwatch Institute to extensions of
scientific associations such as the World Climate Research Programme to hybrid groups
of scientists and policymakers such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 4
Whether or not this array of associations constitutes a global public sphere capable of
supporting robust claims for transnational democracy will be taken up in the course of
this chapter. There is evidence, however, that international environmental NGOs have
played a significant role in shaping the negotiation process of treatiesto be more inclusive
as well as the wording once rules for inclusion, such as the Aarhus Convention,5 were
passed.6
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The interchange between international environmental law and global public
sphere as well as far-reaching communications and financial networks shorn of state-ties
appear to bolster claims that the prominence of states to handle collective problems is
receding. However, without speculating on the long-term viability of states or for that
matter intergovernmental organizations, I argue that the energy of citizens and groups
hoping to promote environmentally benign arrangements or rectify environmental harms
should not become fixated upon promoting participatory international institutions,
although such pursuits need not be abandoned altogether. Instead, environmental
activism, advocacy, and protest should support international environmental laws that
enmesh domestic laws while also devoting attention to raising awareness at the domestic
level of violations of international agreements. Stated succinctly, a multi-pronged
strategy must not only include but prioritize 'greening' developed states. This strategic
imperative becomes clearer in light of the pattern of international negotiations that show
the presence of domestic environmental laws to be a strong indicator of a government's
support for an international treaty.

A. Imagining Cosmopolitan Identity: Risk and Fate
The subtext to the finitary imagination is conflict; more specifically, war. The
steady build up of surface and atmospheric measurement capacity during World War II,
aided by more extensive satellite and computing networks during the Cold War arms race,
is not coincidental. France developed an "international weather telegraphy network"
following theloss of a naval fleet during the Crimean War.7 Animated by a Malthusian
strain, there remains at stake in the finitary political imagination the supposed threat of
7
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societal breakdown as populations encounter their carrying capacity, driving individuals
to infringe upon others' rights. The originary political imagination, too, was inspired in its
Hobbesian expression by the conclusion of the Thirty Years War at Westphalia.
Furthermore, not only did the French Revolution offer fodder for Kant's argument for
progress but the Treaty of Basle occasioned his writings on perpetual peace.8 In both
accounts, the unit of conflict is the nation-state.
The debate within political theory over the nature of relationships created by
globalization has, likewise, centered on the relevance of the nation-state. In many ways,
attempts to posit cosmopolitan democracy in terms that either extend or bypass the state
misapprehend the equilibrium that exists at present as well as available opportunities. The
relationships generated in the course of globalization – unequal, mediated, far-reaching,
untraceable – operate in a way that social contract theories focused on voluntary
associations as well as deontological theories focused on obligatory principles are illprepared to capture. This is due, in part, to the way in which both approaches have
framed debate over whether a non-exclusive global 'people' is brought about through the
occurrence of problems in common (affectedness) or by dint of consensual identification
(membership). From the vantage of prudential analysis that treats legitimacy as
insufficiently contextual, it is possible to see that such a split is inherited from the
presupposition of the nation-state built into Kantian cosmopolitanism in which
membership and affectedness were aligned without remainder.
The questions of who constitutes a global 'people' and on what grounds are central
for political theorists who countenance cosmopolitan democracy. For those for whom
inclusion is premised upon affectedness, environmental problems are easily categorized
8
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as a subset of risk-calculations, which identifies groups in terms of shared risks. German
sociologist Ulrich Beck poses the issue clearly:
The international intractability of modernization risks is matched by the way they
spread. At least for the consumer, their invisibility hardly leaves a decision open.
[…] They can be in anything and everything, and along with the absolute
necessities of life – air to breathe, food, clothing, home furnishings − they pass
through all the otherwise strictly controlled protective areas of modernity. […] In
this sense they bring about a new kind of risk ascription by civilization. This
recalls in some respects the status fate in medieval society. Now there exists a
kind of risk fate in developed civilization, into which one is born, which one
cannot escape with any amount of achievement, with the 'small difference' (that is
the one with the big effect) that we are all confronted similarly by that fate.9
Beck ties together two key points. First, the risks posed by the very act of existing and by
day-to-day objects occur outside of any identifiable system of choice by consumers such
that they appear as fated. Second, no one is exempt from risks in general and so share a
similar fate. Thus, a community of fate becomes coterminous with a universal risk
society, providing the bridge from seemingly local industrial products (and by-products)
to a global community.
The angling of potential hazard into common fate, even while acknowledging the
uneven nature of the threat, emerges almost simultaneously in the international arena
around environmental questions. Beck's Risk Society, originally published in Germany in
1986, is complimented by the report of the World Commission on Environment and
Development, also known as the Brundtland report, published in 1987. In the opening
chapter entitled "A Threatened Future," the Brundtland Commission offers a parallel,
albeit only slightly less dramatic, diagnosis:
Societies have faced such pressures in the past and, as many desolate ruins remind
us, sometimes succumbed to them. But generally these pressures were local.
Today the scale of our interventions in nature is increasing and the physical
effects of our decisions spill across national frontiers. The growth in economic
9
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interaction between nations amplifies the wider consequences of national
decisions. Economics and ecology bind us in ever-tightening networks. Today,
many regions face risks of irreversible damage to the human environment that
threaten the basis for human progress.10
Offering the Commission as a micro-cosmopolitan unity, Gro Brundtland states that
commissioners "were acting not in our national roles but as individuals; and as we
worked, nationalism and the artificial divides between 'industrialized' and 'developing',
between East and West, receded. In their place emerged a common concern for the planet
[…]."11
To take a final example that brings the analysis more directly into environmental
political theory, Barry Holden in his treatment of global warming argues that "the very
existence of the global warming problem may well be a powerful inducement for the
emergence and growth of a global community. Here there is, indeed, a 'community of
fate', but on a global scale."12 In positing this connection, however, Holden rejects linking
this community grown in response to a particular problem to something resembling a
global state. Claiming that "a global community would not necessarily be linked with the
existence of government," Holden borrows the distinction between government and
governance, where governance is managed by a "global civil society."13
There is much to be sympathetic with in this line of thinking, particularly insofar
as the emergence of new and difficult issues reshapes the political landscape. However, I
am reluctant to make the leap from collective problems to collective identity so swiftly,
especially when such identities are seen as both undefined while simultaneously
reflecting the democratic urges of a global environmental movement. Of significance in
10
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this conception of a global community is that it simply arrives, occurring without volition.
My hesitancy, then, derives from the lack of answers for two different problems. First,
granting the possibility that nothing precludes attachments to abstract, collective identity
at the global level, the question remains as to the nature of this attachment. The
supposition amongst those advocates just discussed appears to be that a cosmopolitan
identity will arise that is sufficient to override other attachments that may be less abstract.
To put the issue a bit differently, the burden is on those whose arguments necessitate a
global collective identity to explain whether such 'thin' relationships are likely receive
priority over 'thicker,' more comprehensive relationships. Second, and of greater
importance, is the questionable assumption that the global collective identity attributed to
the mix of activists and NGOs forming a transnational environmental movement is, in
fact, a democratic identity. The implication is that in the constitution of global
democracy, nation-states exist simply as a barrier that, once removed, would allow an
informal democratic politics to unfold. Such an assumption is even more troublesome for
those who subscribe to more demanding deliberative notions which entail not only a
particular normative orientation for citizens but also a set of competencies for exercising
one's political agency.

B. Constructing Cosmopolitan Community: A Humanitarian State
Beginning from affect leads, in the above accounts, to the involuntary emergence
of 'governance' tied to an amorphous global public sphere in which democracy manifests
a popular will. An alternative line of reasoning that defines collective identity in terms of
consent is also present in recent attempts to conceptualize a global democratic order.
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Turning to the full-blown conceptions of cosmopolitan democracy offered by David Held
and Jürgen Habermas allows me to trace more directly the potential for and limitations of
the nation-state in addressing large-scale environmental issues.
While both authors build their theories on a diagnosis of the modern nation-state
as undergoing – either presently or in the recent past – a 'legitimation crisis,' David Held's
vision for cosmopolitan democracy seeks to incorporate affectedness into consensual
membership. Seeing the all-affected principle (see Chapter 2) as generating 'overlapping
communities of fate,' Held nonetheless envisions a union of such communities in terms
commensurate with a social contract. He writes,
Nonetheless, the idea of a democratic cosmopolitan order is not simply
compatible with the idea of confederalism, a wholly voluntary, treaty-based union,
constantly renewed through limited agreements. It is the case that the creation of a
cosmopolitan democracy requires the active consent of peoples and nations: initial
membership can only be voluntary. It would be a contradiction of the very idea of
democracy itself if a cosmopolitan democratic order were created non-voluntarily,
that is, coercively.14
Differentiating this contractual basis from the involuntary association generated by the
all-affected principle, Held proposes reorganizing established political units into a
federated system. In this version, a tiered structure brings together already existing
(democratic) governments through a transfer of authority, mimicking the erection of
government from out of civil society in a Lockean state of nature.
Held's version of cosmopolitan democracy fits squarely within the Kantialineage,
offering intergovernmental relations defined by treaty and infused with a cosmopolitan
ethos at the top. He writes, "[t]he case for cosmopolitan democracy is the case for the
creation of new political institutions which would coexist with the system of states but
which would override states in clearly defined spheres of activity where those activities
14
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have demonstrable transnational and international consequences."15 Despite claiming that
this federation would serve as a separate source of authority within well-defined areas, it
is the notion of 'overriding' states that is pregnant with ambiguity. The character of a
cosmopolitan inspired international federation is described as 'overriding' states in a very
limited sense. Held writes,
A cosmopolitan democracy would not call for a diminution per se of state
capacity across the globe. Rather, it would seek to entrench and develop
democratic institutions at regional and global levels as a necessary complement to
those at the level of the nation-state. This conception of democracy is based upon
the recognition of the continuing significance of nation-states, while arguing for a
layer of governance to constitute a limitation on national sovereignty.16
Held assures his readers that state capacity is not to be diminished, merely state
sovereignty. Given the demands that Held places upon cosmopolitan democracy,
maintaining this distinction results in a 'thin' citizenship attached to emaciated institutions
incapable of fulfilling the tasks assigned to them.
In order to ensure that a cosmopolitan democracy does not encounter a
'legitimation crisis' of its own in which citizens abide by laws out of more instrumental
reasons such as avoiding punishment or achieving a desired end, as opposed to a more
favorable normative sympathy, Held sees his model democracy as involving more robust
institutions than those offered by ambassadors and diplomats. He goes on, "[a]t issue, in
addition, is not merely the formal construction of new democratic institutions, but also
the construction, in principle, of broad avenues of civic participation in decision-making
at regional and global levels."17 Held continues, posing two requirements that will serve
as a guide in specifying the sorts of institutional structures he has in mind,
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Two distinct requirements arise: first, that the territorial boundaries of systems of
accountability be restructured so that those issues which escape control of a
nation-state […] can be brought under better democratic control; and, second, that
the role and place of regional and global regulatory and functional agencies be
rethought so that they might provide a more coherent and useful focal point in
public affairs.18

Based on these requirements, Held articulates a vision of cosmopolitan democracy that
involves creating or enhancing 'regional parliaments' whose "decisions become
recognized, in principle, as legitimate independent sources of regional and international
regulation."19 In an attempt to accommodate the groupings formed by the all-affected
principle, Held includes "general referenda" tied to "constituencies defined according to
the nature and scope of controversial transnational issues," while offering "elected
supervisory boards" as a potential balance insofar as they are "statistically representative
of their constituencies."20 Finally, in line with the federated model that Held employs, a
set of rights and obligations would be "enshrined within the constitutions of parliaments
and assemblies (at the national and international level)" and the "influence of
international courts be extended so that groups and individuals have an effective means
of suing political authorities for the enactment and enforcement of key rights, both within
and beyond political associations."21
The call to amend constitutions (where they exist) and establish a set of universal
rights raises the question: how are violations of rights to be enforced? Even in light of
Held's more extensive juridical system and more numerous representative bodies, the
issue of enforcement calls upon altogether different capacities. Although Held claims to
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uphold state capacities, it is difficult to reconcile this position with his statement that "a
proportion of a nation-state's police and military (perhaps a growing proportion over time)
could be 'seconded' to the new international authorities and placed at their disposal on a
routine basis."22 His federal model of cosmopolitan democracy has, up to this point,
replicated the basic features of the United States' constitutional distribution of roles
between state and federal government. With his treatment of enforcement powers,
however, Held diverges from this example in his understanding of loaning police and
military services. Enforcement here entails something more than an alliance, along the
lines of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or a coordinating body like the
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). Held's response to the question
of enforcement amounts to alternating, as opposed to shared, control in such a way as to
challenge any notion of a state as possessing a monopoly on the legitimate use of
violence. In the process, Held grafts the trappings of the post-Westphalian nation-state,
centered on military and police administration, onto a global regulatory body that no
longer serves as a 'complement' to or 'layer of governance' built upon the 'continuing
significance of nation-states.'
What remains unique in Held's plan for cosmopolitan democracy is his
abandonment of the more pared down, minimalist cosmopolitanism outlined by Kant in
an attempt to address the problems arising from an 'interconnected' world. Where Kant's
emphasis is on conditions that would eliminate war, Held's more ambitious aims of
rectifying transboundary, collective problems involve significant differences such as the
retention of 'state capacities.' He explains his divergence from Kant on this point:
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For Kant universal hospitality is, therefore, the condition of cooperative relations
and of just conduct. But while Kant's opposition to colonialism and arguments for
universal hospitality are noteworthy, they do not elaborate adequately the
conditions of such hospitality. For without conceiving of cosmopolitan law as
cosmopolitan democratic law, the conditions for the protection of freedom and
autonomy for each and all cannot be satisfactorily envisaged.23
Thus, the principle of hospitality offers little purchase on the sorts of problem-solving
that Held sees as necessary. Held lends substance to the principle of hospitality, instead
arguing for increased control over the circumstances shaping one's life:
Moreover, in a highly interconnected world, 'others' include not just those found
in the immediate community, but all those whose fates are interlocked in
networks of economic, political and environmental interaction. Universal
hospitality is not achieved if, for economic, cultural or other reasons, the quality
of the life of others is shaped and determined in near or far-off lands without their
participation, agreement or consent.24
By interjecting the all-affected principle into a theory grounded in consent, Held attempts
to uphold Kant's valuing of autonomy while also responding to Kant's reasons for
rejecting a unified state.
Held sets himself an enormous task – preserving individual autonomy in the face
of global interconnectedness – for which his response is to argue for consensual
intergovernmental association outfitted with not only representative bodies but access to
military force while also claiming to avoid reproducing the nation-state. Unfortunately,
he misconstrues Kant's reasons for defining cosmopolitanism in minimal terms. As
Richard Tuck points out,
Kant's intention was to show that a genuinely Hobbesian account of modern
international relations was possible, and that Rousseau's pessimism on this score
was unfounded: it was not the case that one was caught between the Scylla of a
world state and the Charybdis of perpetual war. The central aspect of this claim
was that the rules governing the relationship of modern states would be minimal
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in character, thicker (on Kant's account) than those of a Hobbesian state of nature,
but much thinner than those of a civil society.25
Cosmopolitanism does not transcend the nation-state, but aims for equilibrium between
states, which is why for Kant the means of achieving a cosmopolitan order is to integrate
international law. Insofar as Held insists on combining the all-affected principle, which
he claims is necessary to account for the interconnectedness brought about by
globalization, with a confederation built on membership, he must explain the consent of
states in terms of the needs of global civil society. It is this difficulty that renders Held's
project untenable.
One finds in Jürgen Habermas's cosmopolitanism greater fidelity to Kant's stress
on international law despite the distance he seeks to establish.26 In contrast to David Held
who clearly identifies the need for his cosmopolitan democracy to possess regulatory
authority in order to address the problems that give rise to it, Habermas disavows the
'state capacities' that Held embraces. When viewed in light of the authors' convergence
on the need for similar content to international law, the difference illuminates a
significant limitation to cosmopolitan democracy in general: the inability to specify what
functions are available to achieve global 'governance,' particularly when approached in
terms of legitimacy as opposed to effectiveness.
Habermas defines the aims of 'transnational' democracy in nearly identical terms
to Held. Where Held starts from a diagnosis of globalization as increasing the
vulnerabilities of individuals to effects of activities and decisions over which they have
little to no control, Habermas sees "fears of the disempowering effects of globalization"
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as "far from unjustified."27 Habermas, likewise, seeks to pose the issue of democracy
without assuming any attachment to nation-states, primarily focusing his attention on the
prospects for a European political unit built upon a consciously constructed political
identity. To clarify, Habermas does not reject understanding the scope of 'the People'
according to a community of fate, but refuses that the solidarity of such a community can
arise under present conditions as a primordial or "pre-political community."28 Instead, the
emergence of a (European) civil society enables a distinctive political public sphere to
form that is, on Habermas account, capable of sustaining a collective identity to generate
solidarity.
Unlike David Held, uncoupling democratic institutions from the territorially
bounded nation-state does not lead Habermas to global democracy tout court. His
digression from Held's strictly global vision hinges on important reservations about the
degree of attachment that can be generated amongst and between citizens. Because
Habermas is much more explicit than Held about the need for global redistributive
policies, what he refers to as "world domestic politics," he is attuned to the greater degree
of solidarity called for in order to support welfare provisions for a broader, abstract
community. He writes of the United Nations as a prototype for global democracy:
The restriction to elementary services for maintaining order is a response not just
to the pacificist motivations that gave rise to the United Nations as a world
organization in the first place. The world organization also lacks a basis of
legitimacy on structural grounds. It is distinguished from state-organized
communities by the principle of complete inclusion – it may exclude nobody,
because it cannot permit any social boundaries between inside and outside. Any
political community that wants to understand itself as a democracy must at least
distinguish between members and non-members. The self-referential concept of
collective self-determination demarcates a logical space for democratically united
citizens who are members of a particular political community. Even if such a
27
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community is grounded in the universalist principles of a democratic
constitutional state, it still forms a collective identity, in the sense that it interprets
and realizes these principles in light of its own history and in the context of its
own particular form of life. This ethical-political self-understanding of citizens of
a particular democratic life is missing in the inclusive community of world
citizens.29
By focusing on the role of shared normative commitments, Habermas relegates the
possibility for non-exclusionary politics to Kant's 'kingdom of ends.' Lacking the "active
solidarity" required for redistributive policies, the "reactive" solidarity characteristic of
global democratic politics is, for Habermas, limited only to agreement on the general
principles.30
As I detailed in Chapter 2, Habermas's diagnosis of modernity leads him to depict
social cohesion as deeply fragile. As I have just shown, this diagnosis extends to his
argument against a global democratic politics. However, this does not lead Habermas to
reject transnational democracy. Instead, the potential for transnational democracy finds
its fulfillment not in common language or ancestry, but in the more circumscribed realm
of shared history and attachment to normative principles.31 The development of
constitutional patriotism develops, according to Habermas, "in the medium of politics
itself."32 What this amounts to is the transference of attachments to the nation-state as a
manifestation of popular self-expression to the guiding principles embodied in the
universal rights. Thus, constitutional patriotism serves as the conceptual bridge between
'pre-political' attachments and expressly political attachments by way of dialogue and
debate. Habermas further specifies: "To the extent that identification with the state
mutates into an orientation to the constitution, the universalistic constitutional norms
29
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acquire a kind of priority over the specific background context of the respective national
histories."33 All that remains for Habermas's theory is an object that embodies the
universal principles informing various constitutions and to which postnational citizens
can redirect their attachments.
Differentiating his use of constitution from a document articulating constraints on
state power, Habermas sees in international law an already existing constitution:
International law, which in its classical form presents an inverted image of the
state and the constitution, provides the starting point for a juridification of
international relations that promotes peace. What is missing in classical
international law is not an analogue of a constitution that founds an association of
free and equal consociates under law, but rather a supranational power above
competing states that would equip the international community with the executive
and sanctioning powers required to implement and enforce its rules and
decisions.34
On this account, human rights serve as universal principles offering the greatest potential
for normative agreement between citizens, albeit mediated by states. Presenting the
notion of constitution in this way allows Habermas to frame a global 'domestic politics'
without defending a robust global government. Indeed, Habermas turns to the formula of
'global governance without global government' that Held utilizes, stating:
No structural analogy exists between the constitution of a sovereign state that can
determine what political competences it claims for itself […], on the one hand,
and the constitution of an inclusive world organization that is nevertheless
restricted to a few, carefully circumscribed functions, on the other.35
And like Held, Habermas also envisions a tiered political infrastructure divided into
national, transnational (regional), and supranational (global) levels. The supranational
level is tasked with "securing peace and promoting human rights," while the transnational
level links the various economic and environmental arenas that are already ongoing but
33
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charges them with "promoting actively a rebalanced world order."36 States, then, would
remain the decisive terminus for most international politics despite the presumption that
states agree to forego war.
As one critic has correctly pointed out, Habermas's characterization of a tiered
international order as lacking "the character of a state as a whole" underestimates the
degree to which even "[g]enerality and consistency in law presuppose some capacity to
enforce legal norms without undue dependence on those against whom they may need to
be enforced."37 While Scheuerman aptly challenges Habermas's disavowal of state
functions and Robyn Eckersley sees constitutional patriotism as potentially failing "to
ignite the same depth of human sentiment as, say, local attachment to place, or one's
familiar linguistic or ethnic community," I expose Habermas's shortcomings from a
different angle.38 This is not to dismiss Scheuerman's and Eckersley's critiques, both of
which are complementary to my point: Habermas's cosmopolitan theory places its
conceptual burden on the rule of law but overstates the coherence of international law.
International law does not exist as a body of jurisprudence in the sense that
differing regimes are bound to follow precedents set in alternative arenas. Habermas
isolates the conjunction of Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the priority of law
formulated under the United Nations over other treaties as specified in Article 103 of the
UN Charter. Isolating this strain of international law is crucial for Habermas to argue that
the role to be performed at the supranational level of governance is well circumscribed,
with "the enforcement of established law" taking "precedence over the constructive task
of legislation and policy-making," which "demand a higher degree of legitimation, and
36
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hence more effectively institutionalized forms of citizen participation."39 Although he
indicates that recent disputes under the World Trade Organization "increasingly take into
account the protection of human rights," 40 Habermas offers a less optimistic assessment
of the transnational level:
The pressure of problems generated by an increasingly globalized society will
sharpen the sensitivity to the growing need for regulation and fair policies at the
transnational level (i.e. the intermediate level between nation-states and the world
organization). At present, we lack the actors and negotiation procedures that could
initiate such a global domestic politics. Realistically speaking, we can only
envisage a politically constituted world society as a multilevel system that would
remain incomplete without this intermediate level.41
As I demonstrate below, what Habermas calls the transnational level − comprising
myriad legal regimes – does contain significant normative innovations, but it does so
because of the flexibility enabled by unconsolidated coverage of international
environmental laws. This lack of coherence is recognized by Habermas but is construed
as failure. He claims,
International organizations operate more or less well at this intermediate level as
long as they perform coordinating functions. However, they fail in tasks of global
regulation in the fields of energy and environmental policy and in financial and
economic policy.42
Ironically, given Habermas's concern with the construction of international normative
principals, he fails to give innovations such as the precautionary principle and
differentiated responsibility sufficient attention and focuses only on perceived
shortcomings in coordinating regulation. This inaccurate weighting masks a potentially
more important point: the fragmented and incoherent 'system' of rules that Habermas
designates transnational may offer a more effective source of normative agreement than
39
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the human rights at the heart of the supranational level. The Convention on Long Range
Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP) is a prime example of a regime that is
"relatively short on regulatory content" while "changing the discourse in terms of which
this issue is addressed and drawing its members into an increasingly complex social
practice that has altered responses to long-range air pollution over a period of several
decades."43 The key difference between international environmental law and human
rights law is that human rights are more thoroughly codified − having roots reaching back
to the natural rights theories of Aquinas, Grotius, and Suarez − while environmental
problems have initiated processes of negotiated response that are, as yet, unsettled.

C. States and the Fragmented Jurisdiction of International Environmental Law
The building of competing, even contradictory, international environmental legal
regimes can be viewed as evidence of failed regulation, as it is by Habermas. There is,
however, a unique dynamic to the current configuration of international environmental
law that lends extra weight to a strategy of state-centered political transformation. At
minimum, this dynamic suggests that environmental activists and advocates will be less
successful achieving their objectives if they fail to recognize states as viable sites of
political contestation. Underestimating governmental politics − whether strategic
litigation, interest-group lobbying of federal, state, and local legislators, or pursuing
appointments in executive administration – and misunderstanding the way in which
environmental politics at the nation-state level shape and are shaped by international law
can result in missed opportunities that will be harder to recapture as international
environmental laws becomes more comprehensive.
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Although a strong case has been made for amending constitutions to include a set
of environmental rights, I target the level of routine, day-to-day politics in economically
developed, constitutional democracies (see Chapter 3 for criteria).44 Rights-oriented and
state-oriented strategies for environmental politics are not mutually exclusive. However,
in showing the unique opportunities available within international environmental law, I
am more concerned with demonstrating what may be lost by an overemphasis on
democracy 'beyond the state.' This task is made all the more important insofar as
environmentally benign policies are not already perceived as necessary or desirable in
any determinable way within Australia, the United Kingdom or the United States, while
even Germany has experienced some curtailment of its environmentally magnanimous
policies during the most recent economic recession. If environmental activists wish to
focus their energies on non-state politics, they cannot afford to do so without initiation of
a Habermasian 'background consensus' that guides environmentally neutral behavioral
patterns. The other option is to accept that regulation as well as monitoring and
enforcement of environmental conditions will diminish without vigilant groups with
access to professionals watching over environmental agencies.
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The turn away from state-centered politics occurs alongside the rise of theories
favoring 'ecological modernization', also known as sustainable development, in which
economic and ecological goals are made to coincide. Market incentives, however, are not
by themselves sufficient for establishing a broad normative orientation supporting
environmentally neutral outcomes, although such incentives may succeed at more narrow
changes. While it is not possible to launch into a detailed critique of reliance upon
incentives, it is worth recalling that if behavior is motivated by incentives and
disincentives then outcomes are dependent upon the continuance of those
(dis)incentives.45
The prospects for selectively engaging territorially-defined states within the
context of fragmented and incoherent international environmental laws are difficult to
discern since doing so requires untangling lines of influence from international
environmental NGOs. Given that arguments for the presence of a global civil society cite
such associations as evidence, it is important to determine what can be accomplished by
movements and what by institutional politics. As Ken Conca argues, "examples of global
civil society in action emanate from two very different types of domains, one in which
state authority is at its strongest, the other where it is weakest."46 He clarifies his point:
[S]tates in pluralistic societies guarantee the existence of at least semidemocratic
space for civil society to operate. In the latter instance, civil society fills a void
left by the retreat of weak, illegitimate, and often postcolonial states – states
which were never really there to be transcended.47
This leads Conca to caution against "assuming that we are seeing the institutionalized
authority of the nonstate, when we may in fact be seeing nothing more than episodic

45
46
47

For a more detailed critique of incentives see Dobson, 2003: 2-3.
Conca, 2005: 193.
Conca, 2005: 193.

219

instances of the temporary convergence of the requisite amounts of power and
legitimacy."48 Without subscribing to the particular terms in which Conca frames the
issue, the basic point that it is unclear how an impermanent movement is to be sustained
as an international force in the absence of inclusive policies protected by state-actors is
valid.
The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change's fifteenth Conference of the
Parties (COP15) at Copenhagen, Denmark, in December 2009, illustrates the precarious
involvement of environmental activists in the negotiation of environmental treaties. The
perceived importance of COP15 as effectively the final opportunity to devise a
continuous plan in expectation of the Kyoto treaty expiring in 2012 led to a massive
increase in registration, particularly from NGOs. As one analyst noted, the official
preliminary number of registered participants was listed at 30,123, with 20,611 being
individual observers from NGOs.49 To put this into perspective, the highest previous
number of registrants was at COP13 at Bali, Indonesia, in 2007 with 10,828.50 Increased
NGO registration, combined with heightened security measures in the face of
approximately 60,000 to 100,000 protesters outside of the convention and a publicly
announced takeover of the building by protesters, led to a noticeable decrease in NGO
participation within negotiations.51 The tentative conclusion reached by Dana Fisher that
"the more civil society actors try to participate – and the diversity of perspectives
represented by the civil society actors involved – the less access they are likely to have,"
suggests the relationship between inclusion, participation and voice is not straightforward.
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Presently, international environmental law comprises multiple jurisdictions, what
one author calls a "patchwork," each covered by a set of bi- and multilateral treaties and
lacking a central judicial body.52 The development of numerous regimes − understood to
include "the principles, norms, rules, and procedures contained in one or more
interrelated agreements, organizations, standard practices, and shared understandings that
together regulate international action in a particular issue area" – has led to unevenness
and inconsistency in the handling of environmental problems.53 On one hand, this
unevenness can lead to ineffective or counterproductive practices. For instance, the
replacement of chloroflourocarbons (CFCs) with hydrochloroflourocarbons (HCFCs) and
hydroflourocarbons (HFCs) following the London amendments to the Montreal Protocol
either eliminates (e.g., HFCs) or slows (e.g., HCFCs) the accumulation of ozone
damaging compounds but at the cost of increased retention of greenhouse gases. The
effect, then, is that improvement under the ozone regime makes resolving climate change
more difficult by entrenching reliance upon HFCs and HCFCs, which trap more CO2 in
the atmosphere than CFCs.54
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On the other hand, the uncoordinated operation of international environmental
law also generates important opportunities best brought to fruition by functionaries of
(developed) states. The two primary reasons for this situation are, first, that only states
possess legal standing to instigate lawsuits and non-compliance procedures under
environmental treaties, as distinct from some human rights and amnesty laws. Second,
certain states possess the requisite capacities for coordinated monitoring and reporting,
although the capacity to take isolated measurements is possessed by numerous private
and public institutions.
That states are the only actors granted legal standing is merely a manifestation of
the purchase the notion of state sovereignty maintains. The effect of exclusive standing is
twofold: states not only choose whether or not to press other states on violations of treaty
obligations but states also choose what forum through which to pursue action. Insofar as
environmental law intersects other areas of law, states can opt to challenge violations
under less (or more) environmentally-inclined organizations such as the World Trade
Organization or the International Court of Justice. The implication of this available
choice is, as Tim Stephens puts it, "that in practice much will hinge on international
environmental diplomacy rather than international environmental law."55 What may be
perceived as a failure to enforce a rule against a non-compliant party need not be
understood one-dimensionally as an inherent deficiency in a state-centered arrangement.
Diplomacy, despite serving as a means of leveraging military or financial
advantage against others, also permits rules to be adapted to specific circumstances
without the need for reopening negotiations. Furthermore, diplomacy can help build
relationships out of which capacity-sharing measures can grow such as China's decision
55
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to accept U.S. assistance on developing an inventory of greenhouse gas emissions.56 In
the case of employing less punitive non-compliance procedures, Stephens observes,
flexibility can lead to future improvements with laws:
[T]here may be value in a precise environmental rule that is enforced somewhat
flexibly. Because NCPs [non-compliance procedures] offer greater prospects of a
cooperative rather than a confrontational approach to compliance problems, states
may be more willing to agree to more extensive and better defined environmental
obligations.57
Not being hit with punitive sanctions for unintended violations, states lacking the
capacity to accurately monitor activity within their territory can receive the help needed
to make implementing domestic regulations more constructive. So long as states remain
the object of environmental regimes, the need to develop capacity is necessary for
effective international environmental regulation.
The exclusive access to adjudicative fora granted states is unlikely to be altered in
favor of including NGOs. At present, NGOs are the only segment of the 'transnational'
environmental movement with a sufficiently coherent identity to be recognized as a
litigant. However, it is also unclear what status could be granted to such groups that
would permit them entry into courts in any substantive way.58 Many environmental
activists and theorists have posited that international NGOs, along with domestic groups,
should speak for otherwise unrepresentable entities such as 'nature' or future
generations.59 While doing so may very well lead to a more consistent enforcement of
environmental laws on one level, greater access for NGOs may also be counterproductive
for improving the laws themselves. Given the difficulties in ascribing liability, it is hard
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to envision what sorts of changes would need to take place in ascertaining harms to future
generations. At minimum, standing would have to be broadened far beyond its current
incarnation. Here again, Tim Stephens, addressing the narrower issue of access via
amicus curiae, outlines the implication: "allowing unfettered access by NGOs may make
states increasingly reluctant to utilize international adjudicative mechanisms to resolve
environmental disputes."60 This goes double for a more extensive change to standing that
would permit members of global civil society to initiate suits.
Instead of seeking greater access at the international level, whether in the
immediate process of treaty negotiation or as unofficial enforcement agents operating
through international courts, the various movements from western Europe, the United
States and Oceania would be better positioned to effect more stringent laws by directing
their attention to domestic legislation. This is not to say that these groups, which
constitute the majority of individual political actors in international environmental
politics, should cease pressure from the 'outside,' through protest and attention-garnering
activities. Beyond improving international environmental laws, though, there is also good
reason to think that the sorts of normative principles likely to be favored by
environmentally-minded Kantian cosmopolitans – fairness of opportunity, prevention of
undue harm, and equitable distribution of burdens – are more likely to flourish as general
principles of international law through their being embedded in environmental treaties.
International environmental law reflects prior struggles to shape domestic
environmental law in states exerting de facto veto power as a result of being heavy
polluters. Two correlations support the strategy I recommend. The first correlation is that
states with pre-existing environmental regulations do not oppose and are more likely to
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support a comprehensive regime than states without domestic laws already in place.61 A
prime example is the support by the United States in the years immediately preceding the
Montreal Protocol. In 1984, after President Reagan sought to retract EPA oversight, the
Natural Resources Defense Council brought suit against the agency to enforce
nondiscretionary provisions of the Clean Air Act. This was accompanied by a shift in
strategy by CFC-producing companies who foresaw stricter legislation. 62 With the
passage of domestic regulation the U.S. began advocating stricter international controls
on CFC production, going so far as to threaten restricting imports on CFC containing
products. 63 A similar change of negotiating position followed the European Union's
adoption in 2005 of an emissions trading scheme in line with Article 17 of the Kyoto
Protocol. Prior to the 1997 Conference of the Parties in Kyoto, the European Union had
sought to prevent including such a provision but by COP15 in Copenhagen it sought an
expanded use of emissions trading credits. The second correlation is the role played by an
active, well-organized domestic environmental movement in pressuring states to avoid
actively working against strict international environmental laws. Although the
relationship is not determinate, strength of domestic environmental movement correlates
in most cases with the position a state takes in negotiations.64
This is not to discount the impact that NGOs are capable of having on
negotiations, only to acknowledge that it remains unclear whether devoted efforts at
greater inclusion in international processes is the panacea it is presumed to be by
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cosmopolitan political theorists.65 Furthermore, there are numerous intervening factors,
especially the ability of coordinated economic interests to frame issues and influence
policymakers in ways contrary to what members of the environmental movement might
prefer. Sufficient treatment of these factors, however, leads beyond the scope of this
chapter.

D. Legitimacy without the State
Challenging directly the state-oriented political strategy I recommend, John
Dryzek and associates have drawn on comparisons of the interaction between
environmental movements and domestic politics in the U.S., U.K. Germany and Norway.
According to Dryzek, et al, implementing a state-oriented political strategy, as opposed to
a communicatively inclusive strategy that favors civil society initiatives for participatory
democracy, is faulty under prevailing conditions. It is important to address this challenge
not only because it opposes the line of argument I have offered but because it illustrates
the problem with attempting to frame analysis in terms of legitimacy: argumentation is
viewed as a sufficient proxy for political struggle even while popular support remains
immeasurable and unverifiable. In Dryzek's case, this results in placing far more faith in
an 'outsider' strategy − political actors seeking to change policy without becoming
members of formal representative or regulatory institutions – than is warranted because
the concept of legitimacy leads in the case of the United States to truncated and
misleading historical analysis.
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Dryzek, et al, portray environmental movements within the United States as
confronted with the options of an outsider, anti-state politics or a 'passive inclusion' built
into pluralism that risks co-optation. The narrative on offer sets the environmental
legislation of the early 1970s as the high watermark for inclusion that is effective but
which becomes co-opted. The starting point for Dryzek's analysis is the ascription,
following Jürgen Habermas and Claus Offe, of 'legitimation' and 'economic' imperatives
to the state, that "set of individuals and organizations legally authorized to make binding
decisions for a society within a particular territory."66 Diagnosing the United States as "a
leader in the late 1960s and 1970s that has turned into a laggard," Dryzek, et al, see the
formation and subsequent professionalization of the 'modern' environmental movement in
the late 1960s as central to this decline.67 The problem as they define it is that, given
modern environmentalism "directly challenged the core economic imperative of all
states," it was able to successfully influence a "massive burst of environmental policy
innovation" so that this "comprehensive embrace of (moderate) environmentalism on the
part of the federal government suggested that environmentalists were, at least for a while,
welcomed into the core of the state."68 Thus, the question becomes: "How could this
happen, in the face of the evident conflict between early 1970s environmentalism's
defining interest and the economic imperative of the state?"69
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The answer, according to Dryzek and his co-authors, is that "environmentalism
could be linked to the state's legitimation imperative."70 Viewing the heightened political
activity of the 1960s as a legitimation crisis leads these authors to interpret President
Richard Nixon's willingness to refrain from vetoing new environmental legislation, in
effect receiving legitimacy from environmental groups, as a necessary ignoring of the
state's imperative to ideologically protect capital accumulation. Dryzek describes this
process of co-optation:
To contain this destabilization, the Nixon administration sought to 'make peace'
with the environmental movement, which appeared to be the least radical and
threatening aspect of the counter-culture. Nixon and his associates had no
personal commitments to environmental values.
By embracing this one movement the Nixon administration,
enthusiastically supported by Congress, sought to regain legitimacy for the
political economy without acceding to any more radical counter-cultural demands.
[…] It is not that the imperatives of the state and those of the environmental
movement were identical, but that the threat to legitimation from one direction –
especially the anti-war and New Left movements – could be defused by inclusion
from a different direction – environmentalism.71
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Inclusion, on this account, resulted in an initial spate of legislative activity but at the cost
of dividing 'mainstream' and 'radical' environmental groups along a line of inside or
outside, pro- or anti-state. Amongst those groups embracing inclusion, "we see
professionalization and hierarchy growing with time" as "large Washington-based
organizations increasingly sought to secure deals and 'carry' their largely passive
membership."72 In terms of democratic legitimacy, Dryzek, et al, charge, centralization
came without member input as "[a]t the top of the movement, impassioned amateurs
fuelled by moral outrage were replaced by professional directors and presidents: thinking
like a manager replaced thinking like a mountain."73
The interpretation of events offered by Dryzek, et al, describes the 'laggard' period
of U.S. environmentalism as a reassertion of the state's economic imperative, particularly
under President Ronald Reagan, limiting the influence of the environmental movement to
peripheral measures aimed at preventing gross violations. In their broad coverage Dryzek
and co-authors acknowledge that successes have been achieved by 'included' groups but
that these are difficult to distinguish from the day-to-day operation of interest group
politics.74 The strategy advocated by John Dryzek and Christian Hunold writing on the
same subject is that:
In the United States conventional interest group action within the state made
perfect sense in the early 1970s. After that, the rewards of such action became
meager. However, this did not lead the major groups to change their strategy;
either they did not realize what had happened or they could not resist the
incentives of passive inclusion. For such an insider strategy to make sense once
again, ecological modernization must get on the U.S. policy agenda. But
ecological modernization has made no headway in U.S. policy discourse, still
dominated by conflicts between economy and environment.75
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This rejection of state-oriented political strategy except when aligned with the state's
legitimation imperative − a point expanded into the claim that "an effective state-related
politics of environmental risk require[s] a vital green public sphere" − rests on a troubling
analytic framework.76
The approach taken by Dryzek, et al, involves two points of emphasis that result
from placing legitimacy at the center of their analysis: first, a truncated historical
narrative and, second, an overstatement of the environmental movement's shortcomings
following its professional institutionalization in the 1970s and 1980s. It comes as a bit of
a surprise that given Dryzek, et al, acknowledge the legislative precursors to the early1970s environmental policy boom, the admittedly halting development of environmental
regulatory law is treated as unrelated. They defend this decision on spurious grounds,
arguing:
A focus on environmentalism makes our study tractable because the movement
has a well-defined beginning in the 1960s. Thus we have history as grist for our
study, but not too much history. While organizations that we can in retrospect
style 'environmentalist' existed long before that, there was no consciousness of
'the environment' as such, nor any sense of a movement that united the concerns
that came to be grouped under the environmental heading. And in sheer numbers
and political influence, these pre-1960s developments look tiny compared to their
successors.77

76
77

Dryzek, et al., 2003: 194.
Dryzek et al., 2003: 11.

230

Speaking only to the U.S. context, the claim that because groups concerned with
conservation and preservation such as the Sierra Club, National Audubon Society, Izaak
Walton League, and Wilderness Society did not speak in terms of 'the environment' is to
miss the essential point: because groups formed in an earlier era of political dispute had
since pursued different missions, sometimes to the point of dividing members, they were
crucial to the existence of a 'modern' environmental movement.
There are clear surface-level connections that are ignored in Dryzek's legitimation
narrative such as the formation of Friends of the Earth by David Brower being the
immediate result of Brower's resignation as executive director of Sierra Club in 1969.78 A
similar relationship can be seen in the support provided to the fledgling Environmental
Defense Fund, which had a tactical alliance with the National Audubon Society (NAS) in
seeking to ban DDT in 1966, as NAS and the Conservation Foundation provided
financial backing for the group's activities until "they were able to obtain a Ford
Foundation grant to establish the organization's own tax-exempt status."79 The immediate
support provided by well-established environmental organizations should not distract
from the more important point that many of them began during previous periods of
struggle. Neglected is the period of heightened activity at the beginning of the twentieth
century, with John Muir leading the foundation of the Sierra Club in 1892, Gifford
Pinchot working out of the U.S. Forest Service and creating the soon-to-be-named
National Conservation Association in 1908, or again in the era of the New Deal which
witnessed the convening of the Wilderness Society and the National Wildlife Federation.
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At the tactical level, the nascent environmental movement honed its tactics while
simultaneously seeking a more ambitious regulatory agenda. In particular, the
implementation of massive infrastructure projects served as targets for experimenting
with different approaches. The positions staked out in the battle over the damming of the
Hetch Hetchy valley under President Theodore Roosevelt were in play again as President
Franklin Roosevelt sought the construction of Echo Park Dam. The campaign to prevent
the building of Echo Park Dam involved learning to employ communications media in
new ways. As one historian puts it:
[A]s a precursor and training ground for the modern environmental movement it
was a key turning point in American environmental politics, both symbolically
and practically. The Echo Park controversy marked the postwar rebirth of the
ecological preservation groups as an effective political force, and taught them new
tactics for using the mass media to mobilize broad-based political opposition.
From this experience they began to generate organizational momentum for more
far-reaching campaigns […]. They also shifted their tactics away from ad hoc
publicity campaigns on behalf of particular places into more organized and
ongoing political lobbying in state capitols and Washington, which no
conservation group had previously done.80
The utilization of symbolic acts to attract media attention, rallying public support as a
means of pressuring government, and direct lobbying of legislators and agency officials
found expression in the Echo Park campaign. The simultaneous pressure of both 'insiders'
and 'outsiders' would be both effective and difficult to duplicate on a predictable basis.
Along with learning to engage media outlets, the legislative victories of the 1930s
and 1940s served as major breakthroughs that subsequent legislation of the 1960s and
1970s would build upon as direct precedent. On three fronts – air, water, and policy
integration – the legislation of the 'golden era' turned to previously established executive
authority. Although these had not previously been housed under a single agency as with
80

Andrews, 2006: 191.

232

EPA, even this idea had been pushed by Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes and
supported by the President's Committee on Administrative Management of 1936.81 In the
case of the 1969 passage by Congress of the National Environmental Policy Act,
proposing environmental impact assessments for governmental agencies while opening
up new participatory avenues for environmental groups, a strong predecessor existed for
interagency assessments in the water-specific Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act passed
in 1934 and amended in 1946 and 1958.82 Waterways had been regulated to prevent
public health issues since the revision of Public Health Service standards in 1925 but
federal-level influence would be expanded in 1948 with the passage of the Water
Pollution Control Act.83 The passage of the Clean Air Act in 1970, likewise, built upon
steadily expanded federal government regulation of previously state and local problems.
Although a great deal of the heavy lifting was accomplished by the cost-sharing structure
of federal grants provided for under the Clean Air Act of 1963, the 1970 version
promised for the first time to combine vehicle and stationary emissions sites under the
rubric of a national ambient air quality standard.
This is not intended to downplay the significance of the environmental movement
of the 1960s and 1970s, but to illustrate that these were moments of crystallizing political
struggle as much as catalyzing them. The fluid development of the early environmental
movement, tied as it was to in-house conflicts between government officials and
patronage, has led one historian to describe the shift 'from conservation to environment'
as a disjointed process tied to changing patterns of consumption following World War II,
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which is "a convenient dividing line between the old and new values."84 In another case,
however, a more serious challenge to the narrative offered by Dryzek and co-authors is
made. Speaking of the rapid passage of air quality legislation in 1970, Richard Andrews
writes:
Such a sudden and unprecedented expansion of federal regulatory authority
deserves close attention. It would be tempting to attribute it to the rising influence
of environmental advocacy groups, or of mass public concern for the
environment, but in fact all these statutes except the 1970 Clean Air Act were
enacted before those forces had coalesced at the national level.
A more persuasive explanation, therefore, is that as a few leading states
and cities began to toughen their air pollution control regulations – though only a
few, such as California, Pennsylvania, New York City, and Los Angeles – key
industries themselves acquired a powerful new interest in obtaining moderate and
uniform federal standards that would preempt more stringent and inconsistent
state and local standards.85
The notion that companies operating in a large national market would prefer to be subject
to a unified set of rules, particularly since this streamlined lobbying efforts as regional
and national actors could consolidate under industry-wide umbrella organizations,
highlights the difficulty of framing the issue in terms of 'legitimation' and 'economic'
imperatives. Is this simply an instance of an 'economic' imperative aligning with
environmental interests in a more uniform but expansive policy or should the passage of
this legislation be viewed as a state trading momentary legitimacy for some groups to
preserve the legitimacy of capitalism over the long-term? The answers are problematic
precisely because the terms in which the question can be asked are deficient.
The narrative offered by Dryzek, et al, remains problematic on an even more
important level: the notion that gains in legitimacy resulted from broad popular
participation or 'thinking like a mountain.' This is to let the symbolic importance of Earth
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Day in 1970 replace the subtler changes in attitudes that took place during earlier
struggles. A number of factors shaped not only the motivations but the reception of the
modern environmental movement, making it fundamentally inseparable from a broader
context. Not least of these factors was the involvement from 1933 to 1941 of
approximately 2.5 million males aged eighteen to twenty-five in the Civilian
Conservation Corps. Although it is impossible to know with any certainty, I concur with
Andrews's judgment that this contributed to the increase in outdoor recreation of the
1950s, helping to shape future proponents of environmental protection as well as the
perceptions of many parents in the 1960s.86
Furthermore, the notion that the environmental movement was allowed access to
'the core' of the state in order to quell a legitimation crisis, translating a political
calculation on the part of President Nixon into a structural function of the state, is
insufficiently attuned to historical detail in its treatment of legitimacy. Although Earth
Day witnessed large-scale participation, this should not be mistaken for democratic
participation in leading 'grassroots' environmental groups. Upholding the characterization
of grassroots movements offered by Robert Gottlieb as "predominantly local in nature,
more participatory and focused on action," Dryzek and co-authors view environmental
civil society today as a new source of 'legitimacy' based upon the inclusive and
participatory nature of grassroots environmental organizations.87 It is worth noting,
however, that at the time that 'mainstream' and 'radical' environmental groups divided
over strategic disputes, it was an older, membership-based organization that allowed
participation while the more radical group pursued the visions of a small band of leaders.
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As Christopher Bosso points out, the departure of David Brower from the Sierra Club
was emblematic of a willingness on the part of some more radical leaders inspired by a
wholesale critique derived from the New Left, to view members as too conservative.
Bosso describes the situation thusly:
Brower came to regard the Sierra Club's traditional governance structure – in
particular, the power of its members to elect the board – as too unwieldy and an
obstacle to the rapid responses needed to carry out the battle on multiple fronts. In
his view, the membership was a source of revenue and a base to mobilize for
political battle, but an organization's leaders should be free to set the agenda and
choose the tactics. Members could always 'vote with their feet' if they were
unhappy. […] None of the environmental advocacy organizations created during
or after the wave of the late 1960s and early 1970s made any pretense of giving
dues-paying members, assuming they had any, a voice in agendas, tactics, or
governance.88
According to Bosso, the reason for this different receptiveness was that the older
conservation organizations "were also the only environmental organizations built on a
base of local chapters or affiliates."89 Thus, the notion of legitimacy elides too many
important distinctions, its analysis too blunt, to capture the politically relevant
dimensions of environmental politics.
At stake, then, is the visibility of past successes from which groups may learn and
in which individuals may seek inspiration for future involvement. In the years leading up
to the publication of their work, Dryzek and his co-authors were able to observe what
appeared to be the blossoming of a global environmental movement as large-scale
protests against institutions such as the World Trade Organization occurred repeatedly
from 1999 through spring 2003. This new movement linked a call for sustainability with
a strong critique of global capitalism and its purported capture of international institutions.
However, much as in the years following the heightened expressions of political agitation
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in the 1960s, flourishes of protest occurred but have not been sustained, even by the
institutionalization of global fora such as the World Social Forum. The logic of the
analysis provided by Dryzek, et al, leads to a lopsided portrayal of political potentiality as
such activities wane. Retreating into a search for conditions of legitimacy, however, is to
neglect the role of vindication in a political world in which power still operates; that is, in
a political world in which inaction remains a form of action. It is in the unevenness of
political structures, institutions, and change that opportunities reside to be vindicated,
even where such opportunities are mundane and unheroic.

E. Political Opportunity in an Uneven World
As I have articulated above, international environmental politics is uneven and
asymmetrical, with some institutions and associations serving as sources of democratic
opportunity (e.g., the Aarhus Convention) at the same time that others exercise a futile
regulatory agenda (e.g., the Kyoto Protocol). Thus, although I do not anchor a vision of
an environmentally benign international politics to deliberative or participatory
democracy, I also do not preclude their expansion where warranted. By jettisoning
legitimacy as the standard of measurement, I have highlighted striations invisible from
within the purview of deontological politics.
Despite a subtle shift of argument away from an assumed, inherent value of
democratic politics, I follow Robyn Eckersley in what she terms an "inside-out-inside"
approach.90 Thus, environmental political strategy should incorporate state-oriented
politics in order to foster "multilateral agreements between states that create overlapping
supplementary structures of rule that actively utilize existing territorial governance
90
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structures."91 Eckersley, likewise, grounds a practical vision in a similar assessment of
unevenness. Describing her strategy as "unit-driven transformation," it is "developmental
(rather than just ad hoc and incremental) in that it conscientiously seeks to extend
promising domestic and multilateral trends in environmental governance" that "proceeds
by means of patchwork rather than comprehensive change."92
Allowing for the possibility that change is not a homogeneous process, Eckersley
concludes that "it is quite possible and feasible to transnationalize democracy in
piecemeal, experimental, consensual, and domain-relative ways" capable of upholding
"the practical negotiation of principles in tension in response to particular transnational
problems, rather than a priori."93 Eckersley likewise acknowledges that the fragmented
character of international environmental law is a source of normative innovation,
establishing differentiated responsibility, the polluter-pays principle, the precautionary
principle and even sustainable development.94 Going so far as to recognize that
environmental politics must accommodate non-democratic elements, seeking change
instead through persuasive example, she concludes:
To the extent to which a Hobbesian anarchy is transcended by the demonstration
effect, the resulting international order would be variegated, made up of what
might be clusters of transnational green states operating within a larger, less green
and more traditional set of interstate relationships. This means that only where
zones of affinity emerge among particular groupings of states – such as in the
European Union − that a genuine transnational democracy becomes possible.
However, it would not be global. […] Whether green states eventually proliferate
to the point where they create a 'critical mass' and change the character and
practices of the society of states must remain an open question.95
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The implication, seen clearly when magnified through the lens of international politics, is
that the a priori privileging of democratic politics demands a more narrowly defined
procedural scope in order to translate input evenly. The relative homogeneity called for
by cosmopolitan political theory helps explain the disavowal of state functions by Beck,
Habermas, and Dryzek. The willingness on the part of strong advocates of cosmopolitan
or global democratic theories to tradeoff gains in participation based upon an ambiguous
measure of legitimacy while accepting that environmental concerns may have only a
marginal hope of democratic success even as they point to crises is problematic. It
suggests an inability to locate 'imperfect' opportunities in a world operating under the
'logic of consequences' (see Chapter 1) where inaction becomes active reinforcement of a
status quo.

239

The crucial difference between Eckersley and I lies in our depth of commitment
to democratic politics. Insofar as Eckersley treats "more effective and more legitimate
ways of addressing the shortcomings of exclusive territorial governance" with parity, we
diverge.96 On my account, the unwillingness of environmentally concerned advocates of
cosmopolitan and global democratic politics to accept the coexistence of non-democratic
and democratic procedures and institutions at the international level parallels the
unwillingness of deliberative democrats to recognize the importance of expertise
grounded in experienced and informed judgment as formatively asymmetrical at the
national (and sub-national) levels. It is not coincidental that both take their bearings from
a Kantian political framework. Differences or inequalities in status, capability, and power
between political actors are relevant features that must be accounted for during analysis.
Even where inequalities are normatively problematic, inclusiveness is insufficiently
inculcated, or recognition not forthcoming, these issues should not monopolize the
critical landscape.
At the international level, the proliferation of highly circumscribed institutions I
proposed in Chapter 4 as potential bulwarks against abuse by experts are more readily
available. At the same time, these arrangements have proven capable of accommodating
differences between states, from populous authoritarian structures to small, culturally
homogeneous democracies. Likewise, despite the fact that the United States has actively
worked against employing the precautionary principle in environmental treaties, it has
appeared with greater frequency and consensus since being formulated at the UN
Conference on the Environment and Development at Rio de Janiero in 1992. Similar to
the role played by the precautionary principle as a decision-guiding rule for national
96
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policymaking, the inclusion of this principle in multilateral agreements lessens the need
to exhaust political energies by defending all possible counterfactuals as plausible
without foreclosing the disputation of harm.

F. Mundane Institutions and Episodic Citizenship as Ecologically Irreconcilable
Transboundary and transgenerational environmental problems raise difficult
questions for political theory, particularly insofar as the terms available for understanding
new phenomena and invisible relationships are derived from previous debates. The
debate over membership or affectedness − whether a citizen's political attachments are
based upon the community into which they were born or upon the community generated
by being similarly harmed – repeats this dilemma. As political attachments overlap two
notions of citizenship reflect the priority granted to differing aspects of a single problem.
Construing the tension between different types of relationship as contradictory, each side
in the debate asserts its analysis with greater sophistication. Thus, Andrew Dobson offers
a nuanced attempt at a materialist account of transboundary obligations, taking into
account what I have called the unevenness of international environmental politics. Even
this version of deontology, however, forces its subject into terms capable of addressing
individual responsibility for concrete harms but neglects collective responsibility.
Over the past decade Andrew Dobson has analyzed the status of and potential for
citizenship in a contemporary world characterized by increased global economic activity
as well as environmental harms. His approach begins from the ‗embeddedness‘ of
humans and how this is shaped by processes of globalization. Figuring humans as
―organisms whose production and reproduction depend on adequate provision of
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environmental goods and services,‖ Dobson goes on to state that, ―this metabolistic
relationship with our non-human natural environment constitutes the ineluctable frame
within which our political projects are carried out.‖97 The metaphor of metabolism here
expresses a relationship of necessity between biological conditions and material capable
of adequately fulfilling these conditions that manifests itself in creative acts of supplying
for needs and wants over time.
In his move from the idea of ecological politics to an account of citizenship,
Dobson offers a diagnosis of globalization that corresponds to his emphasis on
production and reproduction. Working through critique as much as through positive
analysis, he rejects conceptualizing globalization in terms of interdependence and
interconnectedness. In the case of interdependence, Dobson claims that this concept does
not acceptably capture inequality as a central feature of global political relationships.98
Stating that ―the capacity to act globally is unequally distributed,‖ Dobson offers the
example of the Kyoto protocol and the United States‘ withdrawal from the agreement to
demonstrate the different degrees of dependence that exist and the way in which acts can
have unilateral effects.
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In Dobson‘s hands the version of globalization as

interconnectedness fairs no better since he claims that this view understates the
asymmetrical developments of globalization.100
Based on these criticisms, Dobson recommends placing power at the center of
analysis. Recognizing the disproportionate relationship between those responsible for
environmental harm and those most vulnerable to and likely to be effected by

97

Dobson, 2006: 176.
Dobson, 2003: 10.
99
Dobson, 2005: 264.
100
Dobson, 2003: 12.
98

242

environmental devastation leads Dobson to view globalization as ‗constitutively
asymmetrical.‘ 101 This emphasis on power lends itself to an interpretation of the
environment as playing ―the role of a weapon of globalisation in the hands of the
powerful and in which globalisation is seen as a project where specific local languages
are turned into global grammars.‖102 Furthermore, emphasizing the role of power as the
basis for the constitutive asymmetry of globalization provides Dobson with a strong
position from which to argue that globalization changes both ―the source and nature of
obligation.‖ 103 Specifically, Dobson posits that an ―asymmetrically globalizing world‖
implies the non-reciprocal nature of obligation in such a world.104
Unevenness, then, results from the interface of political processes and the
disturbance of seemingly stable environmental patterns. However, an impossible
distinction must be introduced between two different aspects to a relationship of harm:
that for which an individual is responsible that has no significant impact when isolated
and the cumulative negative effect of that same action when taken aggregated with
similar acts by other individuals.
According to Dobson, the political obligation attributed to citizens derives from
responsibility for harm, where harm is understood to occur through materially binding
relationships of production. Given this source of obligation, Dobson views the nature of
obligation as one of justice such that one is obligated to provide redress for harms
committed. The issue of scope, then, is defined in dynamic terms as extending to the
community of citizens generated by a particular set of harms caused.
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The liberal environmental citizenship that Dobson rejects focuses on claiming
entitlements in the form of rights. 105 This is closely tied to the territorially bounded
political configurations necessary for the adjudication and enforcement of rights, with
politics being conducted exclusively in the public sphere where virtue is exhibited as
reasonableness, acceptance of procedural legitimacy and a commitment to the force of
the better argument. When looked at through Dobson‘s analysis of globalization this
conception appears problematic. Specifically, the claiming of rights is not able to rectify
harms done when confined to a territorially bounded polity given the relatively common
problem of environmental harms crossing boundaries.
The non-territoriality that Dobson insists on is a rejection of equating citizenship
with membership in a ―bounded community.‖106 His reasoning is that when citizenship
becomes a matter of defining membership in terms of requisite qualifications it is
transformed from a mode of political action into a good to be distributed.107 By focusing
on ‗specific communities of historical obligation‘ that generate ―obligation spaces,‖
Dobson‘s ecological citizenship purportedly allows for a multiplicity of political
memberships.
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communities of obligation constitute, for Dobson, a global civil society, with lines of
obligation and communication crossing territorially defined boundaries.109
Insofar as Dobson embraces a multiplicity of citizenships that one can become
involved in to show that ecological citizenship is not dependent on a territorially bounded
polity, the issue is whether these multiple citizenships dissolves when a given harm has
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been rectified. However, as Harlan Wilson states in his review of Citizenship and the
Environment:
Constructing the meanings of citizenship in terms of unequal power also has the
effect of divorcing citizenship from the public political experiences of members in
actual communities. Dobson‘s citizens do not seem to be members of any political
association; or, rather, their membership is incidental to their citizenship. Hence,
an account of public collective responsibility is lacking; obligations apparently
accrue to individuals only.110
Considering Dobson‘s claim that responsibility is a motivational force that helps to
generate and perpetuate a global civil society beyond the state, it appears that he speaks
only of individual responsibility. Wilson‘s comment, however, does not exhaust the
matter. While the conceptual description of ecological citizenship appears to refer only to
individual responsibility, when Dobson attempts to explain how this citizenship operates
he is unable to do so in terms of individuals. Instead, Dobson relies upon aggregated units
when describing specific obligations. Take for example his description of global climate
change:
―If global warming is principally caused by wealthy countries, and if global
warming is at least a part cause of strange weather, then monies should be
transferred as a matter of compensatory justice rather than as aid or charity./ What
prompts the idea of obligation in this instance is the recognition that our actions
affects the life chances of distant strangers.‖111
The reliance on aggregated units, in this case ‗countries,‘ is, in part, a result of the sheer
quantity of relationships and the magnitude of permutations that must be traced to
account for individual harm within these relationships.
What Dobson fails to see is that membership is mundane, surrounded by the arena
of electoral politics with its campaigns, parties, administrative decisions, and legal
proceedings. The reason citizenship appears coextensive with the community in which
110
111

Wilson, 2006: 280.
Dobson, 2004: 6, emphasis added.

245

citizens are embedded is as a result of institutionalized conventions that, to some extent,
predate and extend beyond consent but within which this mundane political activity is
undertaken as if consent had occurred. Focusing on relationships of harm, or affect,
highlights a more episodic form of politics that exists both within and without this more
mundane landscape. That is to say, an episodic politics of harm that dies out as
motivation is lost or victories are won is nested within and often channeled through more
durable political institutions. Seeking to deduce politics from obligation, even
sophisticated deontologies such as that offered by Dobson must assign responsibilities
that occur in both registers. Attempting to proceed on the basis of this nigh impossible
distinction leads to postponing all questions in order to get the obligations right. However,
by seeking the implementation of the precautionary principle as a legal foundation for
environmental decision-making at the national and international level, it is possible to
proceed cautiously, recognizing the necessity of making judgments in the face of
uncertainty without needing to first unravel threads of responsibility.
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